Patterns of culture and models of democracy

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Patterns of Culture and Models of Democracy:
Towards the Cultural Compatibility Thesis of Democracy

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Patterns of Culture and Models of Democracy:
Towards the Cultural Compatibility Thesis of Democracy

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in het openbaar te verdedigen ten overstaan van een door het college
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geboren op 12 juli 1978
te Teheran, Iran

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To all those who struggle for freedom and democracy in Iran

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Democracy is not just the subject of my Ph.D. research but is a dream that I have for the future of my country, Iran, and for the whole unfortunate region in which I grew up. This dream motivated me to step into a new line of inquiry very different from my earlier academic background in engineering. In this adventurous journey, I had to establish a bridge between my designing-engineering mentality and social-political science. Moreover, the interdisciplinary subject of my research required building another bridge between cross-cultural studies and comparative politics. Using the non-concrete materials of culture and politics seemed an ambitious and hardly fruitful endeavor for this double bridge building project. However, as much as the research has been challenging, it has also been satisfying and rewarding to propose a framework for designing a culturally compatible model of democracy. I have been very lucky to conduct research on the subject I am most passionate about, and even luckier to have been working with the inspiring people during this journey without whom this study would not have been a success.

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Above all, God must be praised for his generous gifts and blessings.

Ammar Maleki,
Delft, May 2015.

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Chapter 1
Introduction

1.1 Preface

On the afternoon of the day that Gaddafi's regime in Libya was subverted, I defended my proposal for PhD research in comparative politics. In that session, I had to argue why the study of the interrelation between societal culture and models of democracy matters. I was there with the strong conviction that democracy is demanded in different cultures, even by those nations that have lived under a long-lasting dictatorship. The Arab Uprisings, and before that the Iranian Green movement, shocked many political analysts and observers who strongly believed that people in the Middle East love their dictators and are happy with the authoritarian regimes in their countries. The domino of uprisings fractured this solid belief and showed that there is a demand for democracy and dignity everywhere.

But bringing down old dictators is sometimes easier than building up a new democracy. The new constitution should be designed (or the old one should be adapted) to arrange a set of democratic institutions. Institutional choices about regime type, power structure and electoral system must be made. These choices will form a county's model of democracy and may have consequences for the transition and consolidation of a democratic system. The issue of what institutional arrangement or model of democracy should be implemented in a new and transitional democracy is a crucial question that can codetermine the destiny of the country. This issue is sometimes taken for granted and political institutions are recklessly transplanted with no attention to the importance of compatibility of democratic model and contextual factors.

In the defense session of my proposal, I hypothesized that societal culture, as an important contextual element, does matter in adoption of a model of democracy and that the compatibility of these two codetermines the legitimacy and performance of a democratic system. Therefore, constitutional engineers and institutional designers in new democracies should take into account the cultural orientations of the society, alongside other factors, and accordingly decide on *opting, adopting and adapting* political institutions.

The committee liked and accepted the proposal[1] and I have tried to do my best to study this hypothesis and examine the relation between societal culture and democratic models and the importance of this

1. I would like to pay tribute to the late Professor Willem Witteveen, one of the members of the interview committee, who was tragically killed along with his wife and daughter in the flight MH17 disaster over Ukraine.

interrelation in the functionality of democracy. This book is the outcome of three years of research on the relation between *patterns of culture* and *models of democracy*. But what do we mean with these two concepts? And what have the literature and other students of culture and democracy said so far? What is the untold story that this book aims to tell?

1.2 Approaches to the Relation between Culture and Democracy

There are different approaches to treating culture within political science. The first approach belongs to those, mainly anthropologists, who believe in 'cultural relativity' and argue that each culture is unique and cultural values and social practices cannot be compared and classified. They advocate a 'thick description' of culture (Geertz, 1973). Radical relativists believe that all societal values, attitudes and practices, even if they are against the basic human rights indicated in the Universal Declaration, should be respected and any remarks or action to criticize or change cultural dispositions would be an imperialistic and neo-colonialistic treatment imposed by Western power and hegemony (see Donnelly, 1984). Advocates of this approach are hesitant to accept any cultural explanation for variation in social, political or developmental success or failure.

There are two other schools of thought that, for quite different reasons, disregard the importance of culture as an explanatory factor. Rational choice theorists believe that rational interests prevail over cultural orientations of individuals; in other words, rationality overcomes nationality. They assume individual preferences as given, which are not affected by cultural values. On the other hand, Marxists understand culture as a 'superstructure' that is utilized by the ruling class to legitimate oppression and justify inequality. These two perspectives see culture as epiphenomenon and share the same idea about the insignificant role of culture in political science.

The opposite approach is proposed by those social and political scientists who believe that (mainly or even only) culture matters and counts in human development and political democracy. This school of thought has root in classic works by Alexis de Tocqueville (2002 [1838]) and Max Weber (2001 [1930]). This approach argues that cultural values and attitudes would be facilitators of, or obstacles to, progress. They mostly utilize comparative methods, mainly qualitative but sometimes quantitative, to examine how cultural factors codetermine

economic performance and political democracy. The radical 'culturalist' perspective often judges cultural values as good versus bad cultures and concludes that a cultural change, from a bad one to the good one, is crucial for successful economic and political development. It is inferable that these scholars believe in the superiority of a set of cultural values. Individualism, for instance, is seen as congenial to progress and democracy (Almond & Verba, 1963; Thompson et al., 1990; p. 256) while collectivism (familism/communitarianism) could be detrimental (Banfield, 1958; Harrison, 1985). The cultural orientation of hierarchy or power distance is mostly interpreted as a despotic orientation in this view (Pye, 1985).

The prominent scholars who sympathize with this perspective have gathered a collection of their ideas in the book *Culture Matters*. This book is the proceedings of the symposium *Cultural Values and Human Progress*, held by Harvard University in the summer of 1998. The book was edited by two famous 'culturalist' advocates, Lawrence Harrison and Samuel Huntington (2000). Among others, Francis Fukuyama, Ronald Inglehart, Lucian Pye, and Seymour Martin Lipset contributed to this edition.

These two opposite views lie on a spectrum between two extreme poles that are labeled as 'cultural relativism' versus 'cultural universalism' (the latter is also called 'cultural imperialism' by its critics).

There is another group of cultural theorists who believe that 'culture matters' (Ellis & Thompson, 1997), but stand between relativists and universalists. They assert that cultural universalists, who believe in superiority and workability of one universal culture, and cultural relativists, who believe in the viability of infinity of cultures, are both wrong. The advocates of 'Cultural Theory', who are inspired by the theory of Mary Douglas, claim that "we can make the world in more than one way but we cannot make it any way we like. More than one is not automatically infinity; there are some numbers in between" (Thompson et al. 2006, p. 325). This approach is called 'constrained relativism' and asserts that there are not more than five viable types of culture, or forms of social solidarity, which can explain the diversity of political preferences.

The point of departure of this book is that each discussed approach is characterized partly by truth and partly by prejudice. This study, first of all, posits that culture is an important factor that cannot be ignored. This book supports the idea of constrained relativism, but not in the orthodox

interpretation that insists on the viability of limited number of 'cultural types'. It will be presented that there are several cultural orientations/dimensions that map the diversity of cultures across countries. They are called dimensions or orientations of national culture. National culture represents the dominant, average inclination of people in a society towards a specific cultural orientation. Needless to say that national culture does not mean that all people in a national unit have the same position across a bipolar cultural dimension. National culture shows the average peak in a bell-shaped normal distribution of people's values.

From the outset, it should be emphasized that these cultural dimensions should not be misinterpreted so as to justify the violation of human rights indicated in the Universal Declaration. This study assumes that these bipolar dimensions do not stretch between black (bad) and white (good) values but between red and blue ones. The different cultural orientations predispose societies towards different preferences. As far as political democracy is concerned, we can find workable democratic countries having cultural values of either pole. However, it seems that models of democracy of countries with different cultures would be different; this is where we think cultural differences do matter. This study accepts universalism insofar as we talk about the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 'democracy as a universal value' (Sen, 1999), however, it rejects universalism and superiority of a pattern of culture or a model of democracy.

1.3 What Manifestation of Culture?

In different studies of the relation between culture and politics, different elements are considered as manifestations of culture: religion (Fish, 2002; Huntington, 1996; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Weber, 2001 [1930]), ethnicity (Jung, 2006; Lane & Ersson, 2005; Lane & Wagschal, 2012), trust (Fukuyama, 1995; Putnam, 1993) and common values or attitudes (Almond & Verba, 1963; Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart & Baker, 2000; Thompson et al., 2006; Wildavsky, 1987).

The importance of religion originates from the seminal work by Max Weber (2001 [1930]) on the relation between Protestantism, capitalism and democracy. Later on, other political scientists elaborate on the role of religion. Huntington (1996), for instance, asserted that democracy is less feasible in Islamic countries. The emergence of democracy in countries with different religions over past decades weakened the credibility of using religious legacies as an explanatory factor for political democracy.

Norris and Inglehart (2002, p. 235) based on an empirical study posit that "Huntington is mistaken in assuming that the core clash between the West and Islamic worlds concerns democracy. The evidence suggests striking similarities in the political values held in these societies." On the other hand, a recent survey-based research of 121 in-country religious groups from 56 nations by Minkov and Hofstede (2014b, p. 1) shows that "with respect to values, a shared national history is a potent cultural factor, whereas a globally shared religion is not". In other words, "the national influence is much stronger than the influence of global religions".

The most important facet of culture, which absorbs more attention in the contemporary study of culture and democracy, is values and attitudes. Among political scientists, culture is mainly defined as being composed of values, attitudes, norms, beliefs, orientations, assumptions and mental products prevalent among people in a society (Huntington, 2000, p. xv; Thompson et al., 2006, p. 319). In the literature, 'values' and 'attitudes' are mostly used interchangeably. This is problematic, since while the former is more durable, the latter is more variable. In this study, we distinguish between cultural values and situational attitudes and will focus on the role of cultural values.

1.4 Political Culture or Societal Culture?

The concept of cultural values in the literature of political science is predominantly described by the notion of 'political culture'. This concept was developed in the seminal book, *The Civic Culture,* by Almond and Verba (1963). They have introduced three types of political culture, namely *parochial*, *subject* and *participant*, according to the level and kind of political participation. Thereafter, many 'culturalists' and 'essentialists' considered political culture as the main factor in explaining the existence and persistence of democracy or autocracy in different countries (a.o. Harrison & Huntington, 2000).

The notion of political culture, in my view, is problematic due to the ambiguities involved in the definition and operationalization of its 'culture' component. The 'political' component indicates that this concept is about the political process and system. Almond and Verba (1963, p.12) defines political culture as "attitudes toward the political system and its various parts, and attitudes toward the role of the self in the system". The *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* describes political culture as "the set of attitudes, beliefs and sentiments

that give order and meaning to a political process and which provide the underlying assumptions and rules that govern behavior in the political system". In both of these definitions, as well as in empirical operationalization of political culture, it is mainly *attitudes* towards politics that are considered and measured.

As mentioned above, the distinction between values and attitudes in defining and operationalizing culture is crucial. The notion of 'value' connotes something durable, while 'attitude' implies a sense of fluctuation. Culture is also acknowledged as a more durable and slow-changing phenomenon. Thus, culture seems to better match values than attitudes. Attitudes are more situational rather than cultural. Given this, the concept of political culture is confusing: is it more about stable values, as the notion of culture implies, or is it more about situational attitudes, as the notion of politics suggests?

This ambivalence can be a source of controversy around the concept of political culture in the literature (see the chapter titled "*Political Culture Revisited*" in Brynen et al., 2013). When a phenomenon is called 'cultural', it implies that this is non-changing or difficult to change. If it is said that political culture is undemocratic, the impression is that no democracy will emerge. But when we talk about political attitudes, the inference will be different; less supportive attitudes towards democracy can be changed and shifted toward democratic attitudes, even over a short time, as attitudes change fast. Allow me to illustrate this with an example.

The World Values Survey asked Egyptians several questions about democracy in 2008 and 2012, both in March (WVS, 2014). The earlier survey was conducted in the era of Hosni Mubarak and the second one was done before the presidential election in which Mohamed Morsi, the candidate of the Islamic party known as the Muslim Brotherhood, won. The answers to three questions can show the challenge of interchangeability of political attitudes and political culture. In a question about the 'importance of democracy'[2], in both rounds of surveys 87% of Egyptian respondents indicated that it is very important for them to live in a country that is governed democratically. In other questions, participants were asked about the 'essential characteristics of democracy'. In 2008 and 2012 respectively, 92% and 85% indicated that "choosing leaders in free elections" is an essential characteristic of democracy. The responses

2- The exact question is 'how important is it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically?' All questions were answered on a 1 to 10 scale from 'not at all important' to 'absolutely important'. I aggregate the percentage of respondents who selected the answers 8 to 10.

to these two questions and stability of responses imply the existence of democratic values among Egyptian people. Another question asks whether it is essential that "religious authorities interpret the laws" in a democracy. This question is assumed to measure the popularity of separation of mosque and state. In answer to this question, 65% in 2008 and 43% in 2012 support the involvement of religious authorities in interpretation of laws as an essential condition of democracy. This remarkable variation shows the effect of situational conditions on the political attitudes of people. This example can reveal the vulnerability of the concept of political culture when one uses political attitudes to operationalize this concept.

I argue that if we distinguish between political attitudes and political culture, then the latter would be the facet or consequence of societal culture in the political behavior of people. Some features of political culture that are addressed in the literature, like 'deference' or 'consensus' (Almond & Verba, 1963) for instance, are features of societal culture indeed, manifested in the political realm as an aspect of social life. Dimensions of societal culture are important due to their influence on different aspects of social interactions. Political behavior and preferences can be interpreted and analyzed as one aspect of societal life. Therefore, one can interpret the 'deference' in political culture as a facet of societal culture of 'power distance'. The 'consensus' political culture can be seen as a consequence of another societal culture, namely collaborativeness (see Chapter 2). Therefore, political culture can be seen as a manifestation or footprint of societal culture in the political domain.

1.5 Democratization and Political Institutions

This study is mainly concerned with the issue of democratization, designing or adapting political institutions in the process of democratic establishment and democratic survival (Schedler, 1998). Although Democracy is a contested concept, however, in the present study democracy is defined as a political system in which political leaders and decision makers are elected in free, fair and frequent elections. This electoral process requires civil and political freedom including inclusive citizenship and freedom of expression, assembly and information (Dahl, 2000; Diamond, 1999; Hendriks, 2010). These are sometimes known as the minimal criteria of democracy that may shape "electoral democracy" and not advanced and liberal democracy. In this book, we are working with this minimalist conception of electoral democracy (Diamond, 1999;

Przeworski, 1999) as we aim to involve and study more new democracies.

The point of departure of this research is not the question of whether or not democracy is compatible with different cultures, but rather the question of what institutional arrangement is more compatible with the context of a new democracy. Some political theorists are convinced that people in some cultures are happy with their dictators and thus do not demand democracy; that is why there is no supply of democracy in those countries. Muslim countries and the Arab World were cited as the supporting example for this assertion. The empirical research of public attitudes on demand for democracy (Jamal & Tessler, 2008; Maleki, 2011) and public uprisings in Arab countries in 2011 discredit these theories. The debate should no longer be on the acceptability of democracy for different cultures but instead the question should be what model of democracy could work better in a specific context.

Democratization begins with establishing democratic institutions. At the very first stage, two major political institutions should be determined: first, the type of political structure or regime type, namely presidential or parliamentary (or a combination of these two); and second, the electoral system, namely majoritarian/plurality or proportional system (or a mixed one). The combination of these two major institutions and their sub-institutions (e.g. term length, electoral threshold, district magnitude) will form a variety of institutional settings and models of democracy. In the literature of comparative politics, based on the seminal work by Arend Lijphart (1999, 2012) on *Patterns of Democracy*, a dichotomy of majoritarian versus consensual models of democracy are widely known and utilized. These two models, or institutional arrangements, have been operationalized only for thirty-six established democracies, most of which are Western.

In democratization literature, there is a long-lasting debate on the superiority of a majoritarian versus a consensual model. Similar debate has been ongoing about the outperformance of various regime types (i.e. presidential vs. parliamentary) and different electoral systems. However, the lack of operationalization of democratic models for many new and developing democracies limits the possibility of conducting a comprehensive comparative study on the impact of institutional settings or the role of cultural factors in democratization. In this book, I try to fill this gap by operationalizing democratic models for 80 electoral democracies including many new and developing ones.

1.6 Which Matters Most? Culture or Political Institutions?

The relation between culture and democratic institutions is complicated. Some scholars rightly define culture as 'informal institution' (Williamson, 2009). It is argued that there is a continuous interaction between formal and informal institutions. However, regarding the success or failure of democracy and performance of governance, some scholars refer to the importance of cultural factors, whereas others emphasize institutional arrangement.

There is a debate between those who believe that culture matters most (Etounga-Manguelle, 2000) and those who posit that institutions matter most (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; Rothstein, 1998). Regarding the successful transition to and consolidation of democracy, this study asserts that while both culture and constitutional/institutional choices matter, the interaction or compatibility of these two *does matter most*. If only culture matters, then in practice we should have seen successful democracies only in countries with a set of similar cultural orientations, or if only institutions matter, then we should have had successful democracies with the same institutional arrangement. The diversity of both societal culture and democratic institutions in workable democracies implies that neither of the two is solely determinant.

According to well-known international institutes for monitoring democracy (BTI, 2014a; EIU, 2010; Freedom House, 2012; Polity IV, 2014), Australia, Botswana, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, Turkey, the USA and Uruguay among many others, have been electoral democracies over the past decade. The cultural diversity of these countries is more than obvious. Interestingly, among them there are countries with collectivist cultures, namely Brazil, Costa Rica, Ghana, Greece, India, Indonesia, Poland, Slovenia, South Korea, Taiwan, Turkey and Uruguay. Many of these countries have a highly hierarchy-oriented culture, like Brazil, Chile, France, Ghana, Greece, India, Indonesia, Japan, Taiwan, Turkey and Uruguay. They are diverse in other cultural dimensions as well. Moreover, among them there are many religious countries with different religions including Roman Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox, Muslim and Eastern religions, and they are also on different continents.

On the other hand, these countries have different democratic institutions. Some are presidential, some are parliamentary, and some are mixed. They also have different electoral systems. As it will be presented, there is no conclusive evidence to show that among these countries one institutional arrangement or model of democracy is, across the board, superior to other models. All in all, it seems that the superiority of a set of cultural values or specific institutional arrangement in establishing and consolidating political democracy is questionable. This comparative study tries to contribute to our understanding of the role of culture, institutions and their interactions in democratization.

1.7 Research Questions and Structure of the Book

Given the brief review above, this book aims to contribute to the discussion on the relation between culture and democracy from a different perspective, emphasizing the interaction or compatibility of the two. In each of the following chapters, one main issue/question about this interrelation will be addressed. These chapters have been written and organized as independent but connected articles.[3] Each chapter can be read as a full independent piece, but chapters are also logically linked to each other and make an interconnected mosaic of culture and democracy. The following is a presentation of a central question and main issues discussed in each chapter:

- *What dimensions of societal culture can explain the diversity of cultural values among nations/countries?*

  Chapter 2 aims to present different cross-cultural theories and identify empirical dimensions of culture that are extracted from large cross-national value surveys. These are known as national dimensions of societal culture that affect different aspects of social life. After a review of both conceptual and empirical theories, the chapter suggests a clustering of many dimensions of culture based on a systematic theoretical and statistical analysis. The proposed clusters will be of use

3- The chapters 2, 3, 4, 5 and 7 are based on co-authored articles which have been already published in ISI-ranked, peer-reviewed journals. As requested by the PhD regulation of Tilburg University (Article 17), it should be emphasized here that the role of the PhD candidate has been dominant in all of these co-authorship. This is demonstrable from the candidate's first authorship in all articles. Moreover, co-authors acknowledge the candidate's demonstrable and dominant co-authorship.

for identifying the proper empirical measures of societal culture at the national level.

- *What are challenges of Cultural Theory, as one of the most dominant theories in political science, for cross-national research?*

  Chapter 3 demonstrates the challenges with Douglasian Cultural Theory and its operationalization for cross-national research. This theory is vastly applied to the political-administrative world and particularly in some studies on the relation of societal culture and models of democracy. Although this theory is mostly used in theoretical and qualitative research, in recent years some students of comparative politics have put effort into operationalizing two dimensions of Cultural Theory, Grid and Group, using cross-national surveys. There are some grave challenges surrounding the operationalization of these two dimensions. Moreover, Grid and Group cannot cover some cultural variances between societies, particularly when it attempts to explain the diversity of democratic models. Chapter 3 discusses the abovementioned challenges and introduces a third dimension, 'Grade', to Cultural Theory.

- *What models of democracy can be recognized among electoral democracies across the world? How can two persistent dimensions of democracy, contestation and participation, be operationalized for a large number of electoral democracies?*

  Chapter 4 aims to operationalize models of democracy for a large number of countries. It is a crucial step for this research as in the literature we lack operationalization of democratic models for new and developing democracies. The influential work on *Patterns of Democracy* by Lijphart includes mostly established and Western democracies. Any comprehensive research on the relation between societal culture and democratic models need to have measurements of both concepts for a wide range of countries from all over the world. Chapter 4 presents a systematic operationalization of two known, persistent dimensions of democracy, contestation and participation, for 80 electoral democracies between 1990 and 2009. We also empirically assess the relation between model, level and performance of democracy and demonstrate that the superiority of a model of democracy, e.g. majoritarian or consensual, is debatable and inconclusive.

- *What is the relation between societal culture and models of democracy?*

  Chapter 5 addresses the main descriptive assertion of this research that culture matters in opting and adopting different models of democracy in different countries. Having identified and operationalized dimensions of societal culture and democracy, we argue and present that cultural orientations of society codetermine the inclination of a country to adopt a specific model of democracy or institutional setting. We utilize the multiple regression analysis to empirically assess the hypotheses regarding the relation between dimensions of culture and democracy. The findings corroborate the assertion that societal culture matters in explaining the diversity of models of democracy.

- *What is the importance of compatibility between societal culture and the contestation dimension of democracy? How can this compatibility affect the democratic outcome?*

  Chapter 6 evaluates the importance of the interaction between dimensions of societal culture and democracy for 'satisfaction with democracy' as an outcome indicator. We hypothesize that the interaction between mastery orientation, as a dimension of societal culture, and integrative (vs. aggregative) dimension of democracy, as the measure of contestation, will affect the level of satisfaction with democracy in new and developing democracies. This assertion is examined empirically in a cross-national study. The findings corroborate the importance of compatibility between societal culture and democratic model.

- *What is the importance of compatibility between societal culture and methods of public participation? How does this compatibility matter for a successful participatory practice?*

  Chapter 7 discusses the importance of involving dimensions of societal culture in designing and implementing a successful participatory practice in the process of policy making. In this chapter, a framework is developed to operationalize the effect of national culture on participatory policy analysis. This framework is utilized in secondary case studies in four countries with different cultures. The findings suggest that the compatibility and adaptation of participatory tools and methods to different cultural contexts would matter for a successful practice of public participation.

- *What is the effect of societal culture on political institutional choices?*

  Chapter 8 elaborates the effect of societal culture on the adoption of different political institutions in different countries. In Chapter 5 the relation between dimensions of culture and democratic models is studied and in this chapter, the relation between cultural values and democratic institutions, which are components of democratic models, will be analyzed. That is, the effect of societal culture on the adoption of different political institutions – namely regime type, electoral system, electoral threshold, compulsory voting and referendum provision – will be examined. Using cross-national data, we demonstrate that there are significant associations between dimensions of national culture and the adopted political institutions in different countries. This leads us to developing a thesis, in the next chapter, about the importance of cultural compatibility for institutional design.

- *What theory can be developed to explain the importance of cultural compatibility in designing democratic institutions?*

  Chapter 9 is the concluding chapter in which a new thesis about the interaction between culture and democracy, based on the empirical findings of other chapters, is introduced. The Cultural Compatibility Thesis (CCT) is developed and examined for a large number of countries. The thesis proposes that cultural orientations of society codetermine opting, adopting and adapting political institutions. The 'culturally compatible score' for each political institution is calculated by aggregating national scores of relevant cultural orientations. Culturally compatible scores reveal what institutional choices would be more compatible to the societal culture of the country. The thesis suggests that the gap between the culturally compatible institution and the existing institution could result in some challenges for the credibility or functionality of the political system. The chapter closes with discussing the limitations of the study and suggesting some further research to validate and improve the findings of this study.

The chapters of the book can be organized under three major parts, which are connected as consecutive stages in studying the association between culture and democracy. The first stage is about *operationalization* and consists of chapters two to four. The second stage focuses on studying *relation and interaction*, which comprises chapters

five through seven. The third stage is around *implication* and consists of the two final chapters. Figure 1.1 demonstrates these stages and the chapters involved.



Figure 1.1. The schematic parts and chapters of the book

Chapter 2

Identifying and Clustering the Dimensions of National Culture*

* This chapter is based on Maleki, A., & De Jong, M. (2014). A Proposal for Clustering the Dimensions of National Culture. *Cross-Cultural Research, 48* (2), 107-143.

2.1 Introduction

Although there are many definitions, there is common emphasis that "culture" consists of shared elements (attitudes, beliefs, values, self-definition) of a community (Triandis, 1996). Hofstede defines culture as "the collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from another" (2001, p. 9). Human mental programs cannot be observed directly, but only established through words, attitudes to real and hypothetical dilemmas or actual deeds. Although some social theorists like Parsons and Shills (1951) and Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961) had used the concept of cultural orientations/dimensions, their application of the concept was still mainly qualitative. "Dimensionalization" of culture in a quantitative sense by applying it at the ecological level of nations has become a popular approach, for establishing core values underlying mental programs and understanding cross-cultural differences, since Hofstede's statistics-based cross-national comparative study. Measuring values by asking people's opinions through questionnaires and classifying them by statistical methods is the first step to translating "dimensions" of national cultures into numbers allowing for large-scale cross-national comparison. Cultural dimensions allow us to distinguish aspects of a national culture that can be measured relative to other national cultures (Hofstede, 2006). More qualitatively oriented anthropologists have often vehemently criticized this line of thought as overly simplistic, methodologically flawed, lacking in nuance and complexity, and failing to demonstrate how underlying social mechanisms operate (Heine et al., 2002). Nonetheless, during the past three decades, the academic literature where sets of dimensions are applied to cultural differences has seen an impressive evolution, especially when it comes to generating country scores.

During the past three decades, other authors have introduced different dimensions, sometimes similar, sometimes different, and sometimes overlapping ones. Some of these authors explicitly intended to verify, improve, or correct Hofstede's work, while others show a face resemblance in spite of the fact that they have different academic backgrounds, different points of departure or different goals. Different researchers made attempts to explain sometimes different phenomena from different perspectives and the sets of cultural dimensions coming out of their work were extracted from different data sets, which led to a rich, but somewhat disorderly variety of approaches and dimensions.

Hofstede himself (later supplemented by his son Gert-Jan and Michael Minkov) has revised and readjusted his dimensions to fit new insights.

The status quo of theoretical and methodological development in this field can now be qualified by two words: enriched and messy. The final result of the 30-year evolution has not so much been a convergence of the dimensions from various authors into one final and definitive model or set, but a collection of partly complementary, partly overlapping, and partly conflicting axes. This situation has the advantage of providing heuristic richness (culture is a multifaceted phenomenon that can not possibly be covered by a small number of linear dimensions) and the disadvantage of leading to incompatibility, inconsistency among these dimensions, and a lack of clarity. Until Minkov (2013) published his most recent monograph with an overview of all major cultural dimensions, scholars and professionals had no publication to turn to for a more or less complete overview of all relevant cultural dimensions in their research or work practice. The question that we will ask ourselves here is whether it is possible not only to generate such an overview, but in addition to group the major cultural dimensions into clusters.

Attempts have been made by Schneider and Barsoux (2003) and Nardon and Steers (2006, 2009) to bring the most likely common denominators of the cultural dimensions together in an overview. However, their sets of 16 and 5 dimensions, respectively, were not so much based on any systematic matching, statistically or heuristically, of insights generated by other scholars, but on ad hoc considerations or common sense. The methodology through which they derive this selection is opaque and it is unlikely that it covers all relevant elements contained in all other series of dimensions. Their objective to synthesize insights from different authors and present a manageable and condensed set of cultural dimensions is laudable, but we think this could be done in a more methodologically transparent fashion. We will try to do this by systematically matching the dimensions of various studies with each other, first conceptually and then statistically. Using this "matching analysis," we will present our nine *clusters of dimensions*. We present these nine as clusters of dimensions rather than as new single dimensions, because they may refer to similar and strongly related dimensions from different studies, which are however *not identical*. In this fashion, we hope to do justice to the original authors and also avoid the trap of collapsing phenomena into single dimensions that should not be completely collapsed. We have no intention to dismiss any cross-cultural theory in favor of another, but simply aim to show how the comparison

and aggregation of all dimensions from different authors can lead us to identify a consistent framework in which all dimensional features contained in the previous work reappear.

2.2 Many Dimensions of Culture

In this section, cultural models and dimensions theorized, defined, and empirically measured by leading research groups on the subject are briefly introduced and summarized. The aim of the chapter is to introduce, compare, and classify the cross-cultural studies for those researchers from different disciplines wishing to apply cultural dimensions in their comparative analysis. Although we take into account qualitative as well as quantitative dimensions in this study, we focus mainly on five distinguished cultural theories with accessible country scores based on their empirical quantitative analysis. In Table 2.1, readers can find a breakdown of some essential information on the five research groups.

We should mention that there are two other recognized cross-cultural researches, namely, works by Smith, Dugan, and Trompenaars (1996) and Bond et al. (2004), each of which introduced two empirically based cultural dimensions not covered in this study. This is due to the fact that they share fewer than 30 countries with other studies, which is problematical for the sampling adequacy of the ecological factor analysis.

Table 2.1. The summary of general information about major empirical cross-cultural theories

	Respondents class	Date of data collection	Number of respondents	Number of nations/countries	Methodology	Response bias corrected	Number of cultural dimensions
Hofstede	IBM employees	1968-1972	117,000	53 (more than 80 in updated version)	questionnaire (factor analysis)	+	4
LTO	using WVS data			93	factor analysis	—	1
Minkov	using WVS data			70-90	factor analysis	—	3
WVS: Inglehart	representatives from all classes	1981-1984	25,000	20	face to face interviews (factor analysis)	—	2
		1989-1993	61,000	42			
		1994-1998	75,000	52			
		1999-2004	96,000	67			
		2005-2008	77,000 (257,000 aggregated)	54 (95 aggregated in four waves)			
Schwartz	teachers and students	1988-2005	43,000	73	questionnaire (smallest-space analysis)	+	7
GLOBE	Middle managers	1995-1999	17,400	62	questionnaire (factor analysis)	+	9 practices (+ 9 values)

Note. LTO = long (vs. short)-term orientation; WVS = World Value Survey; GLOBE = global leadership and organizational behavior effectiveness.

2.2.1 Hofstede's Cultural Model and Minkov's Work

Using survey data from IBM employees, Hofstede empirically derived four cultural dimensions and called them Individualism versus Collectivism, Power Distance, Uncertainty Avoidance (UA), and Masculinity versus Femininity. Later on, he added a fifth dimension, Long (vs. Short)-Term Orientation (LTO), inspired by a group research called Chinese Culture Connection (1987) across 22 countries. Hofstede recently recalculated the LTO dimension using items from the World Value Survey (WVS) database and extended LTO scores to 93 countries (Hofstede et al., 2010).

Collaborating with Michael Minkov, Hofstede adopted one of the Minkov's three dimensions, Indulgence versus Restraint, as the sixth dimension in his latest book (Hofstede et al., 2010). In his book, Minkov (2007) introduced three cultural dimensions, namely, Exclusionism versus Universalism, Indulgence versus Restraint, and Monumentalism versus Flexumility. He extracted them from the WVS database. In Appendix A (Table A.1), Hofstede's cultural dimensions as well as Minkov's are briefly described.

2.2.2 Inglehart's World Value Survey

Ronald Inglehart, the former director of the WVS, factor analyzed the national-level data from the 43 societies obtained in the 1990 survey and found that two main dimensions, Traditional versus Secular-Rational and Survival versus Self-Expression, accounted for more than 70% of the cross-national variance in more than 20 variables. When the factor analysis was replicated with the data from 1995 and 2000 surveys, the same two dimensions of cross-cultural variation emerged, even though the new analysis included more additional countries compared with the earlier study. Hence, Inglehart asserted that these dimensions of cross-cultural variation are robust (Inglehart, 2006; Inglehart & Baker, 2000; see Table A.2 in Appendix A for the description of dimensions).

2.2.3 Schwartz's Cultural Value Orientations

Shalom Schwartz defines (cultural) values as "conceptions of the desirable that guide the way social actors select actions, evaluate people and events, and explain their actions and evaluations" (Schwartz, 1999, p. 24). Like Hofstede, Schwartz also acknowledges that cultural value orientations are relatively stable although cultural values do change gradually (Schwartz, 2006). While Hofstede derived his framework

empirically (i.e., he had some empirical data and based on them he developed his theory), Schwartz developed his framework theoretically, after which he empirically examined it using large-scale multicountry samples.

Contrary to the method of inferring basic value priorities from responses to specific attitude and opinion items (used by Hofstede and Inglehart), Schwartz used his own value survey (SVS), which included 56 value items to operationalize the value priorities of individuals. Respondents were asked to rate the importance of each value items "as a guiding principle in MY life" (Schwartz, 1992). Schwartz (1999) argues that individual value priorities are a mixture of shared culture and of unique personal experience. Therefore, the average priorities attributed to different values by members of a society reflect the essence of their shared culture and reveal the underlying common cultural value (Schwartz, 2006).

Unlike Hofstede and Inglehart who conceptualized their dimensions as independent and orthogonal factors, Schwartz (2006) considers interrelation of cultural value orientation based on compatibility among them in a circular structure. Such a structure reflects cultural orientations (or dimensions) which are compatible (adjacent in the circle) or incompatible (distant around the circle). Considering important issues that confront all societies, Schwartz derived seven dimensions of national culture, which in turn can constitute three bipolar cultural dimensions: Embeddedness (or Conservatism) versus Autonomy; Hierarchy versus Egalitarianism; and Mastery versus Harmony (see Table A.3 in Appendix A for the definitions of Schwartz's dimensions).

2.2.4 The GLOBE Project

The GLOBE (Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness) research program defines culture as "shared motives, values, beliefs, identities, and interpretations or meanings of significant events that result from common experiences of members of collectives and are transmitted across age generations" (House et al., 2002, p. 5). The research by GLOBE is asserted to extend Hofstede's work in a theory-driven fashion (like Schwartz). The authors first specified the general nature of the constructs they wanted to measure before writing down cultural items for each dimension and developing GLOBE scales (Javidan et al., 2006).

The methodology used in GLOBE project to measure cultural dimensions entails two major peculiarities. First, in an attempt to resolve

the logical problems inherent in aggregation of individual-level self-reports, GLOBE respondents were asked to give ratings that described not themselves but their society. Therefore, they assumed that the aggregation of respondents' ratings to higher levels would not be implicitly defining culture as the aggregate of individuals' self ratings, but as the aggregate of their perceptions of others as a social group (Javidan et al., 2006; Smith, 2005). Second, respondents completed two sets of ratings, one describing their society "as it is" to measure *practices* and second, "as it should be" to measure *values* of a society (House et al., 2004). GLOBE has introduced nine cultural dimensions: Performance Orientation, Future Orientation, Gender Egalitarianism, Assertiveness, Institutional Collectivism, In-Group Collectivism, Power Distance, Humane Orientation, and Uncertainty Avoidance (see Table A.4 in Appendix A).

2.2.5 Dimensions from Conceptual Cultural Theories

Apart from the aforementioned empirically based cultural dimensions, there are many other dimensions of culture which should be taken into consideration in any thorough review of cultural theories. In this section, we will briefly list a number of major and well-known conceptual cultural theories by Parsons, Kluckhohn, Hall, Douglas, Triandis, and Trompenaars in each of which some cultural dimensions (even though the relevant authors do not always call them "dimensions") have been introduced and theorized. The main distinction between cross-cultural theories introduced in the previous sections and these theories is that the former enjoy a systematic and quantitative analysis of dimensions for national culture, while the latter proposed conceptual and qualitative analysis of cultural dimensions. However, as we will see, there are some significant similarities between definitions and concepts of many dimensions from different theories. Table 2.2 gives the list of distinguished theorists and their cultural dimensions as well as a short description of each dimension.

Table 2.2. Cultural dimensions from six major cultural theories

Cultural theorist	Short description
Parsons: 5 Pattern variables	1. *Affectivity* (need gratification) vs. *Affective Neutrality* (restraint of impulses) 2. *Self-orientation* vs. *Collectivity-Orientation* 3. *Universalism* (applying general standards) vs. *Particularism* (taking particular relationships into account) 4. *Ascription* (judging others by who they are) vs. *Achievement* (judging them by what they do) 5. *Specificity* (limiting relations to others to specific spheres) vs. *Diffuseness* (no prior limitations to nature of relations)
Kluckhohn: 5 Values orientations	1. *Human nature orientation*: What is the character of innate human nature? (evil-mixed-good) 2. *Man-nature orientation*: What is the relation of man to nature (and supernature)? (subjugation-harmony-mastery) 3. *Time orientation*: What is the temporal focus of human life? (past-present-future) 4. *Activity orientation*: What is the modality of human activity? (being-becoming-doing) 5. *Relational orientation*: What is the modality of man's relationship to other people? (lineality (hierarchical)-collaterality-individualism)
Hall: 3 Cultural dimensions	1. *Context (Low* vs. *High)*: Extent to which the context of a message is as important as message itself 2. *Space (Small* vs. *Large Distance)*: Extent to which people are comfortable sharing physical space with others 3. *Time (Monochronic* vs. *Polychronic)*: Extent to which people approach one task vs. multiple tasks at a time
Douglas: 2 Dimensions of cultural theory	1. *Group*: Degree of incorporation into a bounded social unit 2. *Grid*: Degree to which interactions are constrained by position-specific rules
Triandis: 10 Cultural syndromes	1. *Complexity*: Cultural uniformity and conformity is higher in simple cultures and lower in complex cultures 2. *Tightness* vs. *Looseness*: Tight or loose rules, norms and ideas about what is correct behavior in different situations 3. *Individualism* vs. *Collectivism*: Self as dependent on or interdependent with some in-group 4. *Vertical* vs. *Horizontal*: Accepting hierarchy vs. equality as a given 5. *Active* vs. *Passive*: Changing the environment vs. changing themselves to fit into environment 6. *Universalism* vs. *Particularism*: Treat others on the basis of universal criteria vs. relationships 7. *Diffuse* vs. *Specific*: Judging an individual in a holistic manner vs. discerning different roles 8. *Ascription* vs. *Achievement*: Judge others on the basis of ascribed attributes vs. achieved attributes 9. *Instrumental* vs. *Expressive*: Priority and importance of instrumental relationships vs. social relationships 10. *Emotional Expression* vs. *Suppression*: Express emotions freely vs. control the expression of emotion

Trompenaars: 7 Cultural dimensions	1. *Universalism* vs. *Particularism*: What is more important; rules or relationships? 2. *Individualism* vs. *Collectivism*: Do people derive their identity from within themselves or from their group? 3. *Specific* vs. *Diffuse*: Are an individual's various roles compartmentalized or integrated? 4. *Neutral* vs. *Affective*: Are people free to express their emotions or are they restrained? 5. *Achievement* vs. *Ascription*: How are people accorded respect and social status? 6. *Sequential* vs. *Synchronic*: Do people do things one at a time or several things at once? 7. *Internal* vs. *External Control*: Do people control the environment or does it control them?

Source. Douglas (1973), Hall (1966, 1990), Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961); Parsons and Shils (1951); Triandis (1989, 2002), Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (1997).

2.3 A Proposal for Clusters of Cultural Dimensions

To generate a validated set of exclusive clusters of dimensions, we have to analyze the interrelations among these many dimensions. In this section, through discussing and explaining conceptual interrelations, we propose nine clusters of cultural dimensions and label them.

2.3.1 Cluster One: Individualism versus Collectivism

The first distinguishable cluster of cultural dimensions is comprised of those dimensions that represent the most famous cultural construct of *individualism versus collectivism* (I-C), which characterizes the interrelatedness of individuals. Indeed, all cultural models have this dimension under different labels, namely, individualism versus collectivism (Hofstede and Triandis), universalism versus exclusionism (Minkov), embeddedness versus autonomy (Schwartz), in-group collectivism (GLOBE), individualism versus communitarianism (Trompenaars), self-orientation versus collectivity-orientation (Parsons), relational orientation (Kluckhohn), and group (Douglas). Moreover, the cultural dimension of self-expression versus survival by Inglehart, which entails many different cultural traits in one dimension, includes the attribute of individual autonomy, and hence is associated with I-C.

Furthermore, there are some other cultural dimensions considered as facets/features of the I-C dimension. Three cultural dimensions used by Parsons, Triandis, and Trompenaars are among such dimensions: (a) universalism versus particularism, which is about treating others on the

basis of universal criteria versus relationships. It can be conceptually considered as an attribute of I-C, since in a collectivist cultures the relationship and the loyalty to the in-group is a matter of importance, while in individualistic cultures, no such strong commitment exists and the universal rules should be ideally applied; (b) ascription versus achievement, which indicates whether others are judged by "who they are" (ascribed attributes) or by "what they do" (achieved attributes). It is argued that ascription is important in cultures where one's ties and relations are more important than one's individuality; (c) specificity versus diffuseness represents the cultural trait that determines whether individuals should be judged in a holistic manner or by discriminating the different roles they play in various social settings. In diffuse cultures, relations to others are not restricted to any specific sphere (e.g., work, family life), but taken as a whole. Hofstede (2001) and Triandis (2001, 2004) considered these three dimensions as attributes of I-C.

Moreover, Hall (1966) introduced a dimension called monochronic versus polychronic (time conception), similar in definition to what Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (1997) labeled sequential versus synchronic. It refers to the extent to which people approach one task or multiple tasks at the same time. At the first glance it may seem unclear how this dimension can be related to I-C; however, in a collectivist culture normally people prefer not to reject tasks offered by different friends or relatives since the rejection could weaken this relationship. Thus, accepting different tasks at a time is unavoidable in many occasions for a person in collectivist cultures, while this is not the case in individualistic cultures. Adair et al. (2009) used Hall's time theory and realized that polychronicity and monochronicity are, respectively, seen in collectivist and individualistic environments.

There are two other well-known cultural dimensions by Hall, *context* and *space*, which are arguably associated with I-C. "Context" indicates the importance of context versus content of a message in different cultures, whereas "space" designates what is felt to be a comfortable physical distance from others in various cultures. It is argued that preferences of high-context and small-distance communication are features of collectivist cultures. Adair et al. (2009) have shown that small-distance communication is practiced mostly in high context cultures. Moreover, Gudykunst et al. (1988) mention the parallel between low versus high context dimension and individualism versus collectivism. A very recent empirical study by a large group of researchers (Owe et al.,

2012) also confirmed a significant correlation between contextualism and I-C.

The last cultural dimension related to I-C is what Triandis called instrumental versus expressive which indicates the priority of instrumental activity (e.g., doing one's job) versus expressive activity (e.g., enjoying social relationships). Triandis (2000) asserted that "in general, individualists are more instrumental and collectivists are more expressive" (p.148), although he applied cultural dimensions to the individual and not to the ecological level.

All things considered, individualism versus collectivism is a very rich and broad dimension, absorbing much theoretical and empirical work. However, some of the dimensions mentioned are provisionally assumed facets of I-C and more empirical research is needed to confirm these propositions.

2.3.2 Cluster Two: Power Distance

The second cultural cluster is known as the famous dimension of *power distance* or hierarchy, which reflects the extent to which hierarchical relations and position-related roles are accepted. Hofstede's and GLOBE's power distance and Schwartz's hierarchy/egalitarianism belong to this cluster. Among conceptual theories of culture, the grid dimension by Douglas and the vertical dimension by Triandis represent the same cultural feature. The dimension of survival/self-expression by Inglehart consists of the cultural attribute of hierarchy as well.

Although the first and second clusters can be conceptually distinguished, in many empirical studies beginning with Hofstede (1980), their corresponding dimensions are significantly and strongly correlated. Consequently, in some cultural models, these two constructs are merged into one dimension (i.e., Inglehart's self-expression). Some scholars even consider individualism and power distance two sub-dimensions of a broader definition of individualism/collectivism (Triandis, 1998). Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961), who were one of the first theorists to introduce cultural orientations, considered these two cultural dimensions as different modes of a construct called *relational orientation*, characterized by three possible modalities: lineality (hierarchical), collaterality, and individualism. It is likely that in individualistic cultures people expect and accept more egalitarianism, since the loyalty to a social unit is weaker and hierarchy is not a desirable way of ordering relationships, while in many collectivist cultures hierarchy is seen as a

justified mechanism to create order in a group. Consequently, a meaningful relation between these two cultural orientations is expected.

2.3.3 Cluster Three: Uncertainty Avoidance

The third cluster is known as *uncertainty avoidance (UA)*, which indicates to what extent people feel uncomfortable with uncertain, unknown, or unstructured situations. Hofstede (2001) mentioned that in uncertainty avoidant cultures, many rules, prescriptions, and proscriptions exist, even though they may not always be followed.

GLOBE has also introduced a dimension with the label UA; however, it measures something conceptually different. Venaik and Brewer (2010) have convincingly argued that according to the associated question items for this dimension, the measured country scores and its correlations with other dimensions and phenomena, GLOBE's UA represents the cultural trait of "rule-orientation." As we discussed in Cluster 1, a number of scholars (Parsons & Shills, 1951; Triandis, 2002; Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, 1997) have introduced a cultural dimension of rule- versus relationship orientation (or universalism vs. particularism). This dimension, which resembles GLOBE's UA, is normally considered a facet of individualism versus collectivism.

Furthermore, Triandis (1989) presents the cultural dimension of "tightness" (vs. looseness), which represents to what extent rules and norms exist and are respected in a society. This dimension has a conceptual commonality with UA as well as rule-orientation. It has also been assumed to be a feature of other cultural constructs, that is, individualism (Triandis, 2004) and indulgence (Minkov, 2007).[1]

Among other dimensions, we can argue that those related to the issue of dealing with the future can be conceptually associated with this cluster. Avoiding any unknown and uncertain condition is the main feature of UA, and since the future is the most uncertain aspect of human living, it can be expected that attributes of future orientation are pertinent to this dimension. Thus, future orientation by GLOBE, which is about planning for future, and time orientation (future mode) by Kluckhohn can be categorized in this cluster.

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1. Regarding the dimension of "tightness" (vs. looseness), we used the country scores of a recent empirical cross-cultural study by Gelfand et al. (2011) and found that there is a moderate, significant correlation between this dimension and Hofstede's individualism ($-.47$, $p < .01$, $N = 30$), which confirmed the proposition that it is a facet of rule-orientation (and not UA).

The idea that uncertainty-avoiding societies prepare for an uncertain future by reverting to all sorts of laws and rules (Hofstede, 2001) seems in contradiction with our argument. However, we argue that being simultaneously uncertainty-avoiding and future-oriented does occur in cultures with a strong rule-orientation (e.g., Japan and Germany). In fact, generating certainty that plans and rules will be indeed respected fully compensates for avoiding an uncertain future, and this makes such societies future-oriented.

Among other dimensions of GLOBE, the question items regarding performance orientation indicate their relevance to future orientation and UA. "Being *innovative* to improve performance" and "encouraged to strive for *continuously* improved performance" have conceptual elements (emphasized in italic) relevant to low UA and high future orientation.

2.3.4 Cluster Four: Mastery versus Harmony

The fourth distinctive cluster of cultural dimensions consists of those constructs which manifest the cultural attributes of competitiveness, achievement, and self-assertion versus consensus, equity, and harmony. Mastery (vs. harmony) by Schwartz, masculinity (vs. femininity) by Hofstede and (doing) activity orientation by Kluckhohn (i.e., demand for activity which results in accomplishment) are conceptually associated with this cluster. Moreover, the relation of humans to nature is another facet of this cultural attribute. The distinction between an orientation where people try to control and change the environment and one where being in harmony with it is preferred has been recognized by Kluckhohn (man–nature orientation), Triandis (active vs. passive), and Trompenaars (internal vs. external control).

We believe that Hofstede's masculinity, based on its definition, is a so-called big-dimension combining cultural features of mastery, assertiveness, and gender egalitarianism. We will argue that the two cultural traits of assertiveness and gender egalitarianism should be embodied into two separate clusters. Masculinity is a problematical dimension in that it combines different cultural features. For instance, we can recognize cultures which have high mastery orientation, but at the same time have high gender egalitarianism and low assertiveness (or any other combination of these three features). Combining cultural features of mastery, assertiveness, and gender inequality in one dimension can thus be conceptually misleading.

2.3.5 Cluster Five: Traditionalism versus Secularism

The fifth distinguishable cluster of dimensions accounts for the cultural traits of religiosity, self-stability, feelings of pride and, consistency between emotion felt and their expression versus secular orientation and flexibility. Inglehart's traditional/secular, Minkov's monumentalism, and Hofstede's long-term orientation are three empirical dimensions relevant to this cluster. They share the common features of religiosity, traditionalism, pride, and self-stability versus secularism and self-effacement. We can argue that Schwartz's embeddedness, which has a feature of conservatism, is partly related to this cultural orientation.

Hofstede's long-term orientation (LTO) is an amalgamation of different cultural traits (Fang, 2003), including traditionalism and two other cultural orientations that makes it a so-called big dimension. From the explanation of LTO in Hofstede's recent book (2010), we learn that LTO is construed based on the three items of "thrift," "national pride," and "service to others." The latter item represents the cultural trait of "humane orientation," which is conceptually a distinct cultural feature from traditionalism. Among these three items, only "thrift," which has the lowest loading in the LTO dimension (Hofstede et al., 2010), shows conceptual relevance to the cultural feature of future/long-term orientation. However, it can be argued that "thrift" is a questionable indicator for future orientation since this trait can be partially explained by survival factors.[2] Therefore, the feature of future-orientation is not a dominant and main element of LTO making the label of this dimension a misleading one.[3]

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2. Among three items comprising LTO, "thrift" (desirable trait for children) is the only one related to the concept of future orientation. However, we hypothesized that this trait can be partially explained by the survival factors. Among other desirable traits for children (by WVS), we hypothesized that "imagination" is the one that might better represent the inclination toward the future. We checked both our hypotheses, using WVS data from the period 2005 to 2008, and found a significant positive correlation (0.37, $p < .01$, $N = 55$) between "thrift" and Inglehart's "survival" dimension, which shows the influence of survival situations on the nurture of thrift. Moreover, we found no correlation between LTO (as well as thrift) and the trait of "imagination," while there was a high, significant correlation between GLOBE's future orientation and importance of "imagination" (0.59, $p < .01$, $N = 35$). Therefore, both our hypotheses were confirmed. LTO indeed represents "traditional-stability" instead of "future orientation." Our findings also lend credibility to GLOBE's future orientation as an acceptable construct for measuring future orientation.

3. In our opinion, this incongruous bundle of cultural traits also makes for confusing LTO rankings. In the LTO ranking for 93 countries, we see that Russia and many other postcommunist countries are among the highest LTO countries, and on the other hand,

Among qualitative dimensions, the temporal focus on the past in Kluckhohn's time orientation can be related to the feature of traditionalism.

2.3.6 Cluster Six: Indulgence versus Restraint

The sixth exclusive dimension is indulgence vs. restraint which reflects the extent to which gratification of desires and feelings is free or restrained. This dimension was extracted by Minkov out of items making up Inglehart's big dimension of self-expression. Self-expression incorporates a number of distinct cultural dimensions (i.e., individualism, power distance, and indulgence) in one dimension. Among theoretical dimensions, the one which is conceptually congruent with this cultural orientation is Parsons' affectivity versus affective neutrality, which indicates the choice between gratification and evaluation, permissiveness and discipline (Parsons & Shills, 1951). Moreover, two dimensions proposed by Triandis (emotional expression) and Trompenaars (neutral vs. affective), which indicate whether people express emotions openly or control the expression of emotions, are conceptually related to the cultural feature of this cluster.[4]

2.3.7 Cluster Seven: Assertiveness versus Tenderness

The seventh cluster of cultural dimensions refers to the cultural feature of being assertive and aggressive versus kind and tender in social relationships, manifested also in communication styles. GLOBE's assertiveness and humane orientation are two dimensions embodying this attribute. These two constructs are remarkably distinct from other

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Nordic countries, namely, Denmark, Finland, and Norway have exceedingly low LTO scores, lower than Pakistan and Greece! It is also puzzling that in the first version of the LTO ranking, Pakistan had the lowest score on this dimension (Hofstede, 2001). In contradistinction, GLOBE's future-orientation scores show that Denmark and Finland rank high, whereas Russia and other postcommunist countries have a lower future-orientation, a location of countries which has higher face validity. We assert that high LTO ranks for postcommunist countries do not indicate a strong future-orientation, but instead relate to their low scores on traditionalism and national pride (Halman et al., 2008), originating from communist ideals rejecting religiosity and nationalism. Therefore, we believe that this cluster and their dimensions have no meaningful relevance to the cultural trait of future-orientation, which is conceptually embedded in Cluster 3.

4. Regarding the cultural trait of emotional expression, Matsumoto et al. (2008) conducted a cross-cultural research in 32 countries and measured "overall expressivity." Our statistical analysis showed a high and significant correlation between overall expressivity and indulgence (0.54, $p < .01$, $N = 31$).

empirical dimensions and have meaningful commonalities in their question items.

Although some scholars assume that assertiveness and mastery are two facets of the same construct (e.g., Hofstede in masculinity), these two features do not necessarily co-occur. Thus, assertiveness is a distinguishable feature of culture that can not be mixed with "mastery." Moreover, as we discussed earlier, the item of "service to others" loaded on to Hofstede's LTO, is a cultural trait pertinent to "humane orientation."

Kluckhohn's human–nature orientation, which refers to the conception of innate human nature (evil, mixed, or good) is a conceptual dimension that can be tentatively assumed to be relevant to this cluster.

2.3.8 Cluster Eight: Gender Egalitarianism

The eighth distinct cultural construct concerns gender egalitarianism. GLOBE's gender egalitarianism is the representative dimension of this cluster. The item to assess discriminatory gender roles has been embedded in Hofstede's masculinity. Although it can be argued that in individualistic and low-power distant cultures, gender equality is expected and accepted, so this dimension is conceptually distinct. This dimension of culture might be drastically changed as a result of modernization, but we can still identify some modern societies with a strong role division between genders.

2.3.9 Cluster Nine: Collaborativeness

The ninth and final discernable cultural attribute is the spirit of "team-work." The empirically based cultural dimension for collaborativeness is institutional collectivism by GLOBE, which represents the precedence of group loyalty, group interest, and group acceptance beyond individual goals. The main cultural feature this dimension would measure is the inclination of people to collaborate with each other in conducting social tasks. This feature can not be exclusively covered by any other dimension, although some theoreticians (in our view erroneously) believe that it is an aspect of collectivism. There are several individualistic cultures, to the best of our knowledge, which are very good at team-working (The Netherlands, Nordic countries) and many collectivistic environments in which the team-work is not strongly developed (Greece, Iran, Colombia). Theoretically speaking, societies enjoying higher

interpersonal trust, and consequently lower UA, should practice team-work more easily.

We could also argue that those who are concerned about the future should be more open to collaboration with others. Moreover, team-work is likely to be easier in cultures that are less aggressive and more focused on harmony, whereas this would be difficult within cultures characterized by high self-stability and low flexibility. Therefore, we expect that this cultural construct may have interrelations with dimensions from other clusters, namely, *UA*, *assertiveness*, and *traditionalism*. Nonetheless, we believe that this cultural attribute can not be meaningfully merged in any of the other clusters and it should not be deemed strange if institutional collectivism "measures mostly itself" (Minkov & Blagoev, 2011). That is why we propose that it can constitute a cluster of its own, labeled collaborativeness.

In the next section, this conceptually grounded clustering of dimensions will be examined using a systematic analysis of empirically based dimensions. We will see whether these clusters can be justified on the basis of statistical analysis among quantified dimensions.

2.4 An Empirically Based Examination of the Proposed Clusters

Having proposed nine clusters of cultural dimensions, we examined the credibility of these clusters through analyzing statistical correlations and conducting an ecological factor analysis of the existing empirical dimensions. In a great many publications, the empirically based cultural dimensions have been separately and selectively compared and their correlations discussed (Hofstede, 2001; House et al., 2004; House et al., 2002; Inglehart, 2006; Javidan et al., 2006; Littrell, 2008; Minkov, 2007; Ng et al., 2007; Schwartz, 2006; Smith, 2005). To have a comprehensive comparison of all dimensions and interpret their correlations, we gathered all country scores of national cultures from five major empirical studies, using the most updated published data sources (see Table A.5 in Appendix A), and calculated correlations among all dimensions. The numbers in Table 2.3 reveal these correlations.

While conducting our analysis and generating this table, we had the following considerations. First of all, considering the peculiarities and debates on the puzzlement of GLOBE's cultural "values," which are exhaustively discussed in the literature (Hofstede, 2006; Smith, 2006, 2011), we decided to use only GLOBE's societal "practices" in our

analysis. We are convinced that GLOBE's practices have a stronger conceptual basis and face validity for our study. Second, having discussed the problematical meaning of GLOBE's UA (discussed in Cluster 3), we exclude this dimension from our analysis.

Table 2.3. Significant correlation between empirical cultural dimensions

	H1	H2	H3	H4	H5	M1	M2	M3	I1	I2	S1	S2	S3	G1	G2	G3	G4	G5	G6	G7	G8
H1: Individualism (vs. Collectivism)	1																				
H2: Power Distance	-.64 (59)	1																			
H3: Uncertainty Avoidance			1																		
H4: Masculinity (vs. Femininity)				1																	
H5: Long- (vs. Short-) Term Orientation					1																
M1: Exclusionism (vs. Universalism)	-.72 (42)	.70 (42)	.33* (42)			1															
M2: Indulgence (vs. Restraint)					-.43 (57)	-.31* (46)	1														
M3: Monumentalism (vs. Flexumility)					-.82 (51)	.35* (45)	.35* (51)	1													
I1: Traditional (vs. Secular-Rational)	-.42 (54)	.42 (54)			-.77 (58)	.57 (46)	.30* (57)	.79 (51)	1												
I2: Self-Expression (vs. Survival)	.61 (54)	-.60 (54)				-.66 (46)	.69 (57)			1											
S1: Embeddedness (vs. Autonomy)	-.58 (43)	.63 (43)				.66 (37)			.43 (46)	-.71 (46)	1										
S2: Hierarchy (vs. Egalitarianism)	-.49 (43)	.54 (43)		.32* (43)		.47 (37)	-.35* (46)			-.65 (46)	.63 (49)	1									
S3: Mastery (vs. Harmony)			-.37* (43)						.37* (46)		.37 (49)	.61 (49)	1								
G1: Performance Orientation			-.55 (52)											1							
G2: Future Orientation	.38 (52)	-.38 (52)	-.56 (52)			-.51 (40)			-.35* (51)	.50 (51)	-.35* (40)			.60 (58)	1						
G3: Gender Egalitarianism	.32* (52)					-.42 (40)				.30* (51)		-.38* (40)	-.33* (40)			1					
G4: Assertiveness				[.26] (52)				.30* (45)									1				
G5: Institutional Collectivism			-.46 (52)		.31* (51)	-.40 (40)		-.36* (45)	-.39* (51)					.43 (58)	.46 (58)		-.37 (58)	1			
G6: In-group Collectivism	-.73 (52)	.70 (52)				.81 (40)	-.46 (49)		.51 (51)	-.80 (51)	.64 (40)	.48 (40)			-.57 (58)			-.35 (58)	1		
G7: Power Distance		.36 (52)	.48 (52)			.37* (40)				-.34* (51)					-.42 (58)			-.38 (58)	.40 (58)	1	
G8: Humane Orientation			.35* (52)		-.41 (51)								.37* (40)				-.51 (58)	.30* (58)			1
	Hofstede					Minkov			Inglehart			Schwartz					GLOBE				

Note. All correlations are significant at the level of <.01 except those with an asterisk, which are significant at the level of <.05. A correlation in [] brackets is at the level of 0.1. Figures in parentheses indicate the number of common countries.

References for countries' score: Hofstede et al. (2010) and Minkov (2008) (for Hofstede and Minkov dimensions); House et al. (2004) (for GLOBE dimensions); Inglehart (2007) (most updated available country scores); Licht et al. (2007) (for Schwartz dimensions).

Third, considering many publications concerned with the methodological challenges regarding response bias style (Fischer, 2004; Smith, 2004, 2011), we acknowledge that different cross-cultural models have diverging approaches to the issue. Cultural models by Hofstede (2001), Schwartz (2004), and GLOBE (House et al., 2004) have used various procedures of standardization (i.e., response bias correction). While Hofstede and Schwartz have only provided standardized country scores in their publications, GLOBE study has provided both unstandardized (in the body text of the book) and standardized scores (in

the appendix of House et al., 2004). On the other hand, Inglehart did not correct for the response bias and used the method of comparing extreme positions to extract his dimensions (Inglehart & Baker, 2000). Minkov and Hofstede applied Inglehart's methodology for extracting cultural dimensions of Monumentalism, Indulgence, and LTO, all based on the WVS data set (Hofstede et al., 2010; Minkov 2008). They argue that although the concern about response bias may be problematical, constructing cultural dimensions based on raw scores is justified, if nationally representative samples are used and the extracted dimensions have predictive power with respect to many external variables (Hofstede et al., 2010; Minkov, 2008). Taken together, we are convinced that dimensions with unstandardized scores should not be disregarded from our analysis. In generating Table 2.3, we used all available standardized scores of cultural dimensions by Hofstede (except LTO), Schwartz, and GLOBE, and unstandardized scores by Inglehart and Minkov. Scanning the correlations among different dimensions, we can provisionally confirm that the proposed clusters are plausible.

After generating the proposal with nine clusters through reasoning and establishing the statistical correlations among the dimensions, we will examine our clusters by conducting an ecological factor analysis of existing dimensions. We hypothesize that our proposed clusters should also emerge from the factor analysis of empirically based dimensions.

To conduct a principal component factor analysis, we had to use only those cultural models that had adequate number of common countries for a list-wise analysis of dimensions. As a test of data appropriateness, we checked the Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy with the minimum acceptable level of 0.60. The number of common countries between Minkov's exclusionism and other cultural dimensions was not adequate, and consequently, the KMO measure was too low (<0.5). Thus, we decided to remove this dimension from the factor analysis.[5]

We performed ecological factor analyses of dimensions in two ways: (a) considering all dimensions and (b) considering dimensions with the largest number of common countries. For each case, we have replicated factor analyses for different conditions to ensure that the extracted factors are reliable and consistent.

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5. The sampling adequacy of the factor analysis including Minkov's exclusionism is 0.41 and not statistically acceptable. However, we found no major difference in factors and components extracted from two analyses with and without it. As expected, exclusionism emerges under the cluster of individualism.

2.4.1 Factor Analysis of All Dimensions

We performed the principal component factor analysis of dimensions of cultural models from Hofstede (five dimensions), Inglehart (two dimensions), Schwartz (three bipolar dimensions), GLOBE (seven dimensions), and Minkov (two dimensions), for 33 countries across the world which have scores for all of these dimensions (see Table A.5 in Appendix A). Using the scree plot test as a recommended methodology appropriate for the theoretical interpretation (Fabrigar et al., 1999), seven independent factors were extracted, accounting for 87% of the variance. The KMO sampling adequacy of this analysis was 0.64 and Bartlett's Test of Sphericity was significant. After doing a varimax rotation and considering a cutoff point of 0.5, all dimensions, except GLOBE's institutional collectivism, loaded highly on only one factor, as seen in Table 2.4.

Factor 1 consisted of six dimensions from two first clusters of *individualism* and *power distance*, Factor 2 embodied the cluster of *UA*, Factor 3 contained dimensions of the cluster *traditionalism*, and Factors 4, 5, 6, and 7 matched the exclusive clusters of *assertiveness*, *mastery*, *gender egalitarianism*, and *indulgence* respectively. GLOBE's Institutional collectivism, which is a representative of cluster *collaborativeness*, loaded moderately on both Factors 2 and 4. We hypothesized that this division might constitute evidence for the independence of this cultural construct that might emerge if more cases (common countries) were available. We will examine this hypothesis in the next mode of analysis. Except for GLOBE's power distance, which unexpectedly loaded on Factor 2 instead of Factor 1, all other dimensions loaded on the factors predicted from our conceptual clusters. Taken together, we can observe that the proposed clustering has an acceptable empirical basis.

Moreover, for testing the sensitivity to standardization (response bias correction), we repeated this factor analysis using GLOBE's unstandardized scores. Similar factors and loadings (with very minor changes) were replicated, which revealed that the results were reliable and that unstandardized scores did not have significant influence on the findings. Furthermore, we repeated the factor analysis using the oblique method of factor rotation. We observed that all dimensions loaded on the same factors as emerged from a varimax rotation.

Table 2.4. Results of an ecological factor analysis of 20 cultural dimension scores for 33 common countries, varimax rotated with 7 factors

	Factor 1 (23%)	Factor 2 (17.5%)	Factor 3 (15.3%)	Factor 4 (11.2%)	Factor 5 (8.5%)	Factor 6 (6.3%)	Factor 7 (5.2%)
H2: Power distance	.866						
H1: Individualism	–.853						
S1: Embeddedness	.816						
G6: In-group collectivism	.807						
I2: Self-expression	–.790						
S2: Hierarchy	–.726						
G2: Future orientation		.837					
H3: Uncertainty avoidance		–.808					
G7: Power distance		–.776					
G1: Performance orientation		.774					
M3: Monumentalism			.938				
H5: Long-term orientation			–.881				
I1: Traditional			–.864				
G4: Assertiveness				.883			
G8: Humane orientation				–.805			
G5: Institutional collectivism		.517		–.614			
H4: Masculinity					.760		
S3: Mastery					.754		
G3: Gender egalitarianism						–.902	
M2: Indulgence							.764
Relevant cluster	Clusters 1 and 2	Cluster 3	Cluster 5	Clusters 7 and 9	Cluster 4	Cluster 8	Cluster 6

Note. Total variance explained: 87 %.

2.4.2 Factor Analysis of Largest Common Countries

This time, we only utilized the two cultural theories by Hofstede and GLOBE, which have the largest number of common countries. We examined whether the increase in the number of countries, and consequently common variances, would bring about any new exclusive factors. For the sake of methodological consistency, we performed the factor analysis without unstandardized dimensions (i.e., Hofstede's LTO). The factor analysis was conducted with 12 dimensions for 51 common

countries, covering all continents and different regions in the world (see Table A.5 in Appendix A). Using the scree plot, six factors were extracted, explaining 85.1% of total variance. The KMO sampling adequacy was remarkably high (0.73). As seen in Table 2.5, after a varimax rotation, all dimensions loaded highly on only one factor.

Table 2.5. Results of an ecological factor analysis of 12 cultural dimension scores from Hofstede and GLOBE models for 51 common countries, varimax rotated with 6 factors

	Factor 1 (21.6%)	Factor 2 (21.5%)	Factor 3 (14.8%)	Factor 4 (9.9%)	Factor 5 (9.6 %)	Factor 6 (7.7%)
H2: Power distance	.923					
H1: Individualism	–.829					
G6: In-group collectivism	.827					
H3: Uncertainty avoidance		–.816				
G2: Future orientation		.812				
G1: Performance orientation		.716				
G7: Power distance	[.340]	–.604				
G8: Humane orientation			–.882			
G4: Assertiveness			.789			
G3: Gender egalitarianism				.929		
H4: Masculinity					.938	
G5: Institutional collectivism						.785
Relevant cluster	Clusters 1 and 2	Cluster 3	Cluster 7	Cluster 8	Cluster 4	Cluster 9

Note. Total variance explained: 85.1 %.

Factor 1 embodied two first clusters of *individualism* and *power distance*, Factor 2 represented the cluster of *UA*, Factor 3 is relevant to the clusters of *assertiveness*, and Factors 4, 5, and 6 matched to the exclusive clusters of *gender egalitarianism, mastery*, and *collaborativeness*, respectively. The main feature of this analysis was the emergence of GLOBE's institutional collectivism as an independent factor. This confirmed our hypothesis that the larger number of countries might lead to manifestation of this construct as an independent factor.

Given that the two first clusters are embedded in one factor, seven out of the nine proposed clusters appeared in this factor analysis. Indeed, all dimensions relevant to two absent clusters, *traditionalism* and *indulgence,*

had been excluded in this case, since we only used those dimensions with standardized scores and the largest number of countries in common.

Adding Hofstede's LTO, which also had a large number of common countries (47) with other dimensions, we replicated the factor analysis and found seven independent factors explaining 90% of the variance. Since GLOBE's power distance was the only dimension which loaded on an unexpected factor inconsistent with the conceptual clustering, we removed it from this analysis. This time an independent factor for the LTO emerged and was added to the six former extracted factors. This replication affirmed the reliability of the extracted factors and the plausibility of having the exclusive cluster of *collaborativeness*. All in all, we can assert that the proposed clustering has a convincing empirical basis.

To sum up our observations from the above:

1. All dimensions from the first two clusters (individualism and power distance) loaded highly on only one factor that indicated their high interrelatedness. This might support the skepticism of those who believe that individualism and power distance can not be treated as different dimensions (Smith, 2002). However, as we argued earlier, the conceptual difference between these two dimensions is undeniable. At this stage, we cannot yet come to a final judgment about this unity since there is still some theoretical and empirical evidence lending support to their distinctness. For instance, GLOBE's power distance dimension is one of the most recent empirical researches that shows an exclusive dimension for power distance. Moreover, because some researchers and practitioners might need to focus on one of these two concepts, the separation of dimensions related to each of these two concepts might be more helpful and explanatory. Furthermore, we can still name some countries with virtually the same level of individualism but distinguishable level of power distance (e.g., France, The Netherlands, Germany). Instead of drawing any final conclusion, we prefer to suggest further research on this subject.
2. We found no evidence that the combination of standardized and unstandardized scores made any difference to the consistency of the empirical results of this study. Replication of the factor analysis with unstandardized scores of GLOBE's dimensions in the first analysis and performing a factor analysis of only standardized dimensions in the second analysis gave highly similar outcomes, which we believe justifies our methodology.

3. GLOBE's dimension of power distance (especially the standardized one) seems problematic, emerging under an irrelevant factor (UA). Our study reveals that unstandardized scores of GLOBE's power distance show a higher correlation with Hofstede's power distance (0.54, $p < .01$, $N = 52$), whereas this correlation is markedly lower for standardized scores (0.36). Moreover, GLOBE's power distance has shown no correlation with Schwartz's hierarchy/egalitarianism. Nevertheless, this dimension has a high correlation with Hofstede's UA. That is why it loaded higher on the UA cluster than on power distance. However, when we replicated our factor analysis using GLOBE's unstandardized power distance, in most cases this dimension did appear (or showed higher loading) on the factor relevant to power distance/individualism. Overall, we can not have a final judgment about the appropriateness of this dimension, since Hofstede's power distance, as the reference construct, is itself under debate due to its high correlation with individualism.
4. When considering statistical correlations, we found that some so-called big-dimensions (Hofstede's masculinity and LTO, Inglehart's self-expression) are composed of distinguishable cultural traits. In our conceptual clustering, we discussed the inconsistent cultural items embedded in these dimensions.

We can conclude that eight exclusive factors can be extracted from empirically based cultural dimensions. These factors and the loaded dimensions were confirmed and mapped into the proposed conceptual clusters. All in all, we can assert that our proposal for clusters of dimensions have an acceptable conceptual and empirical basis.

2.5 A New Working Model of Nine Clusters of Societal Culture

Combining the conceptual proposal with the statistical analysis, we propose a final working model of nine clusters of cultural dimensions, including all the empirical and theoretical dimensions extracted from several cultural theories. Table 2.6 illustrates under which cluster each dimension is positioned. Under each cluster in Table 2.6, we *italicized* one or occasionally two empirical dimension(s), which in our speculation could be the representative of cultural features of the corresponding cluster; Hofstede's individualism/collectivism and Schwartz's hierarchy/egalitarianism are proper representatives for the *individualism* and *power distance* clusters, respectively, since they have less

interdependence and higher face validity. Hofstede's UA and GLOBE's future-orientation are recommended for the *uncertaitty avoidance* cluster. We think the latter is a proper dimension for those who are particularly interested in the cultural feature of future-orientation. We are convinced that Schwartz's mastery orientation better represents the *mastery* feature, because it has not been mixed with the attributes of other clusters. Moreover, we recommend Minkov's monumentalism as an appropriate representative of the *traditionalism* cluster since the other dimensions of the cluster are mergers. However, Inglehart's traditional/secular is, in our speculation, the second candidate for this cluster. GLOBE's assertiveness and humane orientation seem proper dimensions for measuring the *assertiveness* cluster. Finally, each cluster of *indulgence*, *gender egalitarianism*, and *collaborativeness* has only one representative dimension to be utilized.

The above are only tentative suggestions based on the embedded features of these dimensions, their intercorrelations and our understanding based on discussions of different dimensions. The final decision about what dimensions are useful and applicable obviously depends on the analyst's objective and focus.

2.6 Conclusion

The appropriate number of cultural dimensions has always been a matter of controversy. While some scholars believe that having many dimensions (more than seven) is confusing and not useful (Hofstede, 2006), others believe that we need more cultural dimensions to better explain the variance among different cultures (Triandis, 2001). It is possible to reduce the number of dimensions to just four or five, but we believe that this reduction weakens their explanatory power. At any rate, there may be a tradeoff between the simplicity of a classification system and its explanatory power.

Table 2.6. A clustering frame of cultural dimensions

	Individualism vs. Collectivism	Power Distance	Uncertainty Avoidance	Mastery vs. Harmony	Traditionalism vs. Secularism	Indulgence vs. Restraint	Assertiveness vs. Tenderness	Gender Egalitarianism	Collaborative-ness
Empirical dimensions									
Hofstede	*Individualism vs. Collectivism*	Power Distance	*Uncertainty Avoidance*	Masculinity vs. Femininity	Long (vs. Short) Term Orientation				
Minkov	Universalism vs. Exclusionism				*Monumentalism vs. Flexumility*	*Indulgence vs. Restraint*			
Inglehart	Self-expression vs. Survival	Self-expression vs. Survival			Traditional vs. Secular-rational				
Schwartz	Embeddedness vs. Autonomy	*Hierarchy vs. Egalitarianism*		*Mastery* vs. Harmony					
GLOBE	In-group Collectivism	Power Distance	*Future Orientation* Performance Orientation				*Assertiveness* Humane Orientation	*Gender Egalitarianism*	*Institutional Collectivism*
Conceptual dimensions									
Parsons	Self-Orientation Universalism Achievement Specificity					Affectivity			
Kluckhohn	Relational	Relational	Time (Future)	Man-Nature Activity	Time (Past)		Human Nature		
Hall	Context Space Time								
Douglas	Group	Grid							
Triandis	Individualism Universalistic Achieved Specific Instrumental Tightness	Vertical		Active		Emotional Expression			
Trompenaars	Individualism Universalism Achievement Specific Sequential			Internal Control		Neutral			

Simply collapsing any set of the above distinguished nine clusters of dimensions into a smaller number of more encompassing dimensions will result in a failure to understand important cultural phenomena. The product of our synthesizing work is not a set of nine pure dimensions, but nine clusters of closely related (but not identical) dimensions generated by different authors. Nor are the importance, weight, and application of these nine clusters the same, but depend on the purpose of the cultural analysis at hand. However, jointly they generate not only a good overview of the state-of-the-art knowledge on cultural dimensions applied to cross-national comparison, but also a conceptually and statistically systematized understanding of how this multitude of dimensions hang together as shown in the clustering frame presented in Table 2.6.

The nine clusters of dimensions generated in this contribution are not the final word on this topic because in our statistical analysis, we had to combine different data sets in which the methods used were sometimes different. It is also true that some clusters (especially individualism vs. collectivism) are much more prominent than others. We do not know whether this is simply because they have more explanatory power or whether analysts have been biased toward this topic. Finally, we were able to disentangle power distance from individualism on conceptual grounds, but not on statistical grounds, so we retained both in our final set. But here too, presumably more work needs to be done.

We do believe that the given distinction in clusters of cultural dimensions has practical value and offers insight to those who wish to apply cross-cultural theories in different fields of study. At a more theoretical level, the clusters can reveal how some dimensions are actually a *combination* of different cultural features, awareness of which is crucial for the correction of the mistaken conception that a cultural dimension represents a specific cultural trait, justified by its distinct "label" (e.g., long-term orientation). The clusters can also help scholars in different fields to find the appropriate clusters or specific dimension within it for their targeted field of study. Scholars and practitioners can find inside the framework which authors have something to say on which dimension(s) or cultural phenomenon. Finally, the clusters can show how many resources are available for the evaluation of a given cultural orientation, that is, how the result for a measure of culture can be compared and cross-checked using several cross-cultural studies. Furthermore, since the quantitative approach for extracting cultural differences is often questioned by more qualitative researchers, showing

that a similar cultural construct can be extracted from two distinct cross-cultural studies lends more credibility to the quantitative approach.

To build further on the framework generated in this contribution, it is conceivable that this type of analysis be replicated using databases that include more common countries. This was a limitation in our work, but as data sets grow and become more robust, future researchers can utilize them for further testing and validation of the framework. An alternative possibility is to extract more dimensions from the WVS database to examine existing dimensions (e.g., power distance) and test the validity of clusters, especially those for which conceptual and statistical exercises lead to divergent outcomes. Finally, we could imagine the Herculean task of taking the clusters as a point of departure for a completely new framework, develop new question items for each cluster and base a new series of surveys based on them. Before such a task can be justified, the framework will first require thorough testing and validation by others and with more extensive data sets.

Chapter 3

Grid, Group, and Grade: Challenges of Cultural Theory in Cross-National Research*

* This chapter is based on Maleki, A., & Hendriks, F. (2015a). Grid, Group, and Grade: Challenges in Operationalizing Cultural Theory for Cross-National Research. *Cross-Cultural Research, 49* (3), 250-280.

3.1 Introduction

A well-known and often-used framework for the analysis of culture in the political–administrative world is Cultural Theory (CT), also known as the Grid–Group theory, developed by Mary Douglas (among others, 1970, 1978, 1992, 1996) and elaborated on by many other scholars (among others, Coyle & Ellis, 1994; Douglas & Ney, 1998; Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982; Hood, 1998; Thompson et al., 1990; Thompson et al., 1999; Verweij & Thompson, 2006). In this chapter, we will critically assess and explore attempts to operationalize and measure culture, in terms derived from Grid–Group theory, at the cross-national level.

At the core of the Douglasian approach to culture are two dimensions of sociality—Grid and Group—that harken back to the work of Durkheim, and four related cultural types (or cultual biases, or ways of life)—individualism, hierarchy, egalitarianism, atomism—that resonate with many other classifications of culture (Thompson et al., 1990). The resulting two-by-two Grid–Group typology has inspired two basic types of cultural analysis.

The first stays close to the anthropological tradition, transferred by the intellectual mother of the theory. This can take a form ranging from classic fieldwork to contemporary discourse analysis in its many versions (e.g., Gyawali, 2001; Hendriks, 1999; Hoppe & Peterse, 1993; Lodge & Wegrich, 2011; Mars, 1982). The emphasis is on the four types of culture, which are used as analytical coordinates, "idealtypes," with which to compare empirical reality. Grid and Group are part of the multilayered analytical coordinates, in addition to other elements. Individualism as an idealtype, for instance, is assumed to be congruent with particular social relations (low Group/low Grid), particular values (equality of opportunity, choice, freedom), views of man (self-seeking), and views of nature (benign) (see Hendriks, 1999; Thompson, 2008; Verweij, 2011).

The second type of analysis is less concerned with qualitative "*verstehen*" (understanding) of culture and more with quantitative measurement, usually in extensive, large-scale, survey research designs (e.g., Boyle & Coughlin, 1994; Caulkins & Peters, 2002; Dake, 1990; Grendstad, 1999; Gross & Rayner, 1985; Kahan, 2012; Lockhart, 2011). The emphasis is on the two name-giving dimensions of the theory, Grid and Group, which are the focus of operationalization and subsequent measurement. Cultural assessment, here, is derived from a set of "axes," on which units of analysis have a particular position, while in the other

approach cultural typification connects to multilayered coordinates with an "onion" type of makeup.

Various scholars tried to measure Grid and Group and test implications of the theory along these empirical dimensions, although it is known that Douglas herself was rather wary of the detailed operationalization and measurement of Grid and Group. Her cultural typology was no more and no less than "a nice little typology that goes a long way in understanding the world around us" (Douglas, 1992, p. 137). And indeed, in this vein, many "worlds around us" have been effectively assessed in rich cultural detail, mainly in single-case, binary-case, or other small-*N* types of research.

Nevertheless, we think there are three good reasons to seek refinement of the other, "axis-oriented," type of cultural analysis, starting from the Grid and Group dimensions. First, if any serious attempt to refine a theory deserves a fair chance to see how far it can come, then surely this one—elaborating on central dimensions of an influential theory—does, even though its main theoretician was not in favor of it. Second, Mary Douglas as well as other proponents of her CT have asserted that it is usable at different levels of analysis, those being either individuals, groups, or nations (Mamadouh, 1999; Swedlow, 2011). Especially in large-scale, cross-national research—the focus of this chapter—the use of measurable dimensions seems inevitable. Third, grave problems and challenges surround the operationalization and measurement of Grid and Group, which demand attention of the type that we seek to provide here.

In this chapter, therefore, we try to contribute to the discussion on the operationalization of Douglasian CT by answering the following questions: (a) What should be the starting point of operationalization: the four cultural types or the two cultural dimensions of Grid–Group Theory? (b) What are the societal cultural traits that Grid and Group represent, if dimension-based operationalization is the better alternative for large-scale cross-cultural research? (c) What are the challenges in operationalizing Grid and Group at the cross-national level? (d) How can we refine and extend the Grid and Group dimensions to properly measure and adequately explain cultural variances across countries? In the following sections, we attempt to answer these questions.

3.2 Operationalization of Cultural Theory (CT)

Regarding the operationalization of CT, the first and foremost question is what should be operationalized to begin with: the proposed

fundamental dimensions of sociality (Grid and Group) or the proposed essential "ways of life" (the four types that are also called "worldviews," "cultural biases," and "form of solidarity" in the CT literature)?

Inspired by the approach of Wildavsky and Dake (1990), most cultural theorists utilize survey items to operationalize four cultural biases. The most known and used instrument for operationalizing CT is a questionnaire designed by Karl Dake (1990, 1991) for measuring four worldviews. Some scholars indicate that Dake's measures fail to display scale reliability and internal validity in empirical tests (Kahan, 2012; Marris et al., 1998; Rippl, 2002). Rippl (2002) argues that "Dake's instruments are inadequate measures of Cultural Theory" because some "correlations were found that do not conform to the theoretical assumptions of cultural theory" (pp. 153-154).

For example, the empirical tests on three measurements that utilized Dake's questionnaire show strong positive correlations between hierarchy and individualism. This violates the theoretical assumption because these two worldviews have dissimilarity on both Grid and Group dimensions and expectedly they should have a negative correlation. Therefore, it indicates that Dake's instrument is problematic for a consistent operationalization (Rippl, 2002). Using a different questionnaire but a similar approach, Coughlin and Lockhart (1998) also operationalized four worldviews. Similarly, their measurement suffers from a problem of nonconformity of correlations between worldview measures (Rippl, 2002).

Olli (2012) has more recently published an elaborate research on the survey-based operationalization of the four cultural biases. He concludes that "Cultural Theory still works rather poorly in surveys, and I believe I have pushed the limits of what can be done with Dake and Wildavsky's approach to measuring cultural bias" (Olli, 2012, p. 504). However, he emphasizes that his "critiques of the assumptions apply only to analyses that rely on individual-level measurements of the four cultural biases, not the grid–group as two fixed dimensions. A different measurement model changes what one can potentially find" (Olli, 2012, p. 430).

It is proposed, and we support the idea, that for having a more valid and systematic measurement of CT, one should first operationalize the Grid and Group dimensions and then aggregate them to measure four cultural types (Boyle & Coughlin, 1994; Kahan, 2012; Kahan et al., 2007; Rippl, 2002). This approach of developing the cultural types on the basis of the underlying dimensions seems more consistent with the two-dimensional typology introduced in CT. For large-scale cross-national

research, it seems to be the more promising alternative. Before discussing the challenges with the existing operationalization of Grid and Group, we first briefly elaborate on the conceptions, definitions, and measures introduced for these two dimensions in the CT literature.

3.3 Definitions and Measures of Grid and Group

Grid and Group are two bipolar cultural dimensions that were introduced to "account for the distribution of values within a population" (Douglas, 2007, p. 2) and accordingly classify different ways of life or worldviews. Each dimension is supposed to represent some specific cultural traits that cannot be explained by another dimension.

Although there are various ways of expressing these general thoughts, most scholars using the theory would agree that Grid denotes the extent to which people's thoughts and actions are regulated by position-related rankings, rules, and role prescriptions, while Group denotes the extent to which an individual's life is absorbed and sustained by group membership (Coyle & Ellis, 1994; Douglas, 1992).

Grid and Group are not the only bipolar dimensions of culture in social science. There are several other cross-cultural theories that introduce or extract cultural dimensions conceptually or empirically. Comparison of the concepts and definitions of these many dimensions of culture reveal the similarity and differences of dimensions. Chapter 2 provides a summary and clustering of cultural dimensions, including Grid and Group. In the provided proposal of clustering the cultural dimensions based on the conceptual similarities and comparable definitions, Group is clustered with some other known cultural dimensions like individualism vs. collectivism (Hofstede, 2001; Triandis, 2002), universalism (Minkov, 2007; Parsons & Shils, 1951; Triandis, 2002), and in-group collectivism by GLOBE project (House et al., 2004). These are similar conceptual, as well as empirical, constructs to represent (low vs. high) Group. The three empirical constructs by Hofstede, Minkov, and GLOBE are highly correlated and virtually measure the same cultural attributes of the Group dimension (see Table 2.3).

Grid is clustered with known cultural dimensions like power distance (Hofstede, 2001; House et al., 2004), vertical (Triandis, 2002) and hierarchy (Schwartz, 1999). These dimensions represent role asymmetry and the extent to which hierarchy is expected and accepted in different societies, the attributes that the Grid dimension aims to present as well. Although the empirical dimensions measuring power distance/hierarchy

would not be completely converged, they can be considered good estimators for operationalization of the Grid dimension in cross-national level.

Table 3.1. Measures and definitions of Group and Grid suggested by Gross and Rayner (1985)

Measures	Definitions
Group	
Proximity	Measure of closeness of group members, frequency of interactions
Transitivity	Likelihood that if Member 1 interacts with Member 2 and 2 interacts with 3, then 1 will interact with 3
Frequency	Proportion of time a group member spends in some activity with other members
Scope	Diversity of a member's interactive involvement in group activities
Impermeability	Likelihood that a nonmember who satisfies membership requirements will actually gain membership
Grid	
Specialization	Amount of possible roles a group member assumes in a given time span
Asymmetry	Measure of lack of symmetry in role exchanges among group members
Entitlement	Proportion of ascribed versus achieved roles in the group
Accountability	Amount of member interactions in which one is dominant and the other subordinate

Source. Caulkins & Peters (2002).

For any cultural dimension to be measured, it should be clearly identified what cultural traits and attributes the dimension represents. However, Grid and Group tend to be defined in such broad and diverse terms that many different cultural values could be connected to one and the same dimension. The most general description is usually not the problem. Difficulties arise when Grid and Group are to be defined in ways that make them measurable. Gross and Rayner (1985) are among the first, and few, to provide guidelines for measuring Grid and Group. As illustrated in Table 3.1, they introduced different measures for each dimension of Grid and Group.

With regard to the measures and definitions of Group and Grid in Table 3.1, we identify some ambiguities that complicate the operationalization of the two dimensions. The measures for Group lack some essential features of interrelatedness that are normally incorporated in individualism versus collectivism as specified and validated in cross-cultural research (Hofstede, 2001; House et al., 2004). For instance, one of the core values for collectivism is loyalty and commitment to the group. It is not clear whether proximity measures can include loyalty or not. Another feature of collectivist culture is in-group sharing, which in

turn connects to another collectivist attribute of reciprocity. Living with parents until (even late) marriage and, reciprocally, living of parents with (or close to) their children are examples of collectivist sharing. Again, it is not clear whether or not these collectivist features can be assigned to frequency and proximity (as specified in Table 3.1).

Most of the Group measures specified in Table 3.1 can be applied to people who join groups and clubs for volunteering. Contrary to common belief, joining groups and clubs is not a reliable indicator of collectivism. Voluntary activities are more popular among people in individualistic cultures than collectivistic ones because individualists see volunteering as a way of socializing and avoiding being alone (we will elaborate on this later). Thus, the Group measures in Table 3.1 are not particularly defined to describe the cultural orientation of "grouping with insiders" or "in-group collectivism," but they can also be interpreted for cultural trait of "grouping with outsiders" or "out-group collaborativeness." Therefore, two distinct interpretations of Group are recognizable. In this chapter, we call the former "in-Group" and the latter "out-Group" and we argue that these are two distinctive dimensions of culture.

Grid's measures by Gross and Rayner (1985) have less ambiguity and more consistency with the cultural attributes of similar dimensions in cross-cultural research: power distance and hierarchy (Hofstede, 2001; House et al., 2004; Schwartz, 1999). However, as we will show further on, some scholars place other cultural orientations like traditionalism/religiosity, gender egalitarianism, or indulgence on the Grid dimension, which increases complexity again.

Given these considerations, we critically examine the measures and survey items used in the literature for the operationalization of Grid and Group in cross-national research. We will demonstrate that Grid and especially Group are operationalized based on very different interpretations of either Grid or Group, and in some cases, these dimensions are overloaded with cultural traits irrelevant to their basic definitions. Connecting to other cross-cultural studies that empirically measure cultural dimensions, we integrate three cultural dimensions of the GLOBE project in our study. These dimensions are pertinent to Group and Grid, and their definitions and question items (provided in Appendix B) are comparable with the measures in Table 3.1.

3.4 Challenges of Cross-National Operationalization of Grid and Group

Most of the empirical measurements of CT have been made within a nation (Marris et al., 1998; Shin et al., 1989) and particularly in the United States (Gastil et al., 2011; Kahan et al., 2007). In recent years, few studies aimed to operationalize Grid and Group dimensions at the cross-national level. Most of them have used the World Values Survey (hereafter WVS) database and its questionnaire (Chai et al., 2009; Grendstad, 1999; Melton, 2003; Torsello, 2013) and some have used other cross-cultural databases (e.g., Caulkins [1999] uses the Human Relations Area Files' Probability Sample Files).

We argue that inconsistency and arbitrariness are seen in selecting WVS items for operationalization of Grid and Group in a sense that different studies measure different interpretations of these dimensions. In some cases, items are even irrelevant to the conceptual definitions of Grid and Group. Chai et al. (2009) used 22 survey items from WVS as measures for Grid and Group (11 for each). Their selection of items has been questionable and authors have not performed any systematic method to examine the validity of their selection. Although they argued that "use of factor analysis is not readily compatible with deductive theories like Grid–Group theory" (Chai et al., 2009, p. 200), there is no convincing explanation of how their operationalization can be systematic and reliable. We recognized that some of their selective items have been irrelevant to definition of Grid and Group.

Similarly, Melton (2003) used the WVS items to empirically test the Grid–Group theory. He administered a survey to five Groups in an American university, based on both WVS questions and Gross and Rayner's measures. He compared the results of these two instruments and concluded that WVS indicators could be proper tools for operationalization of Grid–Group theory. Similar to Chai et al. (2009), Melton's selection of WVS items for measuring Grid and Group is questionable. In our estimation, some of the selected items are not congruent with the definition of Grid and Group.

Grendstad (1999) also put effort into operationalizing Grid and Group for 12 Western European countries. In his article, which is an attempt to extract the political–cultural map of Europe by using Grid–Group theory, Grendstad (1999) used four cultural items from WVS database. He selected two items for each dimension, performed a factor analysis to validate his assumption, and extracted two factors representing Grid and

Group dimensions. Although the factor analysis is a systematic approach for examining the relevance of items to cultural dimensions, a few items in his analysis are problematic and endanger the sampling adequacy. Moreover, although the factor analysis confirmed the independence of two pairs of items and extracted two exclusive factors, the conceptual relevance of adopted items for operationalizing Grid and Group dimensions are debatable.

Grendstad has reported scores of Grid and Group for Western European countries in his article and that is why his operationalization has been used by other researchers, particularly in some scholarly publications of comparative politics in recent years (Heijstek-Ziemann, 2014; Lockhart, 2011). In the next section, we critically assess these measurements and compare Grendstad's operationalization of Group and Grid with GLOBE's cultural dimensions to illuminate the challenges in interpretations of Group and Grid at the cross-national level.

3.4.1 Operationalization of Group: In-Group Collectivism or Out-Group Collaborativeness?

Grendstad (1999) utilized two items of "membership in voluntary organizations" and "work in voluntary organizations" as measures for Group. Here, again the aforementioned question arises regarding what meaning of Group has been considered in this operationalization. Being a member of a club/organization may not be a proper measure for representing high Group inclination. Indeed, we can theoretically argue that people in individualistic culture, who have less group ties with extended family or friends, would more frequently join voluntary organizations to make themselves busy and socialized. However, people in high Group cultures may have less extra time to spend in voluntary organizations because they have a lot of collective commitments and in-group gatherings. For instance, Spain, Italy, and Greece display stronger collectivistic orientation among Western European countries (we will later present and discuss this in Figure 3.4) while they have a very low rate of membership in voluntary organization.

A study by Rippl (2002) for examining the measurement instrument of the Grid–Group model indicated that the item measuring "joining clubs of any kind" has a very low loading on the Group dimension among a sample of German students. We will show later that "volunteering" is highly associated with the cultural trait of team working or (out-group) collaborativeness.

Comparing with one of the existing cross-cultural measurements, namely, GLOBE's dimensions of culture (see Appendix B for GLOBE's question items), we evaluate Grendstad's (1999) measurement and study what interpretation of Group he has operationalized. His European cross-cultural map, shown in Figure 3.1, indicates that Northern European countries, namely, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Iceland, as well as the Netherlands, score high Group and southern countries, namely, Spain and Italy, score low Group. This is completely contrary to the scores by other established cross-cultural studies, in which the Northern European countries score high individualistic (low Group), whereas Spain, Portugal, and Italy are relatively collectivistic (high Group). Considering face validity, the latter is much more true to life. But what is the reason for this discrepancy?



Figure 3.1. Grendstad's European cultural map (1981 & 1990) based on the Group–Grid model

Note: Figure from Grendstad (1999, p. 469); the circles indicate the 1990 position

As we discussed above, Grendstad used the WVS items of "voluntary involvement" in his study to measure the Group dimension. We indicated that high voluntary activity is much more popular in individualistic cultures than in collectivist societies because in the latter the connections

and interactions of people in their in-group are so much that there is less room for spending time with an out-group through voluntary activities. Thus, we expect that the involvement in voluntary organizations would be higher in individualistic (low Group) cultures. In support of this proposition, we found a high, significant correlation of .61 ($p < .05$) between a Gallup survey item measuring "the percentages of those who volunteered their time to an organization" (Legatum Prosperity Index, 2011) and Hofstede's individualism for 16 Western European countries.

We discussed earlier that we should distinguish between two different perceptions of in-Group and out-Group. This ambivalence of Group, seen in other cross-cultural literatures as well, originates from the lack of distinction between in-group collectivism and out-group *collaborativeness* (see Chapter 2). Whereas the former is a cultural construct to represent the interrelatedness of people in their in-group (sometimes also called familism), the latter is related to collaborative activities and team working mostly with out-groups.

Some cross-cultural scholars consider these two attributes to be two related facets of collectivism (Hofstede, 2001), while in practice it is not the case. GLOBE project (House et al., 2004) has made an effort to separate these two types of collectivism via introducing two exclusive cultural dimensions of "in-group collectivism" and "institutional collectivism." The latter is associated with the spirit of team working while the former represents the cultural feature of interpersonal ties (see Appendix B for the GLOBE's question items). An empirical study in China also indicates the difference between in-group collectivism and out-group cooperativeness (Koch & Koch, 2007). Caulkins (1994), in the chapter titled "Norwegians: Cooperative Individualists", illuminates how the Norwegian culture accommodates the coexistence of cooperation and individualism.

GLOBE's work is a valuable effort to make a distinction between these two cultural features both conceptually and empirically. Understanding the difference between these two constructs is crucial for a meaningful operationalization of Group dimension in CT. We found that there is a high, significant correlation of .77 ($p < .01$) between GLOBE's "institutional collectivism" and the Gallup measure of "volunteering" for 13 Western European countries. Thus, it can be argued that what Grendstad (1999) has measured was not the Group dimension in its meaning of collectivism (in-Group) but his operationalization of Group resembles a facet of the cultural dimension of "collaborativeness" (out-Group). Figure 3.2 presents high correlation of .82 between Grendstad's

Group dimension (scores for 1990) and GLOBE's institutional collectivism for 9 European countries in common. This corroborates our assertion about his operationalization.



Figure 3.2. The relation between Grendstad's Group (scores for 1990) and GLOBE's institutional collectivism

In general, we can recognize a kind of "cultural bias" in definition as well as operationalization of the Group dimension by scholars socialized in relatively individualistic cultures in the western hemisphere. For instance, there is no item related to interpersonal ties, family, parents, or friends in Kahan's questionnaire items for measuring Group; instead, all items are related to the relation between government and citizens (Kahan, 2012). This perception of Group is very different from the alternative perception of individualism versus collectivism based on interpersonal ties. An American bias, in which high versus low Group is associated with left versus right wing and socialism versus capitalism, seems to be dominant in Kahan's measures. Kahan (2012) himself acknowledges that "we devised our cultural worldview measures . . . to understand variance in perceptions of risk within the US public" (p. 737) and he asserts that these measures might perform poorly in other contexts. Similarly, none of

two selected items by Grendstad (1999), a Norwegian scholar, are relevant to interpersonal ties but both are related to joining to voluntary organizations.

Assessing the WVS items selected for measuring Group by three Eastern Asian scholars (Chai et al., 2009), we learned that they selected three items directly related to the importance of family, parents, and friends beside other items related to the private–public dichotomy. Influenced by relatively collectivistic cultures (Korea and China), they are quite likely to be more sensitive to these features of the Group dimension. In another attempt to measure Group using WVS items, an Italian scholar selected one item, among five, associated with the loyalty to friends (Torsello, 2013). The notion that Italian culture is more collectivist than American and Nordic culture, and less collectivist than East Asian culture, might again account for the difference in operationalizing Group. Thus, there are various indications that the operationalization of cultural bias is affected by cultural bias itself, ironically congruent with Douglas's theory.

There are more challenges of operationalization in addition to the ones already illustrated by Grendstad. Among the selected items for the Group dimension by Chai et al. (2009), the variable, "trust people," seems not so relevant to the Group dimension. The authors seem to assume that a higher level of trust is associated with high Group. However, other cross-cultural scholars (Hofstede, 2001; Minkov & Hofstede, 2014a) have demonstrated that the issue of trust is not related to the Group concept but is conceptually relevant to another cultural construct called "uncertainty avoidance." Besides, in the ranking of interpersonal trust index, using the same item from WVS, many countries with high individualist culture (low Group) enjoy high interpersonal trust (Medrano, 2008). Our calculation shows that interpersonal trust index has a significant positive correlation (.49, $N = 65$) with Hofstede's individualism. This is in complete opposition to Chai and associates' assumption that "trust" has a positive interrelatedness with high Group.

Among other WVS items used by Chai et al. (2009) for operationalizing Group, some measure the preference for the control of government on society and economy (e.g., "who should run business/take responsibility: government vs. private"). They assumed that the emphasis on the role of government is an indicator for high Group. It implies that welfare states would have a higher Group dimension in comparison with more capitalistic countries. It is again questionable whether this is a

pertinent indicator for measuring Group, given the definition by Gross and Rayner (1985).

Furthermore, in Melton's, (2003) operationalization of Group, one item is about "the preference for new ideas vs. preference for those that have stood the test of time" (p. 140). We argue that the relevance of this item to the Group dimension is dubious. To the best of our knowledge, this item is also better matched to the cultural dimension of uncertainty avoidance (Hofstede, 2001).

3.4.2 Operationalization of Grid: Power Distance or Religiosity?

Regarding the Grid dimension, Grendstad (1999) used two items: "discuss political matters" and "persuading others to share your views" (p. 468). He asserted that Grid "refers to negotiation, autonomy and networking." It can be argued that these features are not directly relevant to the definition of Grid, which refers to the acceptance of hierarchy and differentiation and asymmetry of roles (Gross & Rayner, 1985). Nevertheless, these two items are not totally irrelevant to Grid definition; however, it is debatable to what extent they really measure Grid. To evaluate this, we utilize GLOBE's power distance as an operationalization of Grid. The content analysis of the questionnaire used for measuring GLOBE's power distance shows that all Grid's measures, indicated in Table 3.1, are covered by GLOBE's question items (see Appendix B for GLOBE's question items). Figure 3.3 shows the relation between GLOBE's power distance and Grendstad's Grid dimension (scores for 1990) for nine European countries in common. As can be seen they have a moderate correlation of .57.

Chai et al. (2009) used the items "importance of religion/God," "justifying of homosexuality/prostitution/abortion/divorce," and "equal job opportunity for men and women" from the WVS database as measures for the Grid dimension. The last item is about "gender egalitarianism," which is related to an independent cultural construct (House et al., 2004). The first two items are associated with the cultural trait of religiosity/traditionalism, which is also distinct from the Grid dimension. Caulkins (1999), in a pilot study employing factor analysis of variables from 60 cultures, shows that the items related to religiosity (ideology) are independent from the factor representing Grid dimension.



Figure 3.3. The relation between Grendstad's Grid (scores for 1990) and GLOBE's power distance

It is widely assumed that there is a plausible association between power distance (or Grid) and religiosity but empirical evidence indicates that no strong correlations exist between them. In some cases, societies with high religiosity have high power distance but the reverse is not necessarily true. For instance, among European countries, while Portugal has a high score of religiosity as well as a high score of power distance, France has a high power distant culture while its religiosity is very low. On the contrary, Ireland has high religiosity but low power distance. Moreover, the United States is an example of having low hierarchy/power distance but virtually high religiosity while China is totally opposite. Thus, these two cultural features cannot be combined in one dimension. Given this, using cultural items related to religiosity as measures for Grid dimension, like what Chai et al. (2009) and Torsello (2013) did, is questionable.

Furthermore, in Melton's (2003) operationalization, one of the WVS items used for measuring Grid is related to "the acceptance of enjoying complete sexual freedom" (p. 141). Again, it can be argued that this item is less relevant to the definition of Grid and more connected to the cultural dimension of religiosity/traditionalism or even more to another

distinct dimension called "indulgence," extracted by Minkov (2007) and adopted by Hofstede as an exclusive dimension of culture (Hofstede et al., 2010).

All in all, we observe that the existing measurements of both Grid and Group suffer from inconsistency and arbitrariness. This does not mean that the survey-based method of measuring culture should be rejected and disqualified per se. Survey methods and statistical tests are established instruments that allow ongoing improvement. Many dynamic social phenomena are measured and evaluated in this way. The main challenge of using these instruments for measuring culture is fundamental to measuring social phenomena in general: safeguarding the validity and reliability of measures. Regarding validity, Grid–Group CT needs to answer the question of what cultural values and conceptual definitions are attributed to Grid and Group; accordingly, proper measures and survey items need to be selected. Grid–Group theory needs to clarify what the Group dimension represents: in-group collectivism or out-group collaborativeness, and what the Grid dimension represents: power distance or religiosity.

Answering these questions is more important for measuring culture at the cross-national level than at the national level because within a specific society some cultural orientations might appear either to be highly interrelated to other cultural orientations or to be totally intangible and irrelevant within that society, while at the cross-national level these cultural differences do matter.

3.5 Measures of Cultural Values or Situational Attitudes?

Normally, it is not expected to observe very sharp changes in the deep cultural patterns of a society over a short period of time. Situation-specific attitudes may change and fluctuate relatively fast but underlying cultural values change more gradually. If Grid and Group are indeed fundamental cultural dimensions, then they should be operationalized using value items rather than attitudinal questions. Grendstad (1999), for instance, tried to measure changes of Grid and Group from 1980 to 1990. Considering a minimum of 0.10 as a remarkable change in his Grid and Group scale suggested that in many Western European countries Grid has had higher variability than Group (see Figure 3.1). In some countries, like Spain, Ireland, and the Netherlands, strong fluctuations in Group are reported as well.

In our estimation, these variations are related to the items selected for measuring these two dimensions. Items on discussing politics, which have been used for measuring Grid, can be considered situational items that may change from time to time. One may discuss political matters a lot around election time and not before or after that. Asking about "belonging to voluntary organizations" and "currently doing unpaid voluntary work" may also measure situational attitudes and not cultural values on the Group dimension. Melton (2003) also used items asking about political activism, namely, signing petitions, joining boycotts, and attending demonstrations, for measuring Grid. It can be argued that these items are also indicators of situational attitudes rather than cultural values.

The findings from another operationalization of Grid and Group support our line of reasoning. Chai et al. (2009) used items from two waves of WVS to operationalize and compare Grid and Group over time. The items selected by them are more relevant to cultural values, rather than situational attitudes. Accordingly, the scores of Grid and Group for 23 countries in two waves of surveys are consistent and the variation of each dimension is low (see Figures 5 and 6 in Chai et al., 2009). This is in accordance with the expectation of low fluctuation of cultural values over a decade.

We do not assert that cultural values and situational attitudes are fully independent but we argue that they present different kinds of social phenomena; proper indicators for measuring the two need to be different. Indeed, the level of variation of an index over time might show whether it measures cultural values or situational attitudes.

Our assumption, in accordance with most students of culture, that cultural values change gradually is not incompatible with the approach taken by some authors in CT who put great emphasis on the dynamic interplay between the four cultural types. Most prominently, Thompson (2008) argues that the four cultural types are repeatedly splitting and coalescing, increasing and decreasing. In our view, the interplay between cultural biases can be highly changeable indeed, while the underlying value patterns and dimensions—which are played and tossed with—are highly durable. Against this background, we propose to better distinguish between cultural values and situational attitudes while selecting items for measuring Grid and Group.

3.6 How Many Dimensions of Culture?

So far, our discussion reveals the challenges of operationalizing multifaceted dimensions such as Grid and Group. In principle, there is no problem if different, adjacent cultural values are attributed to one and the same dimension; "cooperation" and "interpersonal ties" could be assigned to the Group dimension, and "role-asymmetry" and "religiosity" could be linked to the Grid dimension. In making sense of empirical phenomena, however, the overloading of Grid and Group could lead to confusion in understanding cultural diversity—especially across nations, as we demonstrate in this study.

Cultural dimensions are constructed to help in mapping differences among groups of people. When a set of interdependent values is differentiated from others, a new dimension is needed to represent them. Dimensionalization is a kind of classification of cultural values. A classification can be broader or narrower and its number of categories depends on different criteria, some objective and some subjective. The proper number of dimensions should be determined based on the conceptual theory as well as the existing diversity in reality. A parsimonious classification can be useful and appropriate for a specific purpose but it might be nonexplanatory for other purposes. Grid–Group theory made a parsimonious model at the expense of explanatory power of having more, distinctive cultural dimensions.

The number of cultural dimensions is always a matter of controversy. Whereas some cross-cultural scholars believe that having more dimensions is better for explaining the variance of differences among communities (Triandis, 2001), others believe that the number of dimensions should be as few as possible for the sake of parsimony (Douglas, 1999; Hofstede, 2001). Although there is always a trade-off between the principle of parsimony and explanatory power, a middle approach might have the benefit of the both. Working with two big-dimensions of culture is simple and preferable but can be nonexplanatory of subtle differences, especially when we utilize big-dimensions for explaining cross-national differences among countries with a similar cultural background. Big-dimensions can only explain big differences.

New dimensions are required for explaining some variances that cannot be explained with the help of existing dimensions. So a new construct (dimension) must be introduced; otherwise, a latent cultural trait might be embedded into existing dimensions. This overburdens a dimension and can even make it a combination of contradictions.

We already signaled that Chai et al. (2009) define the Grid dimension as an amalgamation of "respect authority" (or acceptance of hierarchy), "gender inequality" and "religiosity." If these three measures do not have a conceptual relevance and significant correlations with each other, combining them in one big-dimension can be seriously misleading. When we have a group of people with high inclination to accept hierarchy and at the same time with high gender equality and low religiosity (e.g., France), then how can one combine these different aspects and make one construct to judge about the community's culture? Thus, if different attributes of culture are not conceptually relevant and statistically correlated to each other, binding them into one dimension is problematic.

Grid and Group theory is not the only parsimonious, two-dimensional cultural theory in the field of cross-cultural studies. Another famous bi-dimensional cultural model is that empirically extracted by Inglehart from the WVS database (Inglehart & Baker, 2000). There is a principal difference between Douglas's theory and Inglehart's model; while the former is a theory-based model, the latter is an empirically driven model. Nevertheless, both believe that a major variance of values and attitudes among societies is embedded in and explained by their two dimensions of culture. In Chapter 2, we argued that Inglehart's big-dimension, namely, survival versus self-expression, is the combination of three separate cultural dimensions, namely, individualism, power distance, and indulgence. This big-dimension might be useful to explain some variances for a specific purpose but the problem arises when someone needs to compare a particular cultural trait, for instance, power distance or indulgence, among societies. That is why in recent years, Minkov (2007) tried to break down Inglehart's big-dimension of self-expression and extract new dimensions out of it.

In the next section, we argue that the Grid–Group model suffers from the lack of, at least, a third cultural dimension, without which CT cannot explain some major cross-national differences, and sometimes intra-national differences as well. We assert that this third cultural orientation cannot be incorporated into Grid and Group either conceptually or empirically.

3.7 Grade: A Missing Dimension of CT

Group and Grid represent two important cultural orientations that differentiate societies or groups of people. Group, in the meaning of what is called collectivism in other cross-cultural theories, is one of the most

elaborated dimensions of culture in the literature. Grid, or hierarchy, or power distance, as labeled by other cross-cultural scholars, is also a well-known dimension in cross-cultural studies.

CT scholars argue that Group and Grid aim to answer two central questions that confront individuals in all societies: "*Who am I*?" and "*What shall I do*?" (Wildavsky, 1987, p. 6). That is, "Am I an individual or a member?" and "Shall I behave as a free equal or a regulated ordinal?" But there is another identity question that should be responded to, namely, "How shall I deal?" with the follow-up question suggested by cross-cultural research, "Shall I compete or compromise?" This reveals a crucial cultural dimension, not covered by Grid or Group, needed for a fuller understanding of cross-cultural variation, as we will substantiate. This cultural orientation distinguishes societies/groups in which people are more focused on dominance, achievement, and excellence versus those societies/groups in which harmonious, agreeable, and relaxed relations are key. Trying to find a label alliterating with Grid and Group, we name this third dimension "Grade."

High Grade culture represents societies in which dominance and mastery are valued, whereas low Grade cultures are more in favor of harmony and compromise. High Grade culture emphasizes grades of achievement and the importance of standing out. Low Grade culture is less focused on exceptional excellence and more interested in acceptable averages. Table 3.2 presents some features related to high versus low Grade cultures.

In the CT literature, competition is loaded on either Grid or Group. For instance, Hampton (1982) and Mars (1982) put competition on the Grid dimension, while Dake and Thompson (1999) loaded competition on the Group dimension. Douglas (1970) assigned this cultural value to the features of an "individualist worldview" (low Grid and low Group) which is also called "competitive individualism" in the literature (Douglas, 1999; Wildavsky, 1987). This implicitly assumes that people with high Grid or high Group cultures have less inclination toward competition and self-assertion. However, the empirical evidence does not confirm this proposition. For instance, at the cross-national level, Japan displays a high Grid and a competition-oriented culture. South Korea has a high Group/high Grid culture as well as a highly competitive culture. Thus, we can have "competitive hierarchy" or even "competitive atomism" in practice.

Table 3.2. Some features related to high versus low Grade

High Grade: Standing out	Low Grade: Settling for
High mastery	Low mastery
Competition	Compromise
Dominant	Reclining
Restless	Laid-back
Ambitious	Contented
Adventurous	Relaxed
Quantity of achievement	Quality of life
Excellence, maximizing	Average, satisficing

Grade is compatible with the third dimension of "activity," which was once suggested by James Hampton (1982) after his attempt, together with Mary Douglas, to give the Grid/Group dimensions an operational definition. Grade is also reminiscent of the third dimension, "manipulation" or "Grip," which was suggested at one point (Thompson, 1982; Thompson et al., 1990), but not further developed as such, to catch positive and negative attitudes to dominance and the exertion of power. Thompson introduced Grip to justify the existence of a fifth way of life (autonomy or hermit), which was not originally in Douglas's typology. Grip is not an orthogonal axis similar to Grid and Group, but is "concomitant of the other two" (Mamadouh, 1999, p. 399). Having an extra, independent dimension will double the number of cultural types, or ways of life, from four to eight. This invalidates the "impossibility theorem," which asserts that "five and only five ways of life" are viable (Thompson et al., 1990, p. 3).

In his PhD thesis, Pepperday (2009) argues for the necessity of employing a third dimension in CT. His proposed dimension, called competition, is compatible with our Grade dimension. He provides a valuable review of other social interaction theories that have implicitly or explicitly proposed a third dimension (Pepperday, 2009). He indicates that "geometrically, three dichotomized dimensions yield eight types," but he draws a similar conclusion as Thompson: "four of them are not viable and do not arise" (Pepperday, 2009, p. iii). This means that his third dimension is also a concomitant and not an independent dimension.

The advantage of Grade over theoretically compatible items such as "activity," "grip," and "competition" is that it can be pinpointed and substantiated, both conceptually and empirically. In the dimensional approach of CT, the expansion of cultural types (or ways of life) due to the presence of a third dimension is not in and of itself undesirable. The number of cultural types is not set in stone and can be revised if additional viable types emerge. After all, cultural dimensions and cultural

types are man-made constructs that are meant to help us in explaining social relations and behavioral patterns.

In a recent symposium on CT, Verweij, Luan, and Nowacki (2011) presented suggestions for testing CT in future research. They indicate that there is an affinity between CT and the analysis of social interaction systems developed by Robert Bales and associates. They asserted that Bales's analyses have many features in common with CT. They notify that Bales (2002) measures the conflicting values and manifested behaviors using three bipolar dimensions: friendly versus unfriendly (conforming to high vs. low Group), rejection of authority (resembling low vs. high Grid), and dominant versus passive. The latter seems to be the very missing dimension in CT that we discussed above. This dimension resembles the cultural features of Grade. The lack of this dimension would limit the explanatory power of CT.

This cultural dimension has been introduced and operationalized in other cross-cultural theories as well (see Chapter 2). Hofstede's masculinity versus femininity has some features in common with Grade. Mastery orientation, operationalized cross-nationally by Schwartz (1999), measures more specifically this cultural dimension. Schwartz (1999, p.28) defines mastery as "a cultural emphasis on getting ahead through active self-assertion (ambition, success, courage, competence)."

Schwartz's mastery does not have any significant correlation either with Grendstad's Grid and Group measures or with other empirical dimensions measuring collectivism and power distance. This corroborates our proposition that Grade is an independent dimension whose cultural values cannot be represented by Grid and Group.

As an illustration for cross-national comparison, comparable with Grendstad's mapping, Figure 3.4 and Figure 3.5 present three-dimensional mappings of Western European countries. They illustrate two different interpretations of the Group dimension, in-Group and out-Group. Scores of GLOBE's in-group collectivism, institutional collectivism, and power distance (House et al., 2004), and Schwartz's mastery (Licht et al., 2007) are used as empirical operationalization of in-Group, out-Group, Grid, and Grade respectively. Comparing these two figures, we see how the different interpretations of Group can result in different cultural mappings of countries. Moreover, the figures also indicate the differences in the Grade dimension across Western European countries.

The lack of this dimension can also be felt in some applications of CT in the study of democracy. Hendriks (2010), in his book *Vital*

Democracy, discusses the affinity between two dimensions of democracy, namely, integrative versus aggregative and direct versus indirect democracy, and two dimensions of "political culture" as well as "societal culture." For political culture, he uses two bipolar dimensions of power distance (vs. power equality) and contest (vs. convergence). For societal culture, he utilizes the Grid and Group dimensions. He argues that the two dimensions of democracy display "elective affinity" with the two dimensions of societal culture and political culture. If elective affinity is narrowed down to conceptual similarity, then the two dimensions of political culture and societal culture should be connected. Grid and power distance should present the same cultural orientation and the same should go for Group and convergence. However, the latter is debatable. The measures distinguishing high and low Group (see Table 3.1) seem to be not closely related to the distinction between contest and convergence. If the third dimension of Grade would be available, then a better connection to the cultural attributes of contest versus convergence could be made.



Figure 3.4. In-Group/Grid/Grade map of Western European countries (based on the empirical scores of GLOBE and Schwartz)

Moreover, this dimension, for instance, can significantly contribute to explaining variance in models of democracy in different countries. In Chapter 5, we present a significant association between the mastery dimension and the adopted model of democracy (i.e., consensual or majoritarian) in action. It will be theoretically argued and empirically demonstrated how cross-national variance in mastery (or Grade) predicts the inclination of different countries to different models of democracy.

All in all, we propose that a third independent dimension is required to explain the variance of culture; without Grade, CT scholars would have to overload the Grid and Group dimensions in dubious ways.



Figure 3.5. Out-Group/Grid/Grade map of Western European countries (based on the empirical scores of GLOBE and Schwartz)

3.8 Conclusion

Summing up and referring back to the four initial questions, this chapter suggests some considerations for operationalizing Douglasian CT for cross-national research:

1. For a systematic and testable measurement of CT, cultural dimensions instead of cultural types should be operationalized. A survey-based approach has been problematic so far in operationalizing cultural types but it appeared to be promising in operationalizing dimensions; other cross-cultural research corroborates this.
2. The definition and measures of Group and Grid need to be specified and, accordingly, adequate question items need to be selected and systematically analyzed. Two distinctive interpretations of Group, namely, in-group collectivism and out-group collaborativeness, and two different interpretations of Grid, namely, power distance and religiosity need to be distinguished. Some cultural orientations might be highly correlated within a particular society or among a limited range of countries (e.g., Western European countries), while being clearly distinctive dimensions among a broader range of countries.
3. In selecting the proper measures for each dimension, survey items representing "cultural values" and "situational attitudes" need to be discriminated. Although the two are interrelated, their variability is quite different; while attitudes can change rapidly, values change slowly and gradually.
4. Not all relevant cultural values and orientations can be incorporated sensibly in two big-dimensions. The cultural orientation that discriminates between the preference for competition or compromise cannot be reliably loaded on Group or Grid. For this reason, we propose the third dimension, of Grade, to be introduced to CT.

This chapter gives some reflections on operationalization of CT at the cross-national level. First, we argued why for a systematic operationalization of CT, particularly for cross-national research, one should measure Grid and Group dimensions instead of direct measuring of four ways of life, which are supposed to be idealtypes extracted from the combination of Grid and Group axes.

We debated that, in some works, different definitions and cultural values—some of which are not interrelated, are used in operationalization

of Grid and Group. This can be confusing if it is not clarified what exact meanings and measures are assigned to Grid and Group. Having a very broad definition of a dimension makes its operationalization arbitrary and selective. Thus, both validity and reliability of such operationalization would be questionable.

We established that two different interpretations of Group are evident in the literature. These two perceptions of Group, called in-Group and out-Group, are related to two distinct cultural dimensions, namely, [in-group] collectivism and [out-group] collaborativeness. This is a crucial specification, regardless of the level of measurement. We assert that the puzzling emergence of two exclusive facets of Group in operationalizing this dimension (Boyle & Coughlin, 1994; Hampton, 1982) can be resolved by understanding this differentiation.

We also discussed the importance of differentiation between cultural values and situational attitudes in operationalizing dimensions of culture. Although there is no doubt that cultural values do change over time, it is widely emphasized that they would change slowly and gradually, whereas situational attitudes might change fast. In any effort for measuring culture, it is very important to distinguish indicators that measure cultural values and situational attitudes.

We believe that the main message of CT and the approach of involving cultural differences for explaining variances in sociopolitical institutions and outcomes are valuable and promising. However, we should not restrict ourselves only to qualitative applications of the theory, nor to the two-dimensional model introduced by Douglas. As we argued above, the two dimensions of Grid and Group cannot cover some cultural variances between as well as within societies, and hence, we should introduce and add other dimension(s) when required. This is also applicable to other parsimonious models of culture like the two-dimensional model proposed by Inglehart.

It is understandable that a cultural model might dismiss a dimension in a specific context in which there is no societal variance in that excluded dimension. It is also conceivable that a cultural bias could be seen in the definition and interpretation of a cultural dimension (e.g., Group) operationalized by different scholars socialized in different cultural backgrounds. But when the application of a model goes beyond a specific context, specification of each dimension and adoption of new dimension(s) would be unavoidable. We think CT should consider this if it is supposed to be utilized in cross-national studies. That is why we argued that the third dimension for representing the cultural orientation of

competition, which we named Grade, can be complementary to the two-dimensional model of CT.

Finally, we suggest that other existing dimensions of national culture, measured and extracted by other cross-cultural scholars who are mostly affiliated with cross-cultural psychology, can be utilized as a kind of operationalization of CT in cross-national level, at least until a systematic and robust operationalization of Grid, Group, and Grade are available. In a recently published article, some Cultural Theorists also argue that they have identified "the remarkable overlap between concepts and theories in cross-cultural psychology and Douglas' approach" (Verweij et al., 2014, p. 83).

We are aware of challenges of the existing dimensions of national culture. They implicitly ignore the variances of culture within nations because they use the average tendency of individuals for measuring cultural orientation of a nation. In any comparative study, one has to select a unit of analysis, either a small group of people or a larger population. The aim of cross-cultural comparative research is to compare the average tendency or dominant cultural orientation of different groups or populations. We are aware of the variations underlying all averages, which is neglected in this procedure. This is one of the major limitations of any cross-national analysis working with averages. Moreover, these theories consider cultural values as static constructs and say less about the cultural changes over time. Another challenge to these measurements of national culture is that sometimes operationalization of a cultural dimension (e.g., power distance) by different scholars are not converging. Some of these limitations are inescapable for any cross-national study and some should be treated and improved.

There is no doubt that we need to have more systematic and comprehensive operationalization of cultural dimensions. For now, however, we can utilize those existing cultural dimensions that have been extracted based on a systematic analysis and specified measures. It is time to reconcile the different cross-cultural studies and make benefit from the variety of efforts, gathering them under the broader umbrella of cultural theory. We have begun to realize this purpose in the field of comparative politics and obtained interesting findings in democratization studies as will be presented in following chapters.

Chapter 4

Operationalizing and Mapping Democratic Models for 80 Electoral Democracies*

* This chapter is based on Maleki, A., & Hendriks, F. (2015b). Contestation and Participation: Operationalizing and Mapping Democratic Models for 80 Electoral Democracies, 1990-2009. *Acta Politica*. DOI: 10.1057/ap.2015.10.

4.1 Introduction

Democracy is a core concept in political science and in many political systems (Lijphart, 1999; Dahl, 2000). It is one of those words that is widely used as something that goes without saying, as if everyone knows what it implies. In actual fact, however, democracy is understood and operationalized in many different ways. It is an essentially contested concept, disguised as a commonplace (Gallie, 1955). The contested nature of democracy has complicated many discussions, among them the academic debate about the best way of measuring democracy. Serious attempts at measuring democracy in larger-N research began in the post World War II period, but as Coppedge (2002, p. 35) writes "it has not been and may never be measured in all its many-faceted, multidimensional glory."

The various attempts in measuring democracy have focused on at least three aspects. Firstly, the level (and presence) of democracy: which countries exhibit the 'minimum criteria' that qualify them as a democratic country? Secondly, the mapping of models: which models of democracy can be distinguished in various countries? Thirdly, the performance of democracy: how do democracies score on measures of good governance, effectiveness and legitimacy? These issues imply crucial preliminary questions. Firstly, what are the minimum criteria of democracy? Secondly, what are the crucial dimensions underlying different models of democracy? Thirdly, which are the crucial performance criteria? The interaction of these three aspects of democracy – level, model and performance - is an interesting and repeatedly debated subject in comparative politics.

Many research efforts and indices in the literature aim at measuring the level (or quality) of democracy (EIU, 2010; Freedom House, 2012; Kaufmann et al., 2009; Marshall et al., 2011; Przeworski et al. 2000; Vanhanen, 2002;). Some other indices measure the performance of [democratic] governance (EIU, 2010; Kaufmann et al., 2009; UNDP, 2012). These measures are available for a large number of countries, some for virtually all countries.

Different types and models of democracy and their conceptual specifics have been elaborately discussed in the literature (Dahl, 2000; Held, 2006; Hendriks, 2010). In recent decades, some attempts have been made to empirically assess the different models of democracy by identifying and measuring some indicators. The seminal research by Lijphart (1999, 2012) on *Patterns of Democracy* is one of the best-

known, comprehensive and systematic works categorizing models of democracy.

This chapter aims to address and improve some challenges in measuring models of democracy in practice. We focus on the operationalization of democratic models based on two crucial dimensions of democracy, which subsequently help us to map a large number of countries, which are deemed democratic to at least some extent.

4.2 Two Dimensions of Democracy: Contestation and Participation

In Dahl's theory of democracy (Dahl, 1971), contestation and participation are considered the two main dimensions of democracy. There are two different approaches to study these dimensions. In the first approach, the constitutional facilitation or 'right' of contestation and participation in a country are assessed, while in the second approach the actual incidence, or 'rate' of contestation and participation in action are measured. The former is about institutional capabilities; the latter is about practical realities. The former is used for establishing the necessary degree or 'level of democracy'; a political system needs to pass a certain threshold in terms of democratic rights to be recognized as an electoral democracy (of whatever type). The latter is used for gauging the particular 'model of democracy'; the rate of participation and contestation determines the incidence of different variants of electoral democracy in practice. Figure 4.1 summarizes this schematically. Dahl himself used the approach pictured left in establishing *polyarchy* - i.e. a political system that satisfies at least a minimum 'level' of democratic rights (Coppedge & Reinicke, 1990).

Lack of constitutional rights may hamper actual contestation and participation, but the incidence of such rights does not fully determine the actual rate and pattern of contestation and participation. The actual rate of contestation (versus pacification) and participation (versus spectating) is rather different in various democracies. This variety produces different models of democracy in action. We will extend the analysis of contestation and participation to measuring 'models' of democracy, as picture right in Figure 4.1[1].

1. Vanhanen (2000) and Altman & Perez-Linan (2002) partially utilized the empirical 'rate' of contestation and participation for measuring level (or quality) of democracy. Their measures are highly correlated with the well-known indexes of level of democracy



Figure 4.1. Different operationalization of Dahl's dimensions of democracy

4.3 Measuring Models of Democracy

Regarding measuring models of democracy, the work by Lijphart (1999, update 2012) has been a major breakthrough. Lijphart operationalized contestation by utilizing five measures and distinguished between majoritarian and consensus models of democracy[2]. In recent years, some other empirical studies, aiming to operationalize the different dimensions of democracy, have come forth (Fortin, 2008; Kriesi and Bochsler, 2012; Vatter, 2009). These tried to replicate as well as extend the Lijphart's model. However, they cover only a limited number of democracies. Lijphart (1999, 2012) included 36 'established democracies' in his book. Vatter (2009) performed his operationalization for 23 'advanced industrial democracies'. Fortin (2008) tried to measure patterns of democracy for 19 'post-communist democracies'. Recently, Kriesi and Bochsler (2012) have made an effort to measure and map 'varieties of democracy' for 50 countries.

In our estimation, there are three major problems with these works: firstly, they do not include many new and developing electoral democracies; secondly, their method of selection and combination of

namely Freedom House and Polity IV. Their efforts are not focused on measuring models of democracy.

2. Lijphart's second dimension, federal vs. unitary, is related to the issue of concentration and centralization of power. It is argued that this dimension is provisionally connected to the size of countries (Taagepera, 2003).

indicators is debatable and revisable; thirdly, participation is less often elaborated in the more specialized literature on the multi-dimensional modeling of democracy. In the more general literature on democracy it is, however, broadly recognized as vital and attention-deserving (Coppedge et al., 2008). To improve these shortcomings, in this study we aim to operationalize two dimensions of democracy, contestation and participation, for a broader range of 'electoral democracies' in a sufficiently systematic way.

We acknowledge that for examining the reasons and consequences of having different models of democracy in different countries, especially for studying this for new democracies, we need, first of all, to operationalize models of democracy for a broader range of countries than available in the existing literature[3]. In particular, the debate on the superiority of a model of democracy (i.e. majoritarian vs. consensual), by comparing the effectiveness and responsiveness of different models, has been ongoing and seemingly endless. We have no inclination towards one particular form or model of democracy. We speculate that a democratic model is not *per se* a determinant of the grade or quality of democracy. We will examine this thesis at the end of the chapter by performing a correlational analysis between dimensions of democracy and indices of level and performance of democracy.

A country needs to pass a certain threshold in order to be grouped with other democratic countries. The latter implies that we have to deal with the issue of minimum requirements of democracy first. We will do that in the next section, dedicated to recognizing democracies.

4.4 Recognizing Democracies

Although there are tens of conceptualizations and definitions of democracy (Held, 2006; Hendriks, 2010; Saward, 2003), there is one core element in all definitions of democracy at the country level, and that is the notion of electoral contestation. In the literature it is widely assumed that having contested elections - free, fair and frequent enough to legitimate elected officials - is the minimum requirement for democracy,

3. We should also mention a herculean, in-progress project named Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) which aims to operationalize seven different conceptions of democracy for a large number of countries over two centuries, through measuring hundreds of indicators (Coppedge et al., 2012). The comparison of our operationalization with the aggregated results of V-Dem project, which presumably will be available by 2015, could be beneficial and supplementary to both studies.

at least at the country level that we are focusing on here (Bowman et al., 2005; Dahl, 1971; 2000; Przeworski et al. 2000). As Dahl (1971) put it: "democratic are all regimes that hold elections in which the opposition has some chance of winning and taking office". A political system satisfying this criterion is classified as electoral (or formal or procedural or institutional) democracy (Dahl, 2000; Diamond, 1996; EIU, 2010; Vanhanen, 2002).

Using three distinguished studies evaluating countries' level of democracy, namely Polity IV (Marshall et al., 2011), Freedom in the World (Freedom House, 2012) and Democracy Index by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU, 2010)[4], we selected 80 countries from around the world from 1990 to 2009 that have enjoyed electoral democracy for at least seven consecutive years (for in seven years a country can have at least two elections)[5].

In order to operationalize different models of democracy in action, we need to identify the type of political regime of each country.[6] Different typologies for distinguishing types of political regimes have been recommended by leading scholars (Cheibub, 2007; Cheibub et al., 2010; Norris, 2008). In spite of differences, such scholars distinguish three main types of democratic regime: parliamentary, presidential and semi-presidential (or mixed). However, they categorize countries differently.

In this study, we need a classification that distinguishes between popularly elected and non-elected executives (e.g. USA vs. Switzerland) and between ceremonial and hands-on presidents (e.g. Austria vs. France) as well. These differentiations are not recognized by the typology

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4. In our study, we consider a country an electoral democracy:

- if a country is recognized under concepts seven (restricted election) or eight (competitive election) of Polity IV

- if a country's score of Freedom House's 'political rights' is lower or equal to four

- if a country's score of EIU's 'electoral process' is higher than five

In the occasional cases that Polity IV has no final assessment for a country or there is a lack of full consensus between different studies, we assess the case based on the highest consensus between the criteria.

5. There are some more electoral democracies in the world but due to the lack of data required (i.e. election results, non-electoral participation) for many small countries, we could not include them in this study.

6. It is important for our study because in calculation of some indicators, namely electoral disproportionality and voter turnout, the type of political regime determines whether or not the results of the presidential elections should be involved. That is, if a country has a presidential or semi-presidential regime then the disproportionality and turnout of the presidential election must be included otherwise only parliamentary elections are taken into consideration.

recommended by Norris (2008), Cheibub (2007) and Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010). We reformulated and rearranged the criteria by Cheibub (2007, p. 35) and accordingly classified the regime types of 80 countries under study (see Table E.1 in Appendix E). The rationale and criteria of our classification can be found in Appendix C.

Recognizing 80 electoral democracies and their regime type, we aim to operationalize two dimensions of democracy, contestation and participation, for these countries. To this aim, we will go through the three main stages of developing an index: conceptualization, measurement and aggregation (Munck & Verkuilen, 2002). In the following sections each stage for each dimension is separately discussed.

4.5 Operationalizing the First Dimension: Contestation

4.5.1 Conceptualization

Competition may be the necessary spice of democracy, but the desire for it depends on the different democratic tastes. No contestation means no real democracy, though this can be institutionalized differently. Power-sharing or integration versus majority-rule or aggregation are two rival conceptions of contestation (Hendriks, 2010; Lijphart, 2007; Norris, 2008).

In the real world of democracy, contestation can be conceptualized through power fragmentation and power distribution. Power is fragmented and distributed in different ways. Power fragmentation is manifested in the role and independence of political bodies (i.e. legislative and executive) and the number of parties competing to take control of these bodies. Power distribution is manifested in the share of power of each party, as well as the power sharing of different political bodies. Power distribution is regulated through the electoral system (i.e. majoritarian, proportional representation, and mixed) and the types of regime (i.e. (semi-) parliamentary and (semi-) presidential).

4.5.2 Measurement: Power Fragmentation and Power Distribution

Lijphart's first dimension, executives vs. parties, indicates the systematic power sharing among different political parties as well as political bodies (executive vs. legislative), and the influence of electoral systems on this (Lijphart, 1999). He turned to five measures to determine

the type and level of party-political contestation: the effective number of parliamentary parties, disproportionality of the electoral system, executive-legislative relations, cabinet inclusiveness and the role of interest groups (Lijphart, 1999). He asserted that his five measures are meaningfully and significantly correlated. However, some critics have argued that some of these measures (e.g. cabinet inclusiveness, executive-legislative relation, interest groups) are incoherent, problematical and not logically related to this dimension (Ganghof, 2010; Taagepera, 2003; Vatter, 2009).

Taaggepera (2003) argued that Lijphart's interest group measure is not logically related to the executive-parties dimension. Moreover, he mentioned that while the other four measures are quite simple, Lijphart's measure for interest groups is very complex. He also criticized Lijphart's method for operationalizing 'executive-legislative relations'. Lijphart (2003) himself mentioned that the indicator to measure executive-legislative relations, based on the duration of the cabinet, has been one of the most troublesome.

All in all, we have been convinced that three attributes in Lijphart's work can adequately help to operationalize political contestation. In the following, we elaborate on them.

4.5.2.1 Effective Number of Parties in the Parliament (ENPP)

This is a well-known and popular measure among political scientists for measuring power fragmentation in parliament. The index developed by Laakso and Taagepera (1979) to measure the effective number of parliamentary parties is widely used in comparative political science. We have used several datasets (mentioned under Table E.1 in Appendix E) to find ENPP for elections in 80 countries between 1990 and 2009.

In a democratic country the ENPP is necessarily more than one. The highest number in practice is around 10 (e.g. in Poland 1999 and Brazil 2006). Having multiple parties in parliament is a characteristic of integrative democracy, we argue. In our model, the importance of this attribute follows a logarithmic rule. It means that the increasing effective number of parties from two to three or three to four should have higher relative importance than the increase of number of parties from eight to nine, or nine to ten. That is why we use the logarithmic scale of the ENPP to extract our indicator:

$$\text{LENP} = \text{Log (Effective Number of Parties in Parliament)}$$

Moreover, by using a logarithmic rule, we scale the LENP between zero and one. If only one party is in parliament (e.g. China) then the LENP score will be zero, which is not the case for a democratic country. The highest score of the indicator can be reached when ENPP is 10 or beyond.

4.5.2.2 Number of Parties in Government (NPG)

In order to measure power fragmentation in the executive, also called the cabinet inclusiveness (Ganghof, 2010), we employ an indicator measuring the effective number of parties in government. This indicator distinguishes between one-party and multi-party government. Using the Database of Political Institutions (DPI) (Beck et al., 2001) and employing the same formula by Laakso and Taagepera (1979), we calculate the "(Effective) Number of Parties in Government (NPG) for 80 countries in the period between 1990 and 2009. In practice, the lowest score of NPG is one, normally for those countries having two-party presidential system, and the highest NPG is around 9 (e.g. India in 1998)[7].

Consistent with our argument for the LENP indicator, we again use a logarithmic formula for developing an indicator for NPG. In many majoritarian democratic countries, the number of parties in government is one. As a logarithm of zero would not be sensible in these cases, we add one to the NPG before making its logarithm. The final LNPG indicator is calculated as follows:

$$\text{LNPG} = \text{Log}\ (\text{Number of Parties in Government} + 1)$$

The lowest score of LNPG is 0.30 (Log (2)) and the highest possible score will be one.

This indicator is used as an alternative to the "minimal winning one party cabinets" in the study of Lijphart (1999, 2012). Empirically we found a high and significant correlation of -0.69 ($N=33$, $p<0.001$) between Lijphart's variable for the range of 1981-2010 and the LNPG scores for the range of 1990-2009. We consider it a successful test of reliability of our indicator.

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7. Importantly and indirectly, NPG integrates the influence of presidentialism. In a full presidential system, the cabinet is often led by a party that the president belongs to. However, there are some countries with presidential system and a multi-party parliament (e.g. Brazil). In such countries and also in semi-presidential systems in which the cabinet must have parliamentary support, multi-party cabinets are more common.

4.5.2.3 Total Electoral Proportionality (TEP)

The electoral system is an important determinant of the distribution of power. Three major electoral systems, namely majority/plurality, proportional representation (PR) and the mixed system can be distinguished. Each of these three systems has several methods elaborately discussed in the literature (Gallagher & Mitchell, 2005). Disproportionality of the electoral system is an important indicator, measuring the difference between the percentages of votes and seats that each party achieves in an election. There are some indices to measure the disproportionality of parliamentary elections (Gallagher, 1991). Gallagher's least square index is a famous formula, used by Lijphart, for measuring disproportionality in practice. Many political researchers calculate Gallagher's index for parliamentary elections and present it in their cross-national datasets (Carey & Hix, 2010; Democracy Barometer, 2010; Gallagher, 2012). We have used all the abovementioned datasets and other sources in the literature to find the disproportionality index for elections in 80 countries between 1990 and 2009. For some cases missing in the literature, we ourselves have calculated Gallagher's disproportionality index.

This index is usually connected to parliamentary elections only (Kriesi & Bochsler, 2012; Vatter, 2009), even though in presidential systems the disproportionality of presidential elections is not only higher but possibly also more fundamental. Lijphart (1999) has wisely included the disproportionality of presidential elections in his analysis. He suggested that presidential elections could be considered as parliamentary elections with only one seat. Following the methodology employed by Lijphart (1999, p. 161), we included presidential disproportionality in our calculations for those countries with presidential and semi-presidential regimes. To this end, we use the vote percentage of the elected president (Beck et al., 2001; Nohlen, 2005; Nohlen & Stöver, 2010), to calculate the presidential disproportionality (100 – vote percentage of the elected president). For those countries that have no majority threshold for the presidential election (i.e. without the 2nd round election), we estimate a disproportionality of 49.9 percent; this is the maximum disproportionality of an election.

Since the disproportionality index is inversely related to the other two indicators (i.e. LENP and LNPG), we calculate the *electoral proportionality* by subtracting the electoral disproportionality from 1. Mackie and Rose (1991) have used the same method to calculate the proportionality index. Finally, following Lijphart's method, we use the

geometric mean for aggregation of parliamentary and presidential proportionalities. Thus, the final formula for the "Total Electoral Proportionality (TEP)" indicator is:

$$TEP = (\text{parliamentary proportionality} * \text{presidential proportionality})^{1/2}$$

The TEP score, consistent with our other two indicators, has the range of 0.5 to one in practice. So, the three indicators display no scaling discrepancy for the aggregation.

4.5.3 Aggregation: Towards the Integrative Dimension of Democracy (IDD)

We have identified three distinct indicators, each contributing one aspect of the realization of political contestation. Now we should combine these, using a proper methodology, to develop an index for measuring the integrative (vs. aggregative) dimension of democracy. Despite the conventional approach to combine the measures through factor analysis (Kriesi & Bochsler, 2012; Lijphart, 1999; Vatter, 2009), we assume that if there is no strong correlation between these measures, we should apply another mathematical method to combine these measures.

As expected, the two indicators of LENP and LNPG are highly and significantly correlated. However, the total electoral proportionality (TEP) indicator has no significant correlation with the indicators of effective number of parliamentary parties (LENP). In Lijphart's work, there is a moderate and significant correlation (-0.50, $p<0.001$) between disproportionality and effective number of parliamentary parties.[8] This significant correlation exists because there are only six countries with presidential and semi-presidential regimes in Lijphart's study. As in our study the number of countries with presidential and semi-presidential regimes increases to 34 countries, a very weak correlation between LENP and TEP appears (0.19, $p<0.10$, $N=80$). Knowing that there is no strong correlation between the electoral proportionality and the other two indicators, we cannot use factor analysis to aggregate the indictors.

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8. Lijphart (1999) plausibly asserted that the majoritarian electoral system leads to a smaller number of parliamentary parties. Nevertheless, some exceptions can be mentioned like India which has more than five effective parliamentary parties in spite of its plurality voting system. On the other hand, a PR system does not necessarily result in a large effective number of parliamentary parties. Indeed, we can point to many democratic countries having PR voting system but a low effective number of parties (e.g. Albania, Greece, Portugal, Spain, South Africa).

These three measures represent three distinct aspects of the integrative dimension of democracy and consequently the low score of any of them cannot be completely compensated with the high score of the other. Therefore, we think the multiplicative rule (geometric mean) is a proper method to aggregate these three measures (Munck, 2009). The index of integrative dimension of democracy is then calculated as follows:

$$\text{Integrative Dimension of Democracy (IDD)} = (\text{LENP} * \text{LNPG} * \text{TEP})^{1/3}$$

By way of reliability test, we calculated the correlations between our IDD index and other, conceptually similar, indices in the literature. IDD is theoretically similar to Lijphart's executives-parties dimension and we predict that they correlate empirically as well. As expected, we found a very high and significant correlation (0.88, $p<0.001$, $N=33$) between our IDD and Lijphart's dimension[9]. Moreover, we found a high and significant correlation of 0.77 ($p<0.001$, $N=23$) between the IDD index (range of 1990-2009) and the first dimension (parties–interest groups) extracted by Vatter (2009) (which was in turn a replication of Lijphart's dimension). The correlation between IDD and the consensus-majoritarian dimension by Kriesi and Bochsler (2012) is very weak and non-significant. This is expected as their dimension includes some (conceptually) inconsistent indicators, excludes presidential disproportionality and lacks a variable measuring cabinet inclusiveness. Their dimension is not strongly correlated with Lijphart's dimension either (0.49, $P<0.01$, $N=29$).

In sum, our IDD index replicates Lijphart's executives-parties dimension for a larger number of countries by employing simpler, widely available and updated measures. We may assume that the IDD-index systematically operationalizes the political consociation (versus contestation) attributes of democracy in action. The scores of IDD and three indicators (LENP, LNPG, TEP) for 80 countries for the period of 1990 to 2009 are presented in Table E.1 in Appendix E.

9. We calculated the correlation between the IDD scores for the years 1990 to 2009 and the scores for Lijphart's first dimension for the years 1981 to 2010 (Lijphart, 2012).

4.6 Operationalizing the Second Dimension: Participation

4.6.1 Conceptualization

Participation is an important pillar of democracy. As mentioned before, in many definitions of democracy and particularly in Dahl's theory, it is one of the main attributes of democracy. Regarding participation, on the one hand, a democratic political system must institutionalize and facilitate participation rights of citizens, and on the other, people should use their participation rights and be involved in the political process. The institutional provisions enabling popular participation resemble the 'main gate of Participation Hall', which must be open. But, citizens should also participate to some extent otherwise "Participation Hall" will remain empty even when its gates are wide open. Many indices of democracy measure the institutional "room for participation" by assessing political rights (e.g. freedom of speech, freedom of association, free and fair electoral process) and universal suffrage. If we are interested in actual or "realized participation", which we are in this chapter, then an independent index is needed to represent this attribute.

Electoral participation is a useful first indicator of political participation. Higher turnout in parliamentary or presidential elections indicates a stronger inclination of people to influence politics in their country. There is also a more direct method of electoral participation, through referendums or similar direct votations. Referendums can be government-initiated or citizen-initiated. The latter normally originate from popular initiatives, which represent the possibility of bottom-up involvement in the political issues. Furthermore, several manifestations of *non-electoral involvement* of citizens can be identified, namely: 'interest in politics', 'membership of parties' and 'engagement in political actions' or in other words: 'political involvement', 'party activities' and 'protest participation' (Norris, 2002; Verba et al., 1978).

In the literature, there is a debate on what should be considered political 'participation'. Verba, Nie and Kim (1978) suggest a distinction between 'political involvement', which incorporates interest in politics and discussions about politics, and 'political participation' which is defined as activities directed to influence the governmental process. Party-related participation is normally considered as conventional political participation, pertinent to electoral participation. It has also been argued that interest in and discussion of politics is not necessarily

connected to political participation since it can be merely 'expressive'. Hence, some scholars excluded it from their analyses of political participation (Parry et al., 1992; Verba et al., 1978). Considering these reflections, we decided to involve only political action or protest participation as a mode of non-electoral participation in practice. Altogether, we conclude that three components - 'general-electoral participation', 'referendum-electoral participation' and 'non-electoral participation' - can adequately represent the main modes of political participations in practice. The next step is to look for proper measures of these three components.

4.6.2 Measurement: Electoral and Non-Electoral Participation

Many indices of democratic participation are based on subjective experts' assessments (Freedom House, 2012; Polity IV, 2014). Developing an index for political participation based on 'objective' and measurable indicators is what we aim to do in this section. Vanhanen (2000) used one measurable indicator - voter turnout - as a proxy of participation in his Index of Democratization. Later, he added referendums in the calculation of his indicator (Vanhanen, 2002). This measure has been criticized by other political scientists as a narrow and improper indicator of quality of democracy (Munck & Verkuilen, 2002).

Peterlevitz (2011) also tried to add the "processes of direct democracy" to voter turnout arguing that a measure merely based on turnout in periodic elections is too "thin" for assessing political participation. He combined voter turnout of legislative or presidential elections and number of referendums in each year. Although a valuable attempt, the resulting index is problematic in some respects. Peterlevitz (2011) weighs the compulsory and optional voting systems equally. Moreover, he multiplies turnout of regular elections with the number of referendums, while there is no convincing justification for doing so. Following our conceptualization, we will identify measures for both electoral participation as well as non-electoral participation. We introduce and discuss each relevant indicator and its formulation.

4.6.2.1 General-Electoral Participation (GEP)

Regarding participation in general elections, we accept voter turnout as the appropriate indicator. In (semi-)presidential systems, we take the average turnout of parliamentary and presidential elections. In our study we use the Voting Age Population (VAP) turnout because it better

demonstrates the real share of the population that participates in elections[10]. Moreover, it is argued that 'inclusiveness' is one of the more important criteria of a democratic system (Kriesi & Bochsler, 2012). Using VAP turnout, we implicitly include the extent of suffrage in our indicator, since the more inclusive democracy has the larger denominator in the turnout ratio[11]. As it is estimated that the turnout in countries with compulsory voting system would be magnified by 7 to 16 percent on average (Blais, 2006; Lijphart, 2007), we multiply a reduction coefficient of 0.85 to the corresponding electoral turnouts. We gathered the list of countries with the compulsory voting from the IDEA (2013) database.[12] The final countries' scores of the General-Electoral Participation (GEP) indicator for the years 1990 to 2009 were calculated and tabulated in Table E.1 in Appendix E.

4.6.2.2 Referendum-Electoral Participation (REP)

Developing an indicator for referendum-electoral participation is a challenging task. In recent years some scholars attempted to measure direct democracy, most of which considered the occurrence and number of referendums as the main indicator (Altman, 2011; Kriesi & Bochsler, 2012; Peterlevitz, 2011).

In his book, Altman (2011) explains different mechanisms of direct democracy. He compiled a table of worldwide events of direct democracy between 1984 and 2009, listing the number of top-down as well as citizen-initiated occasions of direct democracy in 108 countries. As mentioned before, Peterlevitz (2011) supplemented voter turnout with the number of referendums to make an indicator for political participation.

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10. The turnout is usually measured using two different formulas: one is the percentage of total number of votes cast divided by the registered electors (voting eligible population), and the other one is called VAP turnout which has the Voting Age Population as the denominator. The VAP includes all citizens above the legal voting age. The database of International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA, 2013) provides both voter and VAP turnouts for virtually all countries. In the case of missing data for some countries, we use other sources namely African Elections Database (2012), IPU (2012), Keesing (1998) and Nohlen & Stover (2010).

11. In theory, the VAP turnout must be lower than the registered-based voter turnout (because the voting age population is always more than the registered voters). However, since the voting age population is calculated based on the most recent and available census, in some cases the VAP is not updated and consequently the reported VAP turnout is higher than the registered-based voter turnout. In such cases we will consider the lower turnout as the more realistic indictor in our calculations.

12. We apply the reduction factor to 17 countries having compulsory voting. We are aware that this decision may be debated, however, it does not have a major impact on the general pattern of PDD.

In some publications (Altman, 2012; Fiorino & Ricciuti, 2007; Gross & Kaufmann, 2002; Vatter, 2009), authors used the constitutional allowance of referendums, instead of the frequency of referendums, as the measure for direct democracy. In his effort to replicate Lijphart's study, Vatter (2009) even added a third dimension of direct democracy to Lijphart's two-dimensional model. He developed a new index for ranking direct democracy in OECD countries by weighting different types of referendums (i.e. controlled vs. uncontrolled referendums in his terminology) considering the constitutional allowance and the incidence (regardless how frequent) of referendums. In our opinion, this kind of indicator, based on the constitutional provisions for referendums, cannot be a valid proxy for direct democracy *in action*.

We therefore developed an indicator for measuring referendum-based participation by considering the average number of referendums in a decade, at both national and local level. We use different weights for different types (top-down vs. bottom-up), levels (national vs. local) and effects (binding vs. advisory) of referendums (The description of varieties of referendums and the rationale behind our weighting factors are presented in Appendix D). We aggregate all referendums according to the following formula:

$$\text{aggregated score of referendums} = \Sigma \left(K_{\text{effect}} * K_{\text{level}} * K_{\text{type}} * N_{\text{type}}\right)$$

In this formula, N_{type} is the number of realized referendums of each type in each year. Since in practice we should "take into account the declining marginal importance of additional referendums" (Kriesi & Bochsler, 2012, p. 146), the direct participation indicator would be calculated in a logarithmic scale. Thus, we define the Referendum-Electoral Participation (REP) indicator as follows:

$$\text{REP Indicator} = \text{Log}\left(\text{aggregated score of referendums} + 1\right)$$

We added 1 to the formula before taking the logarithm in order to give the zero score to the countries with no referendums. We assume the highest score limit of 1 for the REP. The countries' REP scores for the range of 1990 to 2009 have been calculated and tabulated in Table E.1 in Appendix E.

As expected we found high and significant correlations of 0.71 and 0.66 ($p<0.001$, $N=80$) between the REP indicator and the referendum indicators by Altman (2011) and Kriesi & Bochsler (2012) respectively. There is also a moderate correlation of 0.55 ($p<0.001$, $N=80$) between

REP and Vatter's indicator of direct democracy. This correlation is not unexpected since in both studies a comparable coding of referendum types has been used. As anticipated, there is only a modest correlation of 0.39 ($p<0.01$, $N=64$) between our REP indicator and the DDI indicator by Fiorino & Ricciuti (2007), which is mainly based on the institutional provisions for referendums. In conclusion, the REP indicator is in line with other indices of direct democracy, while including some relevant aspects and nuances not considered by others.

4.6.2.3 Non-Electoral Participation (NEP)

Although the identification of good measures for non-electoral participation is not easy, it is not impossible. For instance, there are some relevant questions regarding the three categories of non-electoral participation in the European Value Survey (EVS, 2012), Afrobarometer (2012), Latinobarometro (2012), Globalbarometer (2012) and the World Value Survey (WVS, 2012). Following the discussion in the conceptualization section, we searched in the question items in several waves of surveys between 1990 and 2009 to gather the data for 'political action' as the main manifestation of non-electoral participation.

We considered three forms of political action as proper measures for non-electoral participation: 'signing a petition', 'joining in boycotts' and 'attending lawful demonstrations'. For each action, the percentage of respondents who choose 'have done' is assumed to be the score of the measure. The three forms of political action can be considered as alternatives to each other in different countries. Signing petitions is the user-friendliest form of participation. In some contexts, however, it is believed to be impotent and those with demands prefer 'protest participation'. For instance, attending demonstrations is more popular than signing petitions in countries like Greece and Spain.[13] We apply the 'maximum' aggregation rule that is proper for the conceptual attributes with the compensatory relationship (Munck, 2009). It means that the highest score among three measures will be the proxy of non-electoral participation[14]. Therefore, the final score for Non-Electoral Participation (NEP) indicator is calculated using the following formula:

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13. According to the WVS, in the survey of 2007-2008, 36% of Spanish and 23% of Greek respondents mentioned that they 'have attended in lawful demonstrations' while 23% of Spanish and 19% of Greek respondents declared that they 'have signed petition'.

14. This aggregation rule is acceptable and reliable if the three measures display a minimum level of internal relatedness. The result of Cronbach's alpha reliability test is 0.61(N=72), which represents a meaningful level of internal consistency. For those

NEP Indicator = Maximum percentage of people who 'have done' signing petitions or joining boycotts or attend demonstrations

4.6.3 Aggregation: Towards the Participative Dimension of Democracy (PDD)

Deciding about the proper aggregation rule is again challenging. We found a weak Cronbach's alpha (~ 0.40) for these three indicators which reveals that factor analysis is not an appropriate method. What else is possible? The proposed index for political participation in the Polyarchy dataset by Vanhanen (2002) is calculated by adding two components of turnout and referendums. In his formula the highest possible score would be 70 points, 30 points of which can be attributed to referendums. Thus, referendums could compensate low turnouts. In this formulation, if a voter turnout in a country is 70 percent or more, then the highest score would be achieved[15]. Altman (2012), in his effort to 'bringing direct democracy back in', suggests an additive formula that gives a 25 percent weight for referendums and 75 percent for other components of democracy. Unlike the earlier formulas, Altman's aggregation rule is not fully compensatory or substitutive but is additive with the specific weight for each component.

We could argue that each of our three indictors (i.e. GEP, REP and NEP) represents one particular mode of political participation. The scarcity of one cannot be fully compensated by the abundance of the other. For instance, it might be argued that the high frequency of referendums in Switzerland could compensate its low turnouts in general elections. But the former 'high' should not overcompensate the latter 'low'. (It is also true for the reverse that the lack of referendum-based participation cannot be ignored due to the high level of voter turnout in general elections.) Needless to say, that the non-electoral participation also cannot be a substitute for the representative participation and referendums.[16]

African and Latin American countries that all three items of political action have not been surveyed, we used only available data to find the NEP score.

15. Peterlevitz (2011) revised the Vanhanen's formula without changing the main logic of it. He considered the same way of aggregation in which the score of referendums is an additive to the turnout. In his formula, the highest score would be 100, which can be achieved by either turnout or number of referendums in a substitutable manner.

16. All sorts of electoral participation need the formal process to be fulfilled and hence take plenty of time and resources. In an occasion that people are not satisfied with adopted policies or the way of governance, the non-electoral participation is the main means of political activism. The political action or protest participation is an important 'control

Considering the different aggregation rules, we conclude that the additive rule with the different weights for each mode of participation is the appropriate approach for aggregating three modes of participation and developing the participative dimension of democracy. Although a selective weighting would always be debatable, an equal weighting for all three modes of participation would be more problematic. We argue that general elections are still the most important locus of national participation, because of the significant role of elected representatives in democratic governance. Thus, the GEP should have extra weight. Regarding the growing importance of direct participation, manifested in referendums and (new) social movements, it should have a proper weight as well. All in all, we propose a 3:1:1 relationship as a sound ratio of the GEP, REP and NEP respectively. Thus, the final formulation of participative dimension of democracy will be as follows:

Participative Dimension of Democracy (PDD) = 0.60 * GEP + 0.20 * REP + 0.20 * NEP

In which GEP= General-Electoral Participation, REP= Referendum-Electoral Participation and NEP=Non-Electoral Participation.

The scale of all three components is between 0 and 1. Hence, the final score will have the same scale. All in all, the proposed ratio is not only in line with the provisional weightings of other scholars, but is also consistent with the theoretical and practical weight of three modes of political participation. The scores of PDD and three components (GEP, REP, NEP) for 80 countries for the period of 1990 to 2009 are listed in Table E.1 in Appendix E.

As a reliability test we can examine the correlation between PDD and indices by Vanhanen (2002) and Peterlevitz (2011). PDD and these two indices have two components (i.e. turnout and referendum) in common. As expected, PDD has high and significant correlations of 0.82 ($p<0.001$, $N=69$) and 0.76 ($p<0.001$, $N=62$) with Vanhanen's and Peterlevitz's indices respectively[17]. Moreover, we checked the correlation between the 'political participation', subcategory of the Economist Index of

force' to regulate the function of power holders. That is, if the power holders know that the public participation and people's surveillance are not only there in election times but also realized in different forms of non-electoral participation, then their accountability would be different. Therefore, lack of non-electoral participation cannot be fully compensated by having high electoral participation.

17. The statistical correlations between PDD and two indices by Vanhanen (2002) and Peterlevitz (2011) were calculated for the years 1990 to 2000.

Democracy (EIU, 2010), and PDD. Among indices of democracy, this is the only index we found that contains an element of non-electoral participation in addition to turnout. The EIU employed some items from WVS similar to what we used in developing the NEP indicator. EIU's 'political participation' is available as of 2006 only. We calculated its average score from 2006 to 2010. This average has a high and significant correlation of 0.70 ($N=80$, $p<0.001$) with the PDD for the 2000s.

Finally, in order to corroborate the assumption that these two dimensions of democracy, i.e. IDD and PDD, are independent and they cannot be reduced to a uni-dimensional model (Coppedge et al., 2008), we calculate the correlation between the two dimensions. As expected, only a very weak correlation of 0.24 ($N=80$, $p<0.05$) between IDD and PDD is found. It confirms that these two dimensions of democracy are independent and non-integrable.

4.7 Two-Dimensional Mapping of Democracy

Our main goal in this chapter is the operationalization of models of democracy on two dimensions, and the subsequent construction of a comparative map for a large number of electoral democracies. Extracting the empirical scores, we map democracy on a global scale for the years 1990-2009. In Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3 the horizontal axis represents the *integrative* (versus *aggregative*) dimension of democracy and the vertical axis shows the *participative* (versus *spectative*) dimension of democracy. The right side of the maps exhibits countries with a more integrative (or consensual) practice of democracy; the left side indicates more aggregative (or majoritarian) democracies. The upper side of the map presents countries with more participative democracy, and the lower zone is ascribed to countries with a more spectative type of democracy.

Four typical combinations or types of democracies can be distinguished. The type with high scores on both the participative and integrative dimension could be called *integrative-participative democracy*. A strong example here is Switzerland, known for its highly consensual system, which brings elites of various persuasions in permanent relations of cooperation, but also its strongly developed arsenal of direct democracy, which gives the general public many ways to participate (Kriesi & Trechsel, 2008). This category also includes the Nordic and Low Countries in North-Western Europe, which may not have the same level of referendum-related participation as Switzerland,

but do display comparatively high general-electoral and non-electoral participation, compared to the bulk of other countries on the map.

High scores on the participative dimension together with low scores on the integrative dimension gives a combination that we label *aggregative-participative democracy*. The prototype here is the USA, which has been known for its highly competitive, majoritarian political system and its relatively participative 'civic culture' for long (cf. Almond & Verba, 1963, 1980; Norris, 2002). Aggregative-participative democracy coincides remarkable, but not exclusively, to the English-speaking group of countries.



Figure 4.2. Two-dimensional map of democracy for 1990 to 2009 with the electoral system highlighted

The type of democracy with low scores on both the integrative and the participative dimension could be called *aggregative-spectative democracy*. Here, a highly majoritarian, 'winner takes all' model coincides with a strong tendency to 'spectator democracy', with citizens

showing thumbs up, or down, in general elections but not a lot of additional political participation. An apt illustration is Greece, with its adversarial, dichotomous political system, and its relatively detached culture of citizenship (Koliopoulos & Veremis, 2002)[18]. Patterns of democracy in Mexico and some other Latin-American countries and new democracies in Africa appear to be even more spectative on the aggregative side of the map (cf. Reid, 2007).

The combination of high scores for integrative democracy and low scores for participative democracy could be named *integrative-spectative democracy*. An extreme variant here is post-conflict Bosnia, where the Dayton agreements have established highly consociational structures (of almost Belgian or Swiss complexity), which are however not combined with the levels of participation found in established consociational countries like Belgium or Switzerland. More typical seem to be the Baltic States, combining more moderate levels of integrative and spectative democracy than outlier Bosnia (Bose, 2005; Patrick & Hamot, 2005). Lastly, at the bottom-left part of the map, we could distinguish a fifth category of countries, with such a low level of democratic participation that we propose to name this category *abstention democracy*. In this category, we find countries like Senegal, Zambia, Mali, Paraguay and Guatemala.

In Figure 4.2, the electoral system of each country (as specified in Table E.1 in Appendix E) is highlighted on the map. All countries with a majoritarian electoral system - except for the persistent 'puzzle of Indian democracy' (Lijphart, 1996) - and the majority of countries with a mixed system are located on the left side of the map. The right side of the map is dominated by countries with a system of proportional representation (PR). Both observations suggest patterns consistent with democratic theory, but it should be noted that especially PR systems are dispersed along the horizontal axis. A considerable number of countries with a proportional electoral system are on the side of aggregative democracy in Figure 4.2. This indicates that the institutional provisions for proportional representation may be conducive to, but not necessarily connected to, the integrative model of democracy. It seems that other institutional and contextual factors play a role in the ultimate development of integrative or aggregative democracy; this will be studied in the next chapter.

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18. Our data for the 1990-2009 period cannot tell whether patterns of political participation have fundamentally changed following the outbreak of the recent financial crisis in 2009.



Figure 4.3. Two-dimensional map of democracy for 1990 to 2009 with the regime type highlighted

Figure 4.3 highlights the regime type of countries. The top of the map (the realm of more participative democracy) is dominated by countries with a (semi-)parliamentary system. The notable exception is the USA, combining a clearly presidential system with a top score on the participative dimension. Uruguay is another exception having a presidential system and a rather high participative model. However, there are also many parliamentary democracies located at the spectative part and even at the bottom of the map (e.g. Bosnia and Jamaica, where a parliamentary system comes together with abstention rather than participative democracy). Although most presidential regimes are on the left side of the map, there are some exceptions - namely Brazil, Indonesia, Benin and Ecuador. The most remarkable exception here is Brazil, which combines a presidential system with a relatively high score on the integrative dimension of democracy. Pattern-defying cases like

these show that the level of integrative or participative democracy in a particular country is not simply determined by regime type.



Figure 4.4. Two-dimensional map of democracy for 1990 to 2009 with the region highlighted

Finally, regions of countries are highlighted in Figure 4.4. Although there are a few cluster-defying exceptions, it is striking to discover that countries with geographical or cultural affinities tend to practice, more or less, similar models of democracy. Figure 4.4 depicts eight country groups, referring to categorizations often-used in the literature (Gupta et al., 2002; Ronen & Shenkar, 1985). The Anglo group of countries sits, without exception, in the aggregative-participative quadrant of the map. The Latin-European group resides here as well, with the exception of Portugal, and despite a somewhat less participative score for Spain and France. The North/West European cluster is clearly grouped in the participative-integrative quadrant, with the tiny exception of Luxembourg, and a location of Finland closer to the Baltic/East European

group. With the notable exceptions of Brazil and Uruguay, the Latin-American countries spread out the aggregative-spectative quadrant, where one part of the African cluster also resides at the most aggregative side; another part (Senegal, Zambia, Mali) is closer to what we earlier called abstention democracy. Benin is the only African country located in the integrative-spectative quadrant. Similar to young democracies in Latin American countries, the large part of Central/Eastern European group are mainly in the spectative-aggregative section of the map, with Bosnia, Slovenia and Slovakia as outliers. Lastly, one group is more dispersed: the Asian group, with one subgroup in the aggregative-spectative, and another in the integrative-spectative quadrant.

Having operationalized dimensions of democracy for the years between 1990 and 2009, we can present the changes of democratic models in countries under study over two decades.[19] Figure 4.5 (top) shows the changes in IDD in 77 countries. Assuming the alteration more than 0.05 as a remarkable change (outside of the shaded area in Figure 4.5), we observe some twenty countries in each side of the figure that have had a considerable shift in their democratic model. Colombia and Croatia experienced the highest shift from an aggregative to an integrative model of democracy (a change more than 0.15). On the opposite, Thailand, Georgia, Turkey and Ukraine have had the highest shift towards a more aggregative model of democracy. Austria, Benin, Cyprus, Greece, Iceland, Indonesia, Malta, Namibia, Sri Lanka, United Kingdom and the United States have had virtually no changes in their democratic models (less than 0.01). Expectedly we can see that a majority of 'established democracies' have experienced less change in their democratic models. Exceptions are Japan, Italy and France that present changes toward a more aggregative model; Norway, Finland and Costa Rica, on the other hand, display shifts to a more integrative model.

19. Since there are two countries (Bosnia, Senegal) which converted to democracy in 2000s and also due to the missing electoral disproportionality for Mali in 2000s, these three countries were excluded from Figure 4.5 (top).



Figure 4.5. Changes in IDD and PDD from1990s to 2000s, ordered from the highest decrease (in left) to the highest increase (in right)

Note: changes less than 0.05 are shaded

Figure 4.5 (down) demonstrates in a substantial number of electoral democracies a shift towards a more spectative model of democracy over the past decade. Considering the same threshold of 0.05, we see that eighteen countries experienced a drop in the participative dimension (PDD), while eleven countries had a slight increase in this dimension.[20] As illustrated in the figure, Lithuania, Albania and Romania are countries with the highest rate of decrease (more than 0.15) in PDD; Macedonia is the only country that experienced an increase of more than 0.10 from 1990s to 2000s. Twelve countries (Spain, Hungary, Sweden, Luxembourg, Finland, Malta, Australia, Croatia, India, Iceland, Norway and Brazil) displayed almost no change in PDD over two decades (less than 0.01). Almost all established democracies (except the UK that has experienced a considerable drop in PDD) had no major change in PDD (see countries in the shaded area). This implies that changes in models of democracy are seen more in new and developing democracies. The operationalization of democratic models in this study could be instrumental for future research on the changes in democratic models.

4.8 Conclusion

The central aim of the previous undertaking was to operationalize models of democracy in action, based on 'two persistent dimensions of democracy' (Coppedge et al., 2008), namely contestation and participation. We recognized three conceptual attributes for each dimension and accordingly developed three indicators to measure each of them. In the aggregation of each of the three indicators, we developed two bipolar indices called the *integrative (vs. aggregative)* dimension and the *participative (vs. spectative)* dimension of democracy. Statistical calculation reveals that these two dimensions have a weak correlation (0.24, $p<0.05$) with each other, which validates the two-dimensionality of our model.

The additional aim of this undertaking was to empirically map a large number of democratic countries, spread across the globe, connecting them to our two-dimensional model. In the previous section we summarized the empirical findings in three comparative graphs, using and assembling data from a number of well-known databases. We noted a number of remarkable country cases as well as some emergent empirical

20. In addition to two countries that have converted to electoral democracy in 2000s, due to missing data of NEP for 9 countries in 1990s, we could not compare PDD for eleven countries.

patterns. We also identified pattern-defying cases (a.o. India and Brazil) as well as theory-challenging observations (e.g. some PR-systems located at the aggregative, left side of Figure 4.2, when PR is usually understood as indicative of integrative democracy), which demand further and deeper analysis.

We finally presented countries' changes in IDD and PDD over two decades and identified electoral democracies with major changes as well as countries with minor variation, which have been mostly established democracies. Much can and will be done by way of subsequent empirical research. But in this chapter, we set out to do first things first - that is: the systematic operationalization and subsequent empirical mapping of democracy for a large-N study of countries.

We started our research with the speculation that the shape of the democratic model is not *per se* a determinant of the level and performance of democracy in a country. To examine this thesis, we calculated the correlations between different dimensions of democratic models and the existing indices of level (or quality) and performance of democracy.

Table 4.1 presents the correlational scores of three groups of indices. As we can see, there is a very weak, positive correlation between IDD and the indices measuring level of democracy (the highest correlation is 0.34 ($p<0.01$) with the Polity IV index and the lowest correlation is a non-significant one with the Freedom House index). The same goes for correlations between IDD and indices measuring performance of democracy (the highest is 0.30 ($p<0.01$) with Human Development Index and the lowest is a non-significant correlation with democratic satisfaction). Lijphart's Executives-Parties dimension shows somewhat higher positive correlations with these indices. This implies that Lijphart's conclusion on the superiority of consensus democracy is not robust when new and developing democracies are involved. It is striking that Vatter's and Kriesi-Bochsler's dimensions have no significant correlations with any indices of level and performance of democracy.

On the other hand, PDD shows higher, positive correlations with the indices of level and performance of democracy, although the correlations between PDD and some indices of level of democracy (i.e. Polity IV and EIU) are not very strong (equal or less than 0.50). However, the direction of causality between the participative dimension and level and performance of democracy is a question to be addressed in further research.

Table 4.1. Pearson correlations between different dimensions/indices of model, level and performance of democracy

Model of Democracy	1	IDD (1990-2009)	1 (80)																	
	2	PDD (1990-2009)	.242** (80)	1 (80)																
	3	Lijphart (Parties-Executives) (1981-2010)	.884*** (33)	.449*** (33)	1 (33)															
	4	Vatter (Parties-Interest Groups) (1997-2006)	.767*** (23)	.212 (23)	.865*** (23)	1 (23)														
	5	Kriesi-Bochsler (Consensus-Majoritarian) (1990-2007)	.224 (49)	.201 (49)	.481*** (29)	.766*** (23)	1 (49)													
Level of Democracy	6	WGI-Voice and Accountability (1996-2009)	.241** (80)	.678*** (80)	.428** (33)	.225 (23)	.175 (49)	1 (80)												
	7	FH-Total Score (1990-2009)	-.167 (80)	-.647*** (80)	-.351** (33)	-.206 (23)	-.207 (49)	-.945*** (80)	1 (80)											
	8	Polity IV (1990-2009)	.341*** (77)	.503*** (77)	.484*** (31)	.161 (22)	.047 (47)	.784*** (77)	-.829*** (77)	1 (77)										
	9	EIU-Electoral Process (2006-2010)	.295*** (80)	.448*** (80)	.363** (33)	.272 (23)	.183 (49)	.732*** (80)	-.712*** (80)	.725*** (77)	1 (80)									
Performance of Democracy	10	WGI-Government Effectiveness (1996-2009)	.237** (80)	.704*** (80)	.437** (33)	.120 (23)	.085 (49)	.917*** (80)	-.825*** (80)	.663*** (77)	.601*** (80)	1 (80)								
	11	WGI-Rule of Law (1996-2009)	.214* (80)	.690*** (80)	.431** (33)	.041 (23)	.036 (49)	.929*** (80)	-.839*** (80)	.666*** (77)	.585*** (80)	.968*** (80)	1 (80)							
	12	WGI-Control of Corruption (1996-2009)	.225** (80)	.685*** (80)	.439** (33)	.087 (23)	.129 (49)	.919*** (80)	-.820*** (80)	.671*** (77)	.594*** (80)	.967*** (80)	.968*** (80)	1 (80)						
	13	EIU-Function of Government (2006-2010)	.267** (80)	.614*** (80)	.466*** (33)	.173 (23)	.155 (49)	.830*** (80)	-.773*** (80)	.682*** (77)	.659*** (80)	.834*** (80)	.826*** (80)	.832*** (80)	1 (80)					
	14	HDI (1990-2009)	.301*** (79)	.687*** (79)	.316* (33)	-.094 (23)	.081 (49)	.759*** (79)	-.685*** (79)	.691*** (76)	.668*** (79)	.788*** (79)	.734*** (79)	.743*** (79)	.580*** (79)	1 (79)				
	15	Satisfaction with Democracy (1990-2009)	-.112 (77)	.394*** (77)	.177 (32)	-.050 (23)	.108 (49)	.489*** (77)	-.454*** (77)	.185 (77)	.007 (77)	.550*** (77)	.587*** (77)	.584*** (77)	.498*** (77)	.102 (76)				
			1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14				
			Model of Democracy					Level of Democracy				Performance of Democracy								

Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10; number of countries in parentheses.

Sources: EIU, 2010; FH: Freedom House, 2012; HDI: UNDP, 2012; Kriesi and Bochsler, 2012; Lijphart, 2012; Polity IV: Marshall et al., 2011; Vatter, 2009; WGI: Kaufmann et al., 2009.

All in all, from our operationalization of two dimensions of democracy for a broad range of electoral democracies, we can conclude that 'model' of democracy (as operationalized here) is distinguishable from other aspects of democracy namely 'level' and 'performance' of democracy. Moreover, the associations between democratic models and performance indicators show that a final, conclusive verdict regarding the superiority of one democratic model over another (i.e. majoritarian vs. consensual) cannot be passed.

This raises the (new) research question as to what factor can explain emergence and workings of different models of democracy in different countries. Although we did not elaborate on this specific question here, we could speculate that the effectiveness and acceptability of each model of democracy is context-sensitive. That is, each model of democracy could be credible and effective in one context and problematic and ineffective in another. In our view, models of democracy should be compatible with the context of democracy in order to be vital. This thesis will be elaborated and scrutinized in follow-up chapters.

We finish this chapter by listing the distinctive features of our two-dimensional approach to democracy.

1. The first, 'integrative' dimension of our two-dimensional model operationalizes the extent of contestation (and competition) in democracy, or the other way around: the level of pacification (and consensualism). It can be considered, to a large extent, a replication of the first, 'executives-parties' dimension in Lijphart's seminal study Patterns of Democracy (1999, 2012). It has, however, the advantage of covering more countries from all over the world, including the newest democracies. Moreover, we opted for the more simple and measurable indicators and excluded the more controversial ones (as elaborated in Section 4.5.2).
2. The second, 'participative' dimension is less often elaborated in the more specialized literature on the multi-dimensional modeling of democracy. In the more general literature on democracy it is, however, broadly recognized as vital and attention-deserving. By assembling usable, but scattered, measures of electoral and non-electoral participation in one dimension we tried to add something that was not there yet. Participation in direct, referendum democracy is considered together with participation in general elections, as well as participation beyond the realm of elections and votations.
3. We have used only 'objective indicators' of real political practices. None of our measures is dependent on the subjective assessments of

third parties (i.e. experts who give a subjective assessment of participation or integration in a particular democracy).

4. We have considered subtleties in the calculation of indicators largely ignored in other works, such as the incidence of compulsory voting in some countries (which needs to be corrected for), local and non-binding referendums (which need to be considered besides national, binding referendums), and presidential disproportionality (which needs to be included in the estimation of total electoral disproportionality).
5. We have scaled our measures using the original scores to avoid the problem of interpretation of standardized data. We have been as transparent as possible about the formulation of our indicators as well as the applied aggregation rules. Using the original scores and providing them in this book gives other researchers the opportunity to replicate the analysis by using different aggregation rules; this is often lacking in this kind of research (Munck & Verkuilen, 2002).
6. We have operationalized the two dimensions of democracy for two decades (1990 to 2009). The starting date of 1990 marks the beginning of a new era of democratization after the fall of communism in many countries. We have carefully assembled data, as comprehensively as possible, so that at least the data of two elections could be included for each country in each decade.

Finally, we should recognize that this study like any other scientific research of this type implies some challenges:

1. The number of variables measuring the two dimensions of contestation and participation could be debated. Although we believe that our three measures for each dimension are both necessary and adequate, other authors may come up with convincing arguments that more measures are needed. Our view is that it should be possible to add an indicator, if it is objectively measurable and, more importantly, if there is a strong theoretical argument for its inclusion.
2. The participative dimension introduced in this chapter represents one of the first attempts to combine three different aspects of political participation, which implies room for improvement. In the development of this dimension, we had to work with available - restricted and imperfect - sources of data for referendums as well as non-electoral participation. The items we have selected from the value surveys and the method for averaging and aggregating them could be challenged. We have tried to operationalize participation as

consistently and convincingly as possible, but we should not rule out future improvements.

3. Our aggregation method differs from the common factor analysis used by various scholars in the field, which may therefore lead to raised eyebrows. However, factor analysis is only possible if there is a meaningful correlation between variables; and it is only useful if a convincing theory for aggregation is lacking (Munck & Verkuilen, 2002). Here, we have tried to formulate an appropriate, theoretically informed, aggregation rule for both dimensions of democracy. We find the arguments for proceeding this way convincing, but this can be debated.
4. The range of twenty years (1990-2009) may be too short for those researchers who would rather see a longer time span than a longer list of countries mapped along the same dimensions. This shortcoming can be tackled by performing complementary research at later points in time, if and when more longitudinal data for the full set of countries can be collected.

Chapter 5

The Relation between Cultural Values and Models of Democracy: A Cross-National Study*

* This chapter is based on Maleki, A., & Hendriks, F. (2014). The Relation between Cultural Values and Models of Democracy: A Cross-National Study. *Democratization*. DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2014.893426.

5.1 Introduction

The relation between democracy and culture is a long-lasting subject of interest in political science. The mainstream of research has focused on finding a relation between qualities of a democratic system (e.g. effective democracy) and the existence of essential values (e.g. self-expression values). Some empirical efforts were made to unravel the relation between cultural values and the level of democratization (see Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p. 245 for the list of literature). In most of these attempts, a number of cultural values were introduced as important drivers or blockers on the track of democracy.

There is, however, an understudied question as to what the relation between cultural values and 'models of democracy' in different countries exactly entails. We know that there are different models or patterns of democracy (e.g. majoritarian vs. consensus and participatory vs. spectator democracy) in various countries (see Chapter 4 and Anderson & Torpe, 2000; Dahl, 2000; Held, 2006; Lijphart, 1999, 2012). But why does a particular country, or country group, treasure and accept one model of democracy, while suspecting and discrediting another type? Does culture matter in adopting and practicing a particular model of democracy?

In this chapter, we explore an alternative - not primarily functionalistic but culturalistic - way of understanding the adoption of different models of democracy in different countries. First of all, we will shortly review different perspectives on the relation between culture and democracy. Second, we will briefly review our operationalization of models of democracy in 80 countries based on two dimensions of contestation and participation. Then we will introduce a set of cross-cultural research projects that empirically extracted dimensions of national culture. Next, we will discuss different features of those cultural orientations that are conceptually relevant to the two dimensions of democracy - contestation and participation – that we elaborated on. Accordingly we will formulate a number of hypotheses regarding the relation between dimensions of national culture and these two dimensions. Finally, we will examine the hypotheses empirically and draw some conclusions and give suggestions for further research.

5.2 Culture and Democracy: A Triangular Relationship

The interaction between culture and democracy can be studied in different ways, as Figure 5.1 shows.



Figure 5.1. The triangular relations between culture, structure and performance

Some authors focus on the relation between cultural values and democratic performance (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Licht et al., 2007). For instance, Inglehart and Welzel (2005, p. 154) in their seminal work on modernization theory argue that there is a casual relation between cultural values and democratization. Based on a massive body of cross-national data, they assert that higher levels of self-expression values lead to higher levels of 'effective democracy', which they define as the product of 'Presence of Democracy' and 'Quality of Democracy'.[1]

The causal arrow that Inglehart and Welzel draw goes from cultural values to democratic performance. They do, however, not examine the interrelation between culture and structure of democracy, nor the possible connection between these two together and democratic performance.

Regarding the role of, and interaction between, culture and democratic institutions, some political scientists argue that 'just institutions matter', or that 'inclusive institutions' matter most (among others: Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; Rothstein, 1998). These scientists eventually try to explain the relation between the institutions and the performance of a nation. They argue, for instance, that it is not culture that determines the

1. To construct the index of effective democracy, they multiply the Freedom House measures of civil and political rights by the World Bank's anticorruption scores.

performance but institutions. We do not disagree with the core message of these theories but we speculate that the compatibility of cultural orientations and institutional design matters as well for the performance of institutions. In this study, we aim to examine how cultural orientations codetermine and influence the preference for different arrangement of democratic institutions, i.e. models of democracy.

Democracy is practiced in different models or patterns. The dichotomy of majoritarian vs. consensus democracy, elaborated and operationalized by Lijphart in his seminal research into *Patterns of Democracy*, is vastly discussed and debated. Some other distinct models like participatory vs. spectator or active vs. passive democracy are identified (Anderson & Torpe, 2000). Each of these models has its own proponents and opponents. No conclusive empirical evidence, however, has shown the consistent outperformance of one particular model by another.

Lijphart (1999) examined the relation between 'structure' and 'performance' of democracy and concluded that the consensus model is a "kinder and gentler" model of democracy. He argued that in a fragmented society, the majoritarian model of democracy is conflict-prone and hence the consensual model should be practiced. Norris (2008) also assessed the relation between democratic institutions and quality of democracy and mainly supported the Lijphartian approach. Linder and Bachtiger (2005) asserted that the consensus model (power-sharing) is crucial for democratization in developing countries in Asia and Africa. Moreover, they examined the influence of the cultural trait of familism on the level of democracy and concluded that this cultural factor would play a more pivotal role (negatively) than economic factors for these societies.

These scholars, however, did not discuss the relation between cultural orientations and models of democracy in their works. Only at the end of his book, Lijphart briefly mentioned some plausible interactions between culture and democratic models. In his review of Lijphart's theory and its critics, Bormann (2010, p. 9) concluded that "in future research endeavors, political scientists in Lijphart's footsteps should try to disentangle the intricate relationship between culture and political institutions to gain a deeper understanding of how the two influence each other". He emphasized that "Lijphart's repeated claim of the superiority of consensus over majoritarian democracies in the presence of evidence to the contrary should be continuously revisited, especially in novel environments".

In his 'theory of democracy in action', Hendriks (2009, 2010) conceptualized the relation between various models of democracy and

compatible socio-political cultures. He theoretically argued that "political cultures and societal cultures are the foundations underpinning the models of democracy" (Hendriks, 2010, p. 32). His study is one of the rare ones that explicitly posits a relation between dimensions of democracy and dimensions of culture. He hypothesized that two dimensions of democracy and two dimensions of culture are associated: the integrative (vs. aggregative) dimension of democracy would relate to the cultural orientation of convergence (vs. contest) and the direct (vs. indirect) dimension of democracy would relate to the cultural orientation of power equality (vs. power distance). Utilizing Hendriks' theoretical model, Heijstek-Ziemann (2014) recently tried to examine the match between mass cultures and models of democratic reform for Western democracies.

All in all, the association between cultural orientations and models of democracy is the most understudied side of this triangle. Nevertheless, diversity of cultural values is likely to underpin the diversity of democratic 'tastes' (people in different countries, with distinguishable cultural values, may well prefer different types of electoral systems and forms of government). Differences in culturally-inspired democratic tastes are not automatically related to differences in the level and functionality of democracy. States like the United States, France and the Netherlands are all established 'full democracies', but their democratic institutions differ significantly and in some respects even dramatically. We assert that the influence of culture on this diversity is considerable and needs to be systematically studied. This relation - between culture and democracy - is the black box that we aim to open up in this chapter.

5.3 Dimensions of Democracy

In recent decades, various attempts have been made to empirically assess different models of democracy by identifying and measuring particular indicators. The breakthrough work by Lijphart - developed in the 1990s and recently updated - is one of the most comprehensive works categorizing different models of democracy in a systematic way. Lijphart (1999, 2012) utilized ten measures to distinguish between *majoritarian* and *consensus* democracy. Other empirical studies, aiming to operationalize different dimensions of democracy, have been presented in recent years (Kriesi & Bochsler, 2012; Vatter, 2009). These tried to replicate as well as extend the Lijphartian model through adding new dimensions of democracy.

In earlier work, Dahl (1971) considered contestation and participation the two main dimensions of democracy. As elaborated on Chapter 4 of this book, we have operationalized models of democracy in action for 80 'electoral democracies', measuring the practice and realization of contestation and participation along two dimensions. The first dimension is called the 'Integrative Dimensions of Democracy (IDD)', which is a replication of the parties-executives dimension of Lijphart for a larger number of countries. The second dimension is labeled the 'Participative Dimension of Democracy (PDD)' and operationalizes political participation. We will briefly describe the components of these dimensions in the following.

5.3.1 First Axis: Integrative Dimension of Democracy (IDD)

Power is fragmented and distributed in a democratic regime. The diversity in the modalities of power fragmentation and the process of power distribution determines the variety of democracies. Competition is the necessary spice of democracy, but the desire for it depends on the different democratic tastes.

Power fragmentation is manifested in the effective number of parties and the share of power of each party, as well as the power sharing of different political bodies (i.e. legislative and executive). Power distribution is regulated through the electoral system (i.e. majoritarian, proportional representation (PR) and mixed) and the types of regime (i.e. (semi-) parliamentary and (semi-) presidential).

Taking into account the indicators used in Lijphart's first dimension and considering the criticisms on some indicators, we have employed three indicators to operationalize the integrative dimension of democracy:

1- Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties (ENPP)

2- (effective) Number of Parties in Government (NPG)

3- Total Electoral Proportionality (TEP)

Although these three indicators are very similar to three variables of Lijphart's first dimension, they were differently formulated and aggregated. We used the logarithmic rule for scaling ENPP and NPG in order to consider an appropriate weighting for increase of number of parties. Moreover, with this formulation the highest score for the indicators will be a unit and hence all three indicators would have the same scale.

These three indicators are aggregated using the multiplicative rule (geometric mean). The index of integrative dimension of democracy is then calculated as follows:

$$\text{Integrative Dimension of Democracy (IDD)} = (\text{LENP} * \text{LNPG} * \text{TEP})^{1/3}$$

This dimension represents to what extent the model of democracy in a country is integrative (or consensual), versus aggregative (or majoritarian). The countries' average score of the LENP, LNPG and TEP and the IDD score for 80 countries in years between 1990 and 2009 are listed in Table E.1 in Appendix E.

5.3.2 Second Axis: Participative Dimension of Democracy (PDD)

Participation is an important pillar of democracy. As mentioned before, in many definitions of democracy and particularly in Dahl's theory, it is one of the main attributes of democracy.

Similar to the first dimension, we have measured the realized participation (and not the institutionalized right of participation), focusing on two major manifestations of political participation: *electoral* and *non-electoral* participation.

Electoral participation can be expressed in the different types of elections namely legislative elections, presidential elections and referendums. Voting in conventional elections, i.e. parliamentary or presidential, is a useful first indicator of political participation. Higher turnout indicates a stronger inclination of people to influence politics in their country. There is also a more direct method of participation, through referendums or direct democracy.

Regarding scoring General-Electoral Participation (GEP), we used the voting age population turnout as the appropriate indicator. In (semi-) presidential systems, the average turnout of parliamentary and presidential elections is considered. We modified turnouts of countries having compulsory voting by a reduction coefficient of 0.85.

We developed a formula for scoring the Referendum-Electoral Participation (REP) using different weighting coefficients for different types (top-down or bottom-up), levels (local or national), effects (binding or non-binding) of referendums (see Appendix D). Since in practice there is a declining marginal importance of additional referendums, the final score of REP would be calculated in a logarithmic scale and be ranged between zero and one.

In order to operationalize the Non-Electoral Participation (NEP), we have considered three forms of political action as proper measures for non-electoral participation: signing a petition, joining in boycotts and attending lawful demonstrations. Using the global surveys (e.g. WVS, EVS, Afrobarometer, Latinobarometer etc.), the maximum percentage of respondents who choose 'have done' for any of three actions is assumed to be the score of the NEP.

We finally aggregated these three indicators using the additive rule. We argued that general elections are still the most important locus of national participation, because of the significant role of elected representatives in democratic governance. Thus, the GEP should have extra weight. Regarding the growing importance of "direct participation", manifested in referendums and 'social movements', it should have a considerable weight as well. All in all, we proposed a 3:1:1 relationship as a sound ratio of the GEP, REP and NEP respectively. Thus, the final formulation of participative dimension of democracy will be as follows:

PDD (Participative Dimension of Democracy) = 0.60 * GEP + 0.20 * REP + 0.2 * NEP

The scale of all three components is between 0 and 1. Hence, the final score will have the same scale. The countries' average score of the GEP, REP and NEP indicators and the PDD score for 80 countries in years between 1990 and 2009 can be found in Table E.1 in Appendix E. Having two dimensions of democracy, we now identify the dimensions of culture, using the major cross-cultural studies.

5.4 Dimensions of Culture

Although there are many definitions, there is a common emphasis that "culture" consists of shared elements - attitudes, beliefs, values, self-definitions - of a community (Triandis, 1996). A society's culture is inherent in values, in the sense of broad tendencies to prefer certain states of affairs over others (Hofstede, 2001). The notion is accepted, largely, that value orientations codetermine the behavior of people in social, economic and political realms. Cross-cultural scholars acknowledge that cultural value orientations are relatively stable although they do change gradually (Hofstede, 2001; Schwartz, 1999).

Many scholars in comparative politics use individual question items from public surveys, particularly the World Value Survey (WVS), to examine the relation between culture and politics (among others: Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Lane & Ersson, 2005; Lane & Wagschal,

2012; Norris, 2011). Some fundamental cultural dimensions extracted from cross-cultural research are, however, less utilized in the field of comparative politics, unlike elsewhere. Since the early 1980s when Hofstede's initial indices were established in a large statistical cross-national comparative study, dimensionalization of culture has become a popular approach for understanding cross-cultural differences.

After Hofstede, other cross-cultural researchers and teams - such as Schwartz, Inglehart, GLOBE and Minkov - have also introduced and empirically extracted different dimensions, sometimes similar, sometimes different and sometimes overlapping ones. In this study, we attempt to utilize these cultural models, which elaborately discussed in Chapter 2, for our analysis.

5.4.1 Selecting from the Many Dimensions of Culture

The dimensions underlying different cultural models often present conceptual similarities as well as strong empirical correlations. In the attempt to show the interrelatedness of different dimensions, we demonstrated in Chapter 2 the similarities and differences of dimensions and finally identified *nine* clusters from 25 cultural dimensions introduced by abovementioned cross-cultural researchers.

Here, we utilize four cultural orientations that in our estimation are conceptually most pertinent to the described dimensions of democracy. We utilize those cultural dimensions that were operationalized over the 1990s or 2000s, the time span at which the dimensions of democracy were measured as well. Although Hofstede (2001) has argued that cultural values of societies change only very slowly, we use the scores from the most recent operationalizations of culture, to forestall possible worries that using scores of a cultural model based on a dataset from the1960s (like Hofstede's) is neither reliable nor representative for people living in recent decades. Therefore, in this study we utilize:

- two dimensions of national culture from Schwartz's study namely *Hierarchy* and *Mastery*, which were measured through a sample of over 15,000 urban teachers in 51 countries, surveyed in 1988–1998 (Licht et al., 2007, p. 667).

- one cultural dimension from GLOBE's study namely *Future Orientation*, measured via middle manager samples in 62 countries, surveyed between 1995 and 1999 (House et al., 2004).[2]
- one cultural dimension from Minkov's study namely *Monumentalism*, which was extracted from WVS data after 1995 (Minkov, 2008).[3]

In the next section we will propose how these cultural orientations can be related to the two dimensions – contestation and participation – of democracy.

5.5 Hypotheses on the Relation between Dimensions of Culture and Democracy

The aim of this study is to examine the relation between cultural orientations and the models of democracy at the national level. We hypothesize that the preference and inclination for a specific cultural orientation in a society can explain the preference for and practice of one model of democracy or another.

A mastery orientation displays an emphasis on the cultural attributes of competitiveness, achievement and self-assertion. The societies with higher mastery orientation stress mutual competition, high ambition and performance. Hardworking is admired there. Mastery orientation gives more sympathy for the strong. Wealth and recognition are two important values in this culture. On the contrary, in a society with low mastery, consensus, solidarity and harmony are more emphasized and the sympathy for the weak is praised. Knowing these attributes, we posit a plausible relation between mastery orientation and the integrative dimension of democracy.

We argue that in a mastery-oriented society, the heatedly competitive and partisan elections are expected and accepted. We posit that the majority/plurality electoral system would be more practiced in these societies. In this environment, "big is beautiful" and thus people mainly support and vote for big and major parties. It is less likely that the

2. Regarding the notion of representativity of matched samples (i.e. samples used by Schwartz and the GLOBE project) see the discussion in Minkov (2013, p. 94).

3. As showed in Chapter 2, monumentalism is strongly associated with Inglehart's traditionalism, which is more known in the literature, however, we decided to use the former because its concept as well as its label better represent the cultural trait that is pertinent to our purpose.

emerging small parties can absorb remarkable votes because mastery-oriented people do not like to vote for a predetermined loser. Given this, the effective number of parties at the electoral level as well as at the parliamentary level would be few, generally less than four. There is a common conviction that few numbers of parties is a result of majoritarian electoral system and having a PR system, number of parties automatically increases (Duverger, 1964; Lijphart, 1999). We think that this generalization is problematic. We argue that cultural factors, particularly the mastery orientation, have an important influence on 'effective' number of parties. We will examine this proposition that the presence of proportional electoral system cannot per se lead to the rise of 'effective' number of parties.

Furthermore, 'winner takes all' mentality is expected to be popular in mastery-oriented societies. Thus, big parties are less cooperative and the one party cabinet would be a norm. Altogether, we assert that mastery-oriented societies would incline to aggregative (majoritarian) model of democracy.

On the contrary, in a harmony-oriented culture, the electoral competitions are expected to be less adversarial. The 'small is beautiful' attitude is admired, and hence, higher supports for small and minority parties are predicted. A balanced distribution of votes is anticipated and parties would rarely achieve a majority of votes. The proportional electoral system and the lower electoral threshold would be more acceptable. Therefore, the effective number of parties would be higher. The cooperation between parties to make a consensus and form a coalition government would be a normal practice. All in all, countries having harmony-oriented culture are expected to lean more towards integrative (consensual) model of democracy.

Hypothesis 1: Societies with a higher Mastery orientation tend towards a less integrative model of democracy.

The cultural traits of self-stability, pride and religiosity are capsulated under the dimension of *monumentalism* (Minkov, 2008). Societies with high monumentality do more strongly believe in their thoughts and convictions. That is why they respect religion and traditions more. They are normally less into compromise and more into dominance. They like to be exceptional. Having distinguished identity is a matter of importance in this culture. Presenting charismatic characteristics is praised and encouraged. That is why many charismatic figures and leaders, sometimes known internationally, are usually emerged in such societies.

On the contrary, there are societies that stress dialectical thoughts and secular orientation. Religion is not an obsession there. People in these societies are more flexible to change their thoughts and compromise in conflicts. Charismatic figures rarely appear in such societies.

Knowing these features, we can expect that societies with strong monumentality are less inclined to the integrative model of democracy. In these societies, the majority of people are loyal supporters of large and strong parties. People would like to see charismatic leaders in power. It is expected to see the presidential system with powerful president in these countries. Elections are preferably very competitive and political discourse is adversarial. The majority/plurality electoral system would be accepted and adopted. In total, it is predicted that there would be fewer effective number of parties in elections and in parliament, even if the PR system would be employed. In a country with the mentality of 'fighting until the best wins', the one-party cabinet is anticipated to form. All in all, likewise the mastery-oriented societies, the monumentality-oriented countries are expected to go for the aggregative (majoritarian) model of democracy.

Hypothesis 2: Societies with a higher Monumentality orientation tend towards a less integrative model of democracy.

Hierarchy (or power distance) is a cultural orientation that reflects the extent to which hierarchical relations and position-related roles are expected and accepted. In societies with large power distance, power-holders are entitled to privileges and subordinates expect to be told what to do (Hofstede, 2001). Decision-making is seen as a capability of experts and powerholders and is not a task for which the powerless expect to be consulted. Public participation should be only in general elections for selecting representatives and delegating the power of governance to them. Involvement of ordinary people in policy-making would be seen as a kind of anarchism. Role of politicians and public managers is seen more important than the role of citizens in politics and governance. In general, there is an elite-oriented attitude towards politics and society. Societies with lower hierarchy orientation have opposite preferences.

Considering these features, we hypothesize that political participation, and especially the engagement beyond the general elections, would be lower in countries with large power distance (hierarchy). People in power distant culture are expected to involve passively. That is, they participate in general elections and other formal instances of participation, but being an active citizen is uncommon in those societies. These societies are

expected to incline more towards the so-called 'spectator democracy' (Anderson & Torpe, 2000) instead of participatory democracy.

Hypothesis 3: Societies with a stronger Hierarchical orientation tend towards a less participative model of democracy.

Future orientation is a cultural trait reflects the long-oriented behavior of people such as planning for or investing in the future (House et al., 2002). Democratic participation is not a 'quick return' business but rather is a medium- or long-term investment. The tree of democracy will be fruitful if people foster it constantly. People should be ready to invest personally in participation in order to benefit of a democratic system. This needs a future oriented mentality. Short-term oriented people are not enough patient to accept the gradual changes and improvements out of their small acts of political participation. They seek for 'fast' and 'big' changes in 'short' time and so they are more in favor of revolutionary changes rather than gradual reforms via continuous participation. Given this, we can expect to see the different preference of modes of participation for societies with long- vs. short-term orientation. That is, while in the former a large number of people engage and prefer to practice more deliberative and discursive modes of participation (Dutch and Japanese style), in the latter a less number of people participate and they adhere mostly to 'protest participation' (e.g. Spanish and Greek style).

Participation is crucial for having a sustainable democracy. Democracy in countries with very low political participation (abstention democracy) is extremely fragile. If people do not involve and give their voice in political decisions, powerholders can easier abuse their power. People's surveillance and feedback can control the health of democratic institutions and responsiveness of elected authorities. Taken together, we hypothesize that future oriented societies would lean to more participative model of democracy.

Hypothesis 4: Societies with stronger Future orientation tend towards a more participative model of democracy.

In the next section, we will empirically examine these four hypotheses.

5.6 Data and Results

Thus far, we identified two dimensions of democracy and four dimensions of culture at the national level. Using the operationalized

dimensions of culture and democracy (see Table A.5 and Table E.1 in Appendices), we now empirically examine our hypotheses in the previous section. Table 5.1 gives a first overview of the relations between cultural orientations and the integrative dimension of democracy (IDD) (see Table E.2 in Appendix E for correlations). The significant correlations between the IDD (and its sub-components) and the cultural dimensions of mastery and monumentalism provide support for the first and second hypotheses.

Table 5.1. Correlations between two dimensions of national culture and IDD, and its components (including outliers)

	IDD	LENP	LNPG	TEP
Mastery (Schwartz)	- 0.39***	- 0.45***	- 0.32**	0.02
	(44)	(44)	(44)	(44)
Monumentalism (Minkov)	- 0.39***	- 0.31**	- 0.37***	- 0.18
	(56)	(56)	(56)	(56)

Note: Pearson correlations, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10; number of countries is in parentheses.

Figure 5.2 gives a more detailed picture of the relation between IDD and the mastery orientation.[4] As can be seen, there is a rather strong reverse association between IDD and mastery. As the most conspicuous outlier on the map, India confirms its reputation as a theoretical puzzle (Lijphart, 1996). Brazil and Israel (and to a lesser extent the Netherlands and Switzerland) are also out of the predominant pattern. Relatively integrative democratic institutions in these countries go more or less against the grain - theoretically assumed and empirically corroborated by most other countries - of relatively competitive, self-assertive (mastery) orientations. If the main three outliers are excluded, there will be a high correlation of 0.64 (p<0.01, N=41) between IDD and mastery (the correlation will be 0.73 if the Netherlands and Switzerland would be excluded as well). In Figure 5.2, the regime type of countries is also highlighted. No meaningful pattern associated with regime type is observed.

4. The regression lines shown on figures have been calculated after removing the outliers.



Figure 5.2. The relation between IDD and Mastery dimension of national culture

Figure 5.3 illustrates the relation between IDD and monumentalism. A correlational pattern is evident, although there are some outliers: Taiwan, Moldova, and, again, Brazil (now more monumental than countries with similarly integrative institutions). When the outliers are excluded, the correlation is 0.52 ($p<0.01$, $N=53$). This pattern corroborates the second hypothesis. Moreover, as implied in the second hypothesis, the full presidential regimes are mostly seen in countries with high monumentality (the exception is South Korea which is an outlier and needs to be further studied).



Figure 5.3. The relation between IDD and Monumentalism dimension of national culture

Table 5.2 presents the correlations between dimensions of culture and PDD (as well as its components). We can see moderate correlations between PDD and two cultural dimensions, hierarchy and future orientation, which give support to the third and fourth hypotheses. Regarding the three components of political participation (i.e. GEP, REP, NEP), we excluded two countries with an exceptional number of referendums (Switzerland and the USA) prior to calculating the correlations.

In accordance with the third hypothesis, the main variance explained by hierarchy is related to direct participation. Schwartz's hierarchy has a weak, negative and low-significant correlation with GEP (turnout), but has higher and significant correlations with the two components of direct democracy namely referendum participation and non-electoral participation. The correlation of Schwartz's hierarchy and the aggregated indicator of 'direct participation' (i.e. REP + NEP) is -0.52. On the other hand, future orientation has a significant association with GEP and NEP while it has no significant correlation with REP.

Table 5.2. Correlations between two dimensions of national culture and PDD, and its components (including outliers)

	PDD	GEP	REP	NEP	REP+NEP
Hierarchy (Schwartz)	- 0.45*** (44)	- 0.27* (42)	- 0.38** (42)	- 0.43*** (42)	-0.52*** (42)
Future Orientation (GLOBE)	0.49*** (46)	0.40*** (44)	-0.21 (44)	0.50*** (44)	0.39*** (44)

Note: Pearson correlations, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10; number of countries is in parentheses.

For taking a closer look at the relation between PDD and cultural dimensions, scatter plots are provided. The pattern displayed in Figure 5.4 mainly confirms the third hypothesis, suggesting an inverse relationship between the participative dimension of democracy (PDD) and Schwartz's hierarchy orientation. As evidenced in the scatter plot, and also based on bivariate regression analysis, Estonia and New Zealand emerge as outliers. Without these two countries the correlation between PDD and Schwartz's hierarchy is 0.52 (N=43, p<0.001). Hierarchy or Power Distance is operationalized quite differently by Hofstede, GLOBE and Schwartz (see the discussion in Chapter 2). Nevertheless, the measures of power distance by all three are significantly, negatively correlated with PDD.

Despite some extreme outliers, Figure 5.5 displays a correlational pattern between PDD and future orientation consonant with our fourth hypothesis. Excluding the outliers of New Zealand, Italy and Malaysia, we found a high and significant correlation of 0.68 (N=43, p<0.01) between PDD and GLOBE's future orientation. It is striking to see that the correlation between non-electoral participation and future orientation (excluding outliers) is 0.72 (N=43, p<0.01) and has the main loading on the correlation between PDD and future orientation. This strongly supports our fourth hypothesis.



Figure 5.4. The relation between PDD and Schwartz's Hierarchy orientation



Figure 5.5. The relation between PDD and GLOBE's Future Orientation

5.6.1 Impact of Socio-economic Factors

Thus far, our findings suggest a meaningful association between dimensions of national-level democracy and societal culture. In order to check the robustness of culture as an explanatory factor, we will examine the impact of some socio-economic factors on dimensions of democracy via a multiple regression analysis. These socio-economic factors are asserted to influence the emergence, preference and practice of different models of democracy across countries.

One of the factors, which is widely mentioned in the literature is fractionalization; the ethno-linguistic diversity within a nation. Lijphart (1977, 1984) argues that the integrative model of democracy, or power sharing, is crucial for achieving and maintaining democracy in plural or divided societies. Norris (2008, p. 24) writes, in support of integrative democracy: "power-sharing is theorized to temper extreme demands and dampen expressions of ethnic intolerance among elites. In segmented societies, the leaders of all significant factions at the time of the settlement are guaranteed a stake in national or regional governments". On the other hand, Snyder (2000, p. 36) refutes that in the early stages of democratization, politicians may stress ethnic hatred and nationalism to build popular support. He argues that "creating an institutional setting for democratization that de-emphasizes ethnicity might turn these identities towards more inclusive, civic self-conceptions".

Economic development and affluence is always a fundamental factor to be examined. There are many theories regarding the relation between economic development and democratization (among others: Inglehart, 1997; Przeworski et al., 2000; Zakaria, 2003). One can argue that the poor have many survival issues to be engaged with, which overshadows the attention to issues like political participation and power sharing.

Size of population is another contextual factor that might affect the practice of different models. Countries with lower population can easier facilitate and afford the participation of a larger portion of the populace. It is also expected that accommodation of different political views is easier in less populated nations.

Finally, the colonial history, particularly the British colonial legacy, can be expected to have a considerable influence on the practice of democratic models. The term 'Westminster model', used by Lijphart, also suggests a British legacy under the majoritarian or aggregative model of democracy.

To examine the impact of these socio-economic factors, we use the natural logarithms of countries' population in 1990 and the average of per

capita gross domestic product (GDP) between 1990 and 2009. The data are derived from the World Development Indicators of The World Bank (2013). The data for ethno-linguistic fractionalization (ELF) is taken from Roeder (2001). Moreover, a dummy variable is calculated for British colonial legacy based on de Blij (1996) and Norris's (2009) data set.

The results of a multiple regression analysis for the integrative dimension of democracy (IDD) are presented in Table 5.3. In accordance with residual statistics, we excluded those countries that emerged as outliers in the multiple regression analysis (Brazil, India and Israel are outliers as also seen in Figure 5.2).

Table 5.3. Multiple OLS regression of IDD on cultural and socio-economic factors (1990-2009)

	Integrative Dimension of Democracy (IDD)					
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Mastery (Schwartz)	- 0.64***	- 0.45***	- 0.61***	- 0.49***	- 0.32**	
Monumentalism (Minkov)				- 0.21	- 0.05	
British Colonial Legacy		- 0.30*			- 0.27*	- 0.52***
Ln Population (1990)		- 0.24*			- 0.37**	- 0.35***
Fractionalization (ELF)		- 0.01			0.11	
Ln GDP/capita (1990-2009)			0.17			0.25*
F statistic	26.67***	9.14***	14.53***	8.89***	5.59***	9.02***
Adjusted R^2	0.39	0.45	0.40	0.32	0.40	0.37
Number of Countries	41	41	41	35	35	41

Note: Standardized coefficients are shown. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.

Model 1 shows that Mastery alone explains 39 percent of the variance in the integrative dimension of democracy. Model 2 indicates the influence of three socio-historical factors. We observe that although British colonial legacy and population size partially reduce the explanatory power of mastery, they add modestly to the total variance explained. Fractionalization shows no impact on the integrative dimension of democracy. Model 3 reveals that the economic factor has low and non-significant impact on IDD. We learned that adding the cultural factor of monumentalism does not increase the explanatory power of the model, as seen in models 4 and 5. It means that when mastery culture is included, monumentalism has no significant impact.

Finally, model 6 presents the influence of socio-economic factors in the absence of cultural factors. British legacy then emerges as the main predictor of the integrative dimension of democracy. In accordance with our theoretical prediction, population size shows a significant, negative impact on IDD. However, the total variance explained by these socio-economic factors together is less than what the mastery dimension explains alone.

Regarding the participative dimension of democracy (PDD), we performed a similar multiple regression analysis, as presented in Table 5.4. In accordance with residual statistics, we excluded the three aforementioned outliers from the analysis (New Zealand, Italy and Malaysia). Among the socio-economic factors, population size and British colonial legacy have no correlation with PDD (see Table E.2 in Appendix E for correlations). Thus, we excluded these variables from the multiple regression analysis. In addition to Schwartz's hierarchy and GLOBE's future orientation, we included natural-logged GDP per capita and fractionalization. There appears to be a significant correlation between the GDP and cultural factors. Fractionalization is also correlated with the economic factor. Therefore, a considerable multicollinearity exists between these variables, and consequently we have to check the influence of independent variables on the dependent variable in separate models.

Table 5.4. Multiple OLS regression of PDD on cultural and socio-economic factors (1990-2009)

	Participative Dimension of Democracy (PDD)				
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Hierarchy (Schwartz)	- 0.32**	- 0.32**	- 0.15		
Future Orientation (GLOBE)	0.64***	0.64***	0.52***	0.49***	
Fractionalization (ELF)		0.01			
Ln GDP/capita (1990-2009)			0.30	0.41***	0.67***
F statistic	22.33***	14.28***	16.64***	24.65***	24.68***
Adjusted R^2	0.57	0.56	0.59	0.60	0.43
Number of Countries	33	33	33	33	33

Note: Standardized coefficients are shown. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.

Model 1 then shows that the two cultural dimensions of hierarchy and future orientation explain more than half of the variance (57%) in the

PDD across 33 countries from all over the world. As seen in model 2, adding the fractionalization variable has no impact on the coefficients and on the variance explained.

Adding GDP per capita, although it has non-significant coefficient, increases the variance explained slightly but reduces the influence of hierarchy drastically, as seen in model 3. The latter is not beyond expectation since GDP and hierarchy have a strong collinearity. In this model, though, future orientation still has the highest explanatory power. Removing hierarchy, we observe that the explanatory power and the significance of the economic factor increases (model 4). The effect of GDP in the absence of cultural factors is presented in model 5. The economic factor alone explains more than forty percent of the variance, however, this is less than what the cultural factors explain (model 1).

All in all, due to the high intercorrelation between the economic factor and cultural factors, particularly hierarchy orientation, it is not easy to say which one has the dominant effect on the participative dimension of democracy. Nevertheless, there is a solid basis under the suggestion that cultural orientations codetermine the tendency toward more participative or spectative models of democracy.

5.7 Conclusion

As Ross (2009, p. 161) suggested, "cultural analysis could enhance our understanding of when specific institutional arrangements and practices are accepted and when they may prove to be problematic". Our analysis reveals that cultural orientation can indeed explain the variance in models of democracy significantly. The inclination towards integrative (versus aggregative) expressions of democracy is strongly correlated with the cultural orientation of mastery. The actualization of participative (versus spectative) democracy is associated with GLOBE's future orientation and Schwartz's hierarchical orientation.

We observed that cultural orientations could also explain why some countries incline to a presidential model. These countries mostly display high monumentality or low future orientations (see Figure 5.2 and Figure 5.5). Our data show that presidential countries (except USA and to a lesser extent Uruguay) have an affinity with the spectative model of democracy (see Figure 5.4). Our data also show that an integrative model of democracy can be combined with a presidential regime. Brazil is a salient example (Benin, Indonesia and Ecuador are other examples) which demands and deserves separate, more-detailed examination. Our

analysis to a large extent corroborated the hypothesized association between cultural orientations and models of democracy. The question now is, what is the significance of this relationship?

Both functioning and malfunctioning states can be found among countries adopting similar models of democracy. An 'end of history' – culminating in one universally appreciated, working model of democracy – has not been reached, and will probably never be reached considering the tenacity of cultural differences. Our more specific findings suggest more specific lessons for the institutionalization and reconstruction of democracy. Where democratic models and cultural orientations are incompatible, adaptations, one way or another, seem to be indivertible. An interesting example is South Africa, where the formal institutions strongly encourage an integrative (consensual) model, not entirely compatible with its dominant cultural orientation (van Cranenburgh & Kopecky, 2004). More aggregative, and thus culturally more compatible, is its democratic practice, with two effective parties in parliament and basically one party in government over the past two decades.

In this study, we shed light on one - relatively understudied - side of the triangular relationship between culture, structure and performance of democracy. Within the confines of this chapter, we can only hypothesize that the relation between culture and structure impacts the relation between structure and performance. The goodness of fit, the compatibility of the cultural orientation of a society and its modeling of democracy could be crucial to the satisfaction with democracy in that country (see the next chapter). Cultural orientations might help to understand why aggregative democracy has proved to be sustainable in countries like the USA, the UK and Australia, and integrative democracy in countries like Sweden, Norway and the Netherlands.

Incompatibility of cultural orientations and democratic institutions, on the other hand, could contribute to the malfunctioning of democracy. This might have grave consequences for the reputation and popularity of democracy, particularly in new and fragile democracies. Our conclusion is that 'culture matters' for the inclination to, adoption and practice of different democratic models. Sen (1999) has argued that democracy is a "universal value". We conclude that the general idea of democracy is indeed globally dispersed, and in that sense non-particularistic – inspiring countries in West, East, North and South– but also that the operational modeling of democracy is culturally dependent to a significant extent. The implications of cultural analysis for the design of democratic institutions, particularly in new democracies, should be elaborately

studied in further research; in next chapters I hope to contribute more to this discussion.

Chapter 6

Cultural Compatibility Matters: The Relation between Democratic Models and Satisfaction with Democracy in Developing Democracies*

* This chapter is based on the article presented in the 85th Southern Political Science Association (SPSA) Annual Conference in New Orleans, the USA, January 2014.

6.1 Introduction

The relation between institutional arrangements, or models of democracy, and the outcome and legitimacy of democratic systems is an ongoing, important question in comparative politics. Many scholars theorize about, and some put effort into examining, which institutional setting would outperform others, as well as what is the best practice or superior model of democracy (Crepaz, 1996; Doorenspleet & Pellikaan, 2013; Horowitz, 1990; Lijphart, 1999; Linz, 1993; Olson, 1986). These efforts have brought about mixed results. Not only could no definite trend of convergence of democratic models be observed in established democracies over the past decades (Vatter et al., 2014), but different institutional settings are adopted in new democracies across the world.

The relation between democratic models and outcomes of democracy cannot be studied systematically without answering another question first: why do different countries adopt different models of democracy *in practice*? Among the many factors that codetermine the preference for a model of democracy in a country, the influence of contextual factors, and particularly societal culture, have been less studied. Cross-national studies on the relation and interaction between *institutional structure*, *societal culture* and *system performance* are scant in comparative politics. This is even more understudied for non-Western, developing democracies. This chapter aims to contribute to this theme of research by theorizing and examining the interrelation and interaction between the three abovementioned factors, focusing on developing democracies.

In this chapter, we argue, first of all, that factors explaining democratic satisfaction may differ for old and developing democracies, and then theorize and examine how the compatibility of societal culture (i.e. mastery vs. harmony orientations) and democratic model (i.e. majoritarian versus consensual models) affects the public's level of satisfaction with democracy (as an outcome indicator) in developing democracies. This will be done in a quantitative comparative study for a large number of developing democracies across the world.

6.2 Why Satisfaction with Democracy?

Many researchers over past decades have tried to examine the impact of institutional structure or democratic models, namely majoritarian versus consensual democracy in the terms of Lijphart (1999), on

democratic performance. In these studies, two different approaches are utilized for evaluating system outcome. The first approach uses performance indicators provided by the international monitoring institutions. These, in turn, are divided into either *expert-evaluated* or *statistics-based* indicators. The example of the former is the Worldwide Governance Indicator (WGI) (Kaufmann et al., 2012); and examples of the latter are the per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP), GDP growth rate, and the Gini index of economic inequality, all reported by The World Bank (2013).

In the second approach, questions in public surveys that measure citizens' evaluation of the democratic system or democratic legitimacy are used. A prominent example of these *citizen-evaluated* indicators is a question item measuring citizens' 'Satisfaction With Democracy' (hereafter SWD). This question has been asked in many different cross-national surveys, such as the World Values Survey (WVS), European Values Survey (EVS), Latino-barometer, Afro-barometer, Asia-barometer, etc. Many scholars employ SWD as a dependent variable to examine the relation between institutional setting and the functioning of democracy in the eyes of citizens.

There is a debate in the literature on the meaning and validity of the survey question on SWD. While some scholars reject the validity of this item (Canache et al., 2001) or challenge its ambiguity (Norris, 1999), many others find it a proper, 'outcome-oriented' indicator for measuring the 'functioning' of democratic institutions, in spite of its shortcomings (Anderson, 2002; Anderson & Guillory, 1997; Fuchs et al., 1995; Linde & Ekman, 2003; Sarsfield & Echegaray, 2006; Wagner et al., 2009).

There is a wide agreement, supported by some empirical and systematic analyses (c.f. Klingemann 1999), that the SWD question does not measure support for the legitimacy or principle of democracy, but rather the performance of the democratic structure, and not the incumbent government, in the eyes of citizens (Anderson, 2002; Linde & Ekman, 2003; Sarsfield & Echegaray, 2006; Wagner et al., 2009). Fuchs et al. (1995, p. 332) call SWD an indicator for evaluating a "country's constitutional reality" or "constitution in operation."

Considering the different arguments, this study assumes that SWD is a relevant indicator for this research for two reasons. First, it is evaluated by citizens whose attitudes are presumably codetermined by their societal culture. And second, SWD supposedly evaluates the level of satisfaction with the institutional model *in operation,* and not satisfaction with the formal constitution. Therefore, the two major components that this study

is interested in, i.e. societal culture and democratic model, seem to be involved in citizens' evaluation of SWD. Given this, we utilize SWD as the dependent variable of this study while employing other *statistics-based* performance indicators as controlling variables.

6.3 Patterns of Institutions and Democratic Satisfaction

This research aims to focus on the relation and interaction between political institutions (or democratic models), 'informal institutions'[1] (or societal culture) and democratic satisfaction (as indicator of democratic outcome) in developing democracies.

The combination of formal constitutional/institutional choices such as regime type (presidential or parliamentary), electoral system and electoral threshold shape different models of democracy in action. In the literature, the famous dichotomy of institutional settings is the integrative (or consensual) versus aggregative (or majoritarian) model of democracy (Hendriks, 2010; Lijphart, 1999, 2012).

In the mainstream of research studying the relation between political institutions and democratic satisfaction, the former is considered the independent variable for predicting the latter. The outcomes, however, are mixed and inconclusive. While some researchers conclude that consensual democracy outperforms the majoritarian model (Anderson, 1998; Anderson & Guillory, 1997; Lijphart, 1999, 2012), others assert the reverse (Aarts & Thomassen, 2008; Berggren et al., 2004; Norris, 1999, 2004). This might be due to the plausible presence of, and a spurious relationship with**,** a third, unseen factor. Another reason may be the analysis of different sets of countries in different studies. In this study, we argue that if the mechanisms and factors explaining the variance in SWD would differ for old and developing democracies, then analyzing all these democracies together could bring about mixed and contradictory results.

Most cross-national studies on the relation of institutional setting and SWD only include Western and established/old democracies. There is scant research on this interrelation for developing democracies. One of the reasons for this is that many researchers utilize Lijphart's operationalization of democratic models in their studies (Anderson, 1998; Anderson & Guillory, 1997); consequently, they do not have the

1. See (Williamson, 2009), or for different meanings of 'informal institutions' see (Helmke & Levitsky, 2003).

operationalized models of democracy for developing democracies. Those studies that have aimed to study the impact of institutional settings on SWD in developing democracies have often used a dummy variable based on the formal electoral system of the country for grouping countries as majoritarian versus consensual democracies (Aarts & Thomassen, 2008; McAllister, 2005). This approach could be problematic because the formal electoral rule cannot precisely represent the model of democracy in practice. That is, we can recognize many countries with proportional electoral systems that have a majoritarian democracy in practice (e.g. South Africa, Spain, Argentina and Romania), and by contrast, there are some countries with majoritarian or mixed electoral rules that maintain a form of consensual democracy in action (e.g. India, Lithuania and Ukraine) (see Chapter 4). Therefore, for studying the influence of institutional settings on SWD, it is crucial to have a proper operationalization of democratic models that includes developing democracies (this is what have been done in Chapter 4).

6.4 Theoretical Hypotheses about Variances in SWD

As mentioned above, most research that has examined the impact of democratic institutions on SWD has focused on old, and mostly Western, democracies. Many of these studies conclude that their findings may have implications for institutional design in new democracies (Anderson & Guillory, 1997; Berggren et al., 2004; Farell & McAllister, 2006). Considering the third wave of democratization (Huntington, 1991), and particularly the democratization peak in the late 1980s and early 1990s, there are many countries that have experienced democratic institutions for twenty some years. By studying the relation between institutions and SWD in developing democracies, we can examine whether or not the findings of previous studies on established/old democracies are applicable to and relevant for developing democracies.

This study argues that the factors explaining democratic satisfaction are likely to be different for old and developing democracies. That is, the age of a democracy matters; and accordingly, in established democracies the levels of satisfaction should be higher in general. Moreover, in old democracies, the institutional arrangements and societal culture have been aligned for a longer time. Therefore, in those societies, citizens' evaluation of 'how democracy works' may be mainly based on their perception of economic performance, rather than on institutional setting.

Anderson (2001), in his European cross-national analysis, asserts that the structure of democratic satisfaction differs in old and new democracies. He asserts that the conventional theories of system support that can explain variances in SWD among mature democracies cannot explain variance in satisfaction levels in developing democracies. Other scholars also indicate that the distinction between old and new democracies should be taken into account when studying democratic satisfaction (Aarts & Thomassen, 2008). For instance, it is argued that in new democracies, lower economic performance and lack of 'diffuse support' for democracy result in lower levels of satisfaction than in old democracies. Given these, we formulate the first hypothesis as two sub-hypotheses, as follows:

Hypothesis 1-1: Age of democracy is a determinant factor in explaining the different levels of SWD in old and developing democracies. That is, older democracies have higher levels of satisfaction.

Hypothesis 1-2: Factors explaining the variance in SWD would differ for old and developing democracies.

This study proposes a new theory and new predictors for explaining the variance in SWD among developing democracies. We theorize that although system performance is likely to affect citizens' evaluation of democracy in all countries, the compatibility of a democratic model and contextual factors can play a crucial role in citizens' evaluation of democratic satisfaction in developing democracies. This assertion is more plausible when we assume that SWD is 'a measuring instrument for a generalized attitude towards the political system on the legitimacy dimension' (Fuchs 1993, p. 242) and not a measure for the performance of and support for the incumbent government (Anderson, 2001).

As in developing democracies the institutional arrangement and the process of decision making are new and different from past experiences, people may judge the political institution based on their attitudes toward the acceptable form of representation and governance, rather than merely on the economic performance of the political system. There are attitudinal differences among people in different countries regarding which institutional arrangement can better represent citizens and make the power-holders more responsive and accountable. These differences exist both between and within countries. However, the model of democracy at the national level is expected to match the preference of the majority.

When values, orientations, and preferences of a society are concerned, the role of societal culture should be taken into account.

Societal culture, or the cultural orientation of a society, is a set of "shared motives, values, beliefs and interpretations" that "guide the way social actors select actions, evaluate people and events, and explain their actions and evaluations" (House et al., 2002, p. 5; Schwartz, 1999, p. 24). These definitions imply that societal culture may codetermine people's evaluation of different institutions in their society. Accordingly, when citizens assess the democratic model or institutional setting of their country, the compatibility of cultural orientations and democratic model may be determinant, that is, the cultural compatibility may matter in democratic satisfaction.

Hendriks (2010), in his *theory of democracy in action*, argues for a sociological relation between models of democracy and societal culture. He calls this relation 'elective affinity' and exemplifies it as follows: "If all intervening factors are removed, one might expect, in a logical sense, that a magnet and a horseshoe will be attracted. Similarly, in a sociological sense, one might expect that participatory institutions and egalitarianism, in a democratic setting, will be attracted… To what degree and in which way such elective affinity arises in actual fact are codetermined by intervening factors" (Hendriks, 2010, p. 39).

In order to study the effect and importance of this 'elective affinity' in action, we hypothesize that cultural orientation of *Mastery* affects the relation between democratic model and levels of SWD in developing democracies. The mastery orientation connotes an emphasis on the cultural attributes of competitiveness, achievement and self-assertion. Societies with higher mastery orientation stress mutual competition, high ambition and performance (Schwartz, 1999). Mastery orientation is more sympathetic toward the strong. On the contrary, in a society with low mastery, consensus, compromise and harmony are more emphasized, and sympathy for the weak is praised.

Accordingly, we posit that in a country in which competition, excellence and achievement are more valued than consensus and harmony, citizens may prefer a competitive and aggregative model of democracy rather than a consensual and integrative model. Therefore, if in such a society the consensual institutions would be transplanted and practiced, the reaction and reception of society, as well as the workability and functionality of the model, may become problematic. Considering Hendriks' analogy, it is expected that in normal conditions and in absence of other intervening factors, integrative (consensual) institutions would

attract societies with a low mastery culture and the aggregative (majoritarian) arrangement would attract societies with a high mastery culture. Consequently, we hypothesize that the affinity and compatibility between democratic model and cultural orientation will affect the levels of democratic satisfaction. That is, in developing democracies in which the cultural orientation and democratic model mismatch, satisfaction with democracy would be lower. Figure 6.1 presents this hypothesized relation. This hypothesis is formulated in the following and examined empirically in the next section:

Hypothesis 2: Cultural compatibility between mastery orientation and integrative dimension of democracy matters for the level of SWD in developing democracies. That is, mastery culture has a moderation effect on the relation between integrative dimension of democracy and SWD.



Figure 6.1. Hypothesized relation between democratic model, mastery orientation and SWD across developing democracies

6.5 Data and Research Method

We perform multiple regression analyses to test the hypotheses of this study. In order to examine the relation and interaction between democratic models, societal culture, and democratic satisfaction, all on the national level, we need a proper operationalization of these three concepts. Regarding the level of analysis, there are some mixed

approaches in the literature. While some political scholars have combined the individual (micro) and national (macro) levels by using standard, ordinary statistical and regression analyses (Anderson & Guillory, 1997; McAllister, 2005), others have criticized their work and tried to employ multi-level regression methods to examine the interactions between different levels (Bernauer & Vatter, 2012; Wells & Krieckhaus, 2006). The individual level analysis is performed to evaluate the impact of voters' ideology or party preference on citizens' evaluation of system performance (e.g. Anderson & Guillory, 1997). In comparative studies that aim to discover a relational pattern on the cross-national level – such as this study – only aggregated data is utilized, and data on the individual level are not taken into account (e.g. Lijphart, 1999, 2012).

6.5.1 Dependent Factor

SWD, as a citizen-evaluated indicator, is the dependent variable in this analysis. Data on SWD is gathered from several cross-national surveys between 1990 and 2009 (see note under Table E.1 in Appendix E for the list of datasets). Differently from the common practice in the field, this study uses longitudinal data on SWD. In the literature, the common practice for studying democratic satisfaction is to use cross-national data of SWD for a specific year (or a short period). These studies mostly focus on the micro-level or multi-level analyses.

As one-year data is less reliable and may be affected by an incidental event, in this study we use aggregated, longitudinal data of SWD (c.f. Wagner et al., 2009). Gathering longitudinal, comparable data for a large number of countries is not an easy task. However, thanks to many cross-national survey studies, I was able to find data on SWD for the two decades, namely the 1990s and 2000s, for 70 electoral democracies whose democratic models have been operationalized in Chapter 4. As the data on SWD should be comparable and nationally representative, I only utilize known and reliable datasets in which the famous question item of 'satisfaction with democracy' is asked as follows:

"On the whole are you 1- very satisfied, 2- rather satisfied, 3- not very satisfied or 4- not at all satisfied with the way democracy works (is developing) in your country?"[2]

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2. The formulation of this question is somehow different in the dataset of International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) as follows: 'All in all, how well or badly do you think the system of democracy in (country) works these days?

1- It works well and needs no changes

2- It works well but needs some changes

These 70 electoral democracies have had data gathered on SWD for both decades. Among them, three countries (Bosnia, Indonesia and Senegal) have no data for the 1990s, as they converted to democracy in the late 1990s or in the 2000s. Excepting 11 countries that have only a one-year dataset for the 1990s, for the other 56 electoral democracies, data on SWD have been gathered for at least two years in each decade. For most of these countries, SWD data for 10 years over the two decades are used. This makes the analysis and findings more reliable.

The score of SWD is calculated for each country by aggregating the percentage of responses selecting 'very satisfied' or 'rather satisfied.' It is argued that using percentages is better than using the average score of responses (i.e. the average of Likert-type scale from 1 to 4), as in the averaging method, which has been used in many cross-national studies (Anderson & Guillory, 1997; Berggren et al., 2004; Wagner et al., 2009), the 'response style' bias can make the comparative study problematical, especially if the study involves culturally diverse countries and regions (Aarts & Thomassen, 2008; Farrell & McAllister, 2006)[3]. The aggregated scores for all these countries, as well as the references, are listed in Table E.1 in Appendix E.

3- It does not work well and needs a lot of changes

4- It does not work well and needs to be completely changed'

We use this dataset for only those countries that have no data in other datasets.

3. Response style concerns the respondents' tendency to answer to questionnaire items systematically. Much research has shown that the systematic response style differences between countries make a comparison of mean scores across countries problematic and misleading (Harzing, 2006). In some countries, people tend to select the extreme or middle response categories on rating scales. They are called extreme response style (ERS) and middle response style (MRS) respectively. Regarding the question of SWD, for instance, middle response style means that the majority of respondents in a country prefer to give the modest answer and select the middle category (in our case, 'rather satisfied') regardless of whether they are satisfied or very satisfied. On the other hand, in a country with extreme response style, most people prefer to give a very strong answer and choose 'very satisfied.' It is argued that this response style is associated with cultural characteristics (Hui & Triandis, 1989). Thus, using the mean score can make the cross-national comparison problematic if this response style would not be treated. To eliminate the response style problem, some cross-national researchers use the percentage of respondents in each country that select positive or negative answers (Inglehart & Baker, 2002; Minkov, 2008; Minkov & Hofstede, 2012). This can reduce the effect of the response style problem. We use the same approach in this study and calculate the score of countries by aggregating the percentage of positive responses (answers 1 and 2) to SWD question.

6.5.2 Independent Factors

Thanks to previous empirical studies, we have a systematic operationalization of societal culture and democratic models. Regarding societal culture, we utilize Schwartz's cultural orientation of Mastery, which has been measured and operationalized for the cross-national level for 59 countries through data gathered by surveys between 1988 and 2007 (scores for a larger number of countries were provided in a personal communication and are different from mastery scores in Table A.5 in Appendix A). Schwartz used his own value survey (SVS), which included 56 value items (Schwartz, 2006). Respondents were asked to rate the importance of each value item as a guiding principle in their life. Schwartz (1999) argues that individual value priorities are a mixture of shared culture and unique personal experience. Therefore, the average priorities attributed to different values by members of a society reflect the essence of their shared culture, as well as reveal the underlying common cultural value (Schwartz, 2006).

With respect to democratic models, in Chapter 4 we put effort into operationalizing the dimensions of democracy for 80 *electoral democracies* for the time period of 1990 to 2009. We operationalize the integrative dimension of democracy (IDD) *in practice*, which consists of three institutional components: effective number of parliamentary parties, effective number of parties in government, and total electoral proportionality. IDD can be considered a replication and extension of Lijphart's first dimension (Lijphart, 2012) for a larger number of countries[4]. The scores of IDD are utilized as the measure discriminating consensual versus majoritarian models of democracy for both old and developing democracies (see Table E.1 in Appendix E for the scores).

Last but not least is the age of democracy as the independent variable for examining the first hypothesis. The starting year of practicing democracy after the Second World War, reported by Cheibub (2007) and the Polity IV individual country regime trends, is used to calculate the countries' age of democracy by 2010.

6.5.3 Controlling Factors

Some macro-level factors are also used as control variables in our multiple regression analyses. For economic performance, (natural-logged) per capita GDP, rate of GDP growth (annual %), and the Gini index from

4. IDD has a high, significant correlation of 0.88 ($p<0.001$, $N=33$) with Lijphart's first dimension (see section 4.5.3).

The World Bank (2013) database are employed. The Polity IV index (Marshall et al., 2011) is utilized as the measure for the level or quality of democracy. For those few countries for which Polity IV does not have the democracy score (i.e. Iceland and Malta), the Freedom House (2012) scores are translated to Polity IV scales. A dummy variable is defined in order to examine the effect of the regime type (zero for parliamentary and one for presidential).

6.6 Results and Discussion

Figure 6.2 shows the average of SWD between 1990 and 2009 versus the birth year of democracy for the 70 electoral democracies. As illustrated, democracies established after WWII and before the 1950s are considered old democracies. Countries that democratized after this time and mostly after the 1970s, over 'the third wave of democracy' (Huntington, 1991), are called developing democracies. For those countries that have experienced some counter-democratic years after their first experiences of democracy, if the counter-democratic period lasted longer than 5 years (e.g. Greece, Uruguay, Colombia), the most recent year of re-democratization is considered as the birth year of democracy.

6.6.1 Different Levels and Explanations of SWD in Old and Developing Democracies

Figure 6.2 illustrates the obvious differentiation in levels of SWD for old and developing democracies. In most old or established democracies, more than 50 percent of respondents assert satisfaction with the way democracy works in their countries, whereas the figures for most developing democracies are lower than 50 percent. This plot provisionally corroborates the first sub-hypothesis (*hypothesis 1.1*), which predicted that levels of democratic satisfaction would be different for old and developing democracies.

The region to which each country belongs is also highlighted in Figure 6.2. It shows that old democracies belong mostly to northwestern Europe and Anglophone countries. There are also two South European countries, namely France and Italy, and some exceptions from Asia and Latin America, namely India, Israel, Japan and Costa Rica. As seen, Colombia and Venezuela are close to being old democracies; however, since these countries have experienced some counter-democratic incidents over the past decades, we find it more realistic to categorize them as developing democracies. In our analysis, in contrast to what is conventional in other

studies (see Aarts & Thomassen, 2008; Anderson 2001), Spain, Greece and Portugal are classified as developing, and not old, democracies. We assert that this is a more realistic classification, as it is based on the age of democracy rather than the western-eastern distinction.



Figure 6.2. SWD versus birth year of democracy

It is striking to see that among developing democracies, African and Asian electoral democracies have higher levels of SWD, comparable to the levels seen in old democracies. All other developing democracies in Latin America (except Uruguay) and in Central and Eastern Europe (excepting Cyprus) have an *average* score of SWD lower than 50 percent for the recent two decades. Moreover, Italy and Israel are two exceptions among the old democracies, as they have a low level of SWD. This figure provisionally indicates that wealth and socio-economic factors cannot per se explain the level of SWD; otherwise respondents in impoverished African countries could not be more satisfied than some wealthier nations in Europe, Asia and Latin America.

In order to systematically examine the first hypothesis and evaluate which variables may explain differences in levels of SWD across old and developing democracies, we perform a multiple regression analysis.

Table 6.1 shows the results of the analysis. Models 1 to 4 show the impact of different factors on the whole set of 70 countries. Models 5 and 6 then examine the explanatory power of variables for old democracies; and models 7 and 8 do the same for developing countries. This separation is made in order to examine the *sub-hypothesis 1-2*, which asserts that factors explaining the variances in SWD would differ for old and developing democracies.

Model 1 presents the effect of democratic age on the level of SWD. It shows that the age of democracy is a positive and significant predictor that can explain 37% of variances in SWD for 70 countries (where the age of democracy is the number of years between 2010 and the year that the country started to practice democracy after WWII). In model 2, the effects of variables related to institutional setting, namely regime type (presidential vs. parliamentary), the integrative dimension of democracy (IDD), and Polity IV score as the indicator of level of democracy, are examined. It is observed that besides the strong impact of democratic age, IDD also has a negative and significant effect on SWD. This means that the consensual model of democracy has a negative impact on the level of SWD. However, it gives a modest increase (5%) to the variance already explained by the age of democracy. Polity IV score and presidential regime have, respectively, a positive and negative non-significant impact on SWD.

In model 3, three economic performance indexes – the (natural-logged) national per capita GDP (purchasing power parity), the percentage of GDP growth and the Gini index of income inequality, all averaged for the time range 1990-2009 – are added to the model. As theoretically expected, the model shows that GDP growth rate has a positive, significant impact on SWD. Income inequality also has a negative impact on SWD, at the significance level of 10%. These variables increase the explained variance of the model to 47 percent. However, adding economic variables to the model does not change the impact and significance of the two former predictors, namely age of democracy and IDD. Finally, model 4 shows all the independent variables that have a more or less significant impact on explaining the variance in SWD among a mix of old and developing democracies. The significance of coefficients and the explained variance of this model are similar to model 3. All in all, the results of all countries imply that the strongest predictor of variance in levels of SWD across the 70 countries is the age of democracy. This corroborates *sub-hypothesis 1-1*.

Table 6.1. Multiple OLS regressions of SWD (1990-2009) for old and developing democracies

	all electoral democracies				old democracies		developing democracies	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Age of Democracy	0.54*** (0.08)	0.46*** (0.10)	0.54*** (0.11)	0.57*** (0.08)			0.04 (0.25)	
Presidential (Dummy)		- 2.58 (4.11)			13.11 (11.50)		-5.88 (4.84)	
IDD (1990-2009)		-41.9*** (15.64)	-47.27*** (15.76)	-46.69*** (15.60)	-5.31 (27.8)		-65.14*** (18.30)	-67.15*** (16.84)
Polity IV (1990 - 2009)		1.98 (1.41)			18.27 (11.85)	18.27** (8.20)	2.77* (1.57)	2.66** (1.15)
Ln GDP/capita (1990-2009)			1.12 (2.52)		3.93 (5.89)		-4.47 (3.72)	
Gini Index (1990-2009)			-0.32* (0.19)	-0.34* (0.18)	-1.63** (0.65)	-1.06** (0.50)	0.03 (0.22)	
GDP growth rate (%) (1990-2009)			2.34** (0.93)	2.32** (0.92)	5.97** (2.48)	4.13* (2.15)	2.69*** (0.95)	2.56*** (0.83)
Intercept	29.16*** (3.57)	16.82 (11.35)	24.55 (24.60)	34.84*** (8.07)	-119.07 (94.93)	-91.40 (82.63)	50.91*** (29.25)	12.06*** (9.68)
F statistic	41.67***	13.65***	12.47***	15.75***	1.90	2.87*	3.58***	9.00***
Adjusted R^2	0.37	0.42	0.47	0.48	0.20	0.21	0.30	0.35
Number of Countries	70	70	66	66	22	22	44	46

Note: Unstandardized coefficients; standard errors are in parentheses.

*** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.10$. IDD is centered around the mean. Models 3 and 4 include 66 countries since data on Gini index is not available for four countries (two among old democracies and two among developing democracies)

In order to test *sub-hypothesis 1-2*, countries are divided into two sets: old and developing democracies. Model 5 shows the multiple regression analysis for old democracies. The age of democracy is excluded from the model, as there is no considerable variation in this variable among old democracies. As seen in Table 6.1 the F-test indicates that model 5 is not significant, although the Gini index and GDP growth rate have significant coefficients in the model. This may be due to the multicollinearity among the variables. Excluding variables with multicollinearity and the non-significant ones, we observe that model 6 is only weakly significant at the 10% level. In this model, Polity IV and the Gini index show a significant impact at the 5% level; and GDP growth rate has a positive impact with a weaker level of significance at 10%. The model explains 21% of variances in SWD among 22 of the old democracies. The results

demonstrate that IDD, which was a strong predictor among all countries in model 4, has no significant coefficient among old democracies.

Model 7 examines the effect of variables on SWD among 46 developing democracies. As seen, the democratic model (i.e. IDD) and GDP growth rate significantly explain the variances in SWD. Level of democracy (Polity IV) also shows a weaker explanatory power in the model. Excluding non-significant variables in model 8, we see that three significant variables explain 35% of the variances in SWD among developing democracies. Comparing models 6 and 8 reveals that the major factors explaining variances in SWD are different for old and developing democracies. This corroborates *sub-hypothesis 1-2*. Indeed, the F-test of models 5 and 6 indicates that none of these variables can reliably explain variances of SWD among old democracies. Other factors should be tested to determine which variable(s) could better explain the variances of SWD in old democracies. This is not the mission of our study, and rather, we want to focus on factors that can predict the levels of SWD in developing democracies.

6.6.2 Explaining SWD in Developing Democracies

Among 70 electoral democracies that are included in this study, 46 are developing democracies. As discussed earlier, the eventual aim of this study is to examine factors that can explain the variance of SWD in developing democracies. We have argued and hypothesized that the interaction between societal culture and democratic models could be determinant in the evaluation of SWD in developing democracies.

We again perform a multiple regression analysis to examine which variables can significantly explain the variance of SWD in developing democracies. Considering the findings from model 8, we reexamine the effect of three variables – institutional setting (IDD), level of democracy (Polity IV) and GDP growth rate – while including the cultural dimension of mastery and its interaction with IDD in our model. This time the multiple regression analysis is performed for 30 developing democracies that have a national score of mastery culture as well as SWD for both the 1990s and 2000s. Although the number of countries with a cultural score is two-thirds of all developing democracies in our study, these countries are adequately diverse in societal culture and geographical region, making them acceptable representatives of developing democracies. Thus, we can propose that the results can be generalized for developing democracies.

In Table 6.2, two sets of models are shown. The first two models do not include the cultural factor. The results of different models, with and without the effect of cultural orientation, are presented in order to make it possible to compare the impact and strength of different predictors.

Model 9 shows that the institutional setting (IDD) is negatively correlated with SWD across developing democracies. This relation is significant**,** and IDD can explain 25% of the variation in SWD. It implies that in developing democracies, people in majoritarian democracies are more satisfied than citizens in consensual democracies. This can be due to the time-consuming process of coalition making and consensus building, which is harder in an integrative model of democracy with many parties. People in new democracies may find this process a messy and ineffective way of cabinet forming and governance.

Table 6.2. Multiple OLS regressions of SWD (1990-2009) for developing democracies

	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12
IDD (1990-2009)	-72.06***	-68.57***	-98.61***	-106.2***
	(22.35)	(23.44)	(23.21)	(22.3)
Polity IV (1990 - 2009)		1.71		
		(1.51)		
GDP growth rate (%) (1990-2009)		1.96*	1.15	
		(1.13)	(1.04)	
Mastery orientation			-34.06**	-34.27**
			(14.72)	(14.78)
IDD (1990-2009) x Mastery			-450.2***	-507.9***
			(153.52)	(144.95)
Intercept	40.14***	21.25*	33.72***	36.51***
	(2.18)	(12.24)	(3.28)	(2.10)
F statistic	10.39***	5.33***	7.60***	7.85***
Adjusted R^2	0.25	0.31	0.48	0.47
Number of Countries	30	30	30	30

Note: Unstandardized coefficients; standard errors are in parentheses.

*** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.10$. IDD and mastery are centered around the mean. Cyprus is excluded as the only outlier with the standardized residual more than 3.

Model 10 shows that GDP growth rate has a positive but weakly significant impact on SWD, while the Polity IV score is non-significant. Including the GDP growth rate increased the explained variance to 31%. It indicates the expected positive effect of economic performance on the level of democratic satisfaction in developing democracies.

Models 11 and 12 present regressions when the cultural factor of mastery orientation is involved. These models reveal the most interesting findings of the study. The interaction term between the mastery dimension and the integrative (consensual) dimension of democracy (IDD) has, as theoretically asserted, a negative and highly significant impact on democratic satisfaction. We observe that adding this interaction term to the model increases the explained variance of SWD to 47%. Moreover, the interaction component has a dominant effect and diminishes the explanatory power of GDP growth rate. In model 12, we exclude the GDP growth rate and observe almost no change in the explained variance of the model. This finding confirms our second hypothesis about the effect of the interaction between societal culture and democratic models on democratic satisfaction in developing democracies.

As seen, the interaction component has a negative effect on SWD. This is congruent with our conceptual theory that the combination of high mastery culture and high integrative dimension of democracy could be incompatible, and consequently this incompatibility reduces the level of democratic satisfaction. The significance and the strong explanatory power of the interaction term corroborate the conceptual relation presented in schematic Figure 6.1. Using the predicted values of SWD by Model 12 and categorizing the mastery orientation of countries to low and high mastery scores, we extract the relation between SWD and IDD, as Figure 6.3 illustrates. We observe two different regression lines presenting the moderation effect of mastery orientation. As suggested by Brambor et al. (2006), the 95% confidence intervals are also shown in the figure. Countries with high and low scores of mastery are highlighted differently. It is striking that among developing democracies, the level of SWD is generally lower for the consensual model of democracy. However, as our thesis proposes, the level of SWD in integrative (consensual) democracies is higher if societies have lower mastery orientations.



Figure 6.3. Moderation effect of mastery orientation on the relation between SWD and IDD

Figure 6.4 shows the real level of SWD over the IDD. The figure shows a three-dimensional bubble chart for 30 countries. The mastery score of countries is presented as the third dimension using the size of bubbles. Two regression lines (calculated from model 12) represent the relation between democratic satisfaction and democratic model for the lower mastery (thinner line) and higher mastery (thicker line) scores. The plot, in line with the findings from the regressions, illustrates that there is a sharp negative relationship between IDD and SWD for countries with higher mastery, while there is no remarkable negative relationship between IDD and SWD for countries with lower mastery. As our theory predicts, among integrative democracies, citizens in countries with higher mastery orientation, like Brazil, Ukraine and Colombia, are less satisfied than those in countries with lower mastery culture, such as Slovenia, Estonia and Chile. Also, it is seen again that in general, developing democracies with higher IDD have lower levels of democratic satisfaction. This finding challenges the assertion that the integrative (consensual) model of democracy might be a better model for any and

every new democracy (Lijphart, 1991), at least from the point of view of legitimacy.



Figure 6.4. Relation between IDD and SWD in 30 developing democracies

All in all, the regression analysis and Figure 6.3 and Figure 6.4 corroborate the second hypothesis of this study. Having verified the second hypothesis, we will, in the next section, check the robustness of the explanatory power of the interaction term.

6.6.3 Robustness of the Effect of the Interaction Term

After finding a meaningful connection among societal culture, democratic model and satisfaction with democracy in developing democracies, the next question is whether or not these findings are robust across time. Our analysis so far has been based on data averaged for the two decades between 1990 and 2009. In this section we replicate our multiple regression analysis using separate aggregated data for the two separate decades of the 1990s and 2000s so as to examine how changes in the integrative dimension of democracy over the two decades affect democratic satisfaction in developing democracies. Considering the results of the multiple regression analysis presented in Table 6.2, we replicate the analysis involving only IDD, mastery orientation and the

interaction term for the two separate decades. Table 6.3 presents the results of these multiple regression analyses.

Table 6.3. Multiple OLS regressions of SWD in 1990s and 2000s for developing democracies

	1990 - 1999		2000 - 2009	
	Model 13	Model 14	Model 15	Model 16
IDD (1990s, 2000s)	- 65.53***	- 90.61***	- 60.25**	- 83.56***
	(19.27)	(21.73)	(23.74)	(22.54)
Mastery orientation		- 27.13*		-29.73*
		(15.21)		(16.93)
IDD x Mastery		- 309.3**		- 539.1***
		(137.8)		(161.2)
Intercept	39.69***	37.12***	40.59***	37.54***
	(2.01)	(2.21)	(2.56)	(2.39)
F statistic	11.57***	7.08***	6.44**	6.73***
Adjusted R^2	0.27	0.39	0.16	0.37
Number of Countries	30	30	30	30

Note: Unstandardized coefficients; standard errors are in parentheses.

*** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.10$. IDD and mastery are centered around the mean. Cyprus is excluded as the only outlier with standard residual more than 3.

The models show that the institutional arrangement (i.e. IDD) and its interaction with societal culture are significant predictors in both decades. However, the results indicate that democratic satisfaction in the 1990s has been more affected by the institutional setting rather than the interaction term, while this is completely reversed in the 2000s.

Models 13 and 15 present the negative impact of IDD on SWD in the 1990s and 2000s respectively. The former explains 27% and the latter explains 16% of the variation in SWD in developing democracies. This means that in the 1990s lower SWD was reported from countries with higher integrative models of democracy regardless of their societal culture. This effect has been reduced in the 2000s. Models 13 and 15 show again that among 30 of the developing democracies under study, countries with higher integrative (consensual) models of democracy enjoy low levels of democratic satisfaction over both decades. This finding challenges the assertion of those political scientists who strongly suggest the consensual model of democracy as a better or best practice for new democracies (Lijphart, 1991, 1999). We speculate that in developing democracies, since there is less experience of collective decision-making and consensus-seeking, the integrative or consensual model of democracy

could be less popular, especially in countries showing cultural tendencies toward heated competition and the 'winner takes all' mentality.

Models 14 and 16 present the effect of the interaction term on SWD in the 1990s and 2000s respectively. In model 14, the interaction term is significant at the 5% level and contributes 12% to the explanatory power of the model. On the other hand, model 16 presents a very strong, significant effect of the interaction term, which in this case contributes 21% to the explanatory power of the model. This difference implies that the compatibility of societal culture and democratic model becomes more influential some years after transition to democracy. Among the developing democracies under study in the 1990s, there are 21 countries that democratized after 1985. The 1990s was, for these countries**,** a transition decade in which they experienced their first free and fair elections. Anderson and Guillory (1997, p. 79) argue that enough time should pass "to generate a sufficient understanding of the nature of the system among the population." We assert that after experiencing some democratic elections and elected governments, the institutional arrangement in practice and its compatibility with the societal culture would intuitively affect citizens' evaluation of how democracy works. This proposition can explain why, in developing countries, the impact of the interaction term on democratic satisfaction is stronger in the 2000s than in the 1990s.

In conclusion, our analysis in this section verifies that the effect of the interaction between societal culture and democratic model on SWD in developing democracies is robust across the two decades**,** and not contingent.

6.7 Conclusion

Focusing on developing democracies, the aim of this study was to develop and examine a theoretical mechanism for explaining the relation between democratic models and satisfaction with democracy when the impact of societal culture is involved. First of all, we have argued why the 'satisfaction with democracy' question is a proper indicator for measuring citizens' evaluation of democratic models in action, or 'constitution in operation,' as Fuchs (1995) calls it.

In this study, we firstly asserted that levels of democratic satisfaction and the mechanism explaining the variances would differ between old and developing democracies. These hypotheses were examined empirically and the results of multivariate regression analysis verified

that the 'age of democracy' is the strongest explanatory factor for differentiate levels of democratic satisfaction between old and developing democracies. Economic performance, as expected, would be another significant predictor of variances in SWD, though with much lower explanatory power. The analysis also reveals that variables explaining the variance in SWD differ for old and developing democracies.

Given the distinction between these two clusters of democracies, we have focused on developing democracies and argued that the interaction between democratic model and societal culture would affect democratic satisfaction in developing democracies. This hypothesis has been examined and verified empirically for 30 developing democracies between 1990 and 2009. The replication of analyses using separate data for the two decades of the 1990s and 2000s confirmed the robustness of the findings. However, we should emphasize that our findings regarding the importance of the interaction term were verified for the set of 30 developing democracies for which we had comparable scores of mastery orientation and SWD. Although the countries involved in our analysis are virtually representative of different cultures and regions, this study should be replicated for more developing democracies whenever cultural scores for more countries are available.

The final question is what implications this study has for the consolidation of democracy in developing democracies and countries in transition to democracy. This study shows that the interaction between, or compatibility of, institutional setting and societal culture does matter. Such compatibility can codetermine the level of democratic legitimacy in the eyes of citizens. Finding the significant role of the interaction term on SWD, we suggest that researchers and practitioners working on political institutions and constitutional engineering consider the compatibility of institutional arrangement and cultural orientations in proposing a democratic model to new democracies. The mentality of seeking the 'best model' should be replaced with the mentality of finding the 'most compatible model.' The debate on the superiority of the aggregative (majoritarian) or integrative (consensual) model of democracy should change its pivotal question to 'what model would be able to bring about a better functionality and credibility *given the context*?'

To answer this question, we need to involve factors other than the ones conventionally used in cross-national studies. Involving cultural analysis and utilizing valuable findings from cross-cultural theories in comparative politics may reveal some unseen factors with considerable

explanatory power. We examined one of them – mastery orientation – in this chapter and much more is to be done in further research.

Chapter 7

The Effect of National Culture on Practices of Participatory Democracy*

* This chapter is based on Maleki, A., & Bots, P. W. (2013). A Framework for Operationalizing the Effect of National Culture on Participatory Policy Analysis. *Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice*, *15*(5), 371-394.

7.1 Introduction

The aim of policy analysis, in general, is to generate and transform policy-relevant information to be utilized in decision making for resolving policy problems (Dunn, 1994). The classical rational style of policy analysis approach developed in the 1960s in the U.S. has been criticized for being technocratic and anti-democratic (Enserink et al., 2013). Participatory Policy Analysis (PPA) claims that it has responses to these shortcomings (Mayer, 1997). The adjective "participatory" refers to the greater involvement of those who affect or are affected by a policy problem in the policy analysis process (Geurts & Joldersma, 2001). PPA expands the range of actors (or stakeholders) involved in the consultation and policy-making process in a discursive or deliberative mode. It entails a policy-making process that is more horizontal than hierarchical, and more democratic in nature, and allows policy and process to bilaterally reinforce one another. Although there is a risk that participants may not be happy with the outcomes, at least they can be satisfied with the process (Deleon, 1990).

Stakeholder participation in public policy development is expected to improve the substantive quality of policy, its legitimacy and implementation, as well as the development of social capital for involved parties (Beierle & Cayford, 2002; Fiorino, 1990; Laird, 1993; Korfmacher, 2001; Webler, 1999). Systematic inquiry into the circumstances that make that these benefits actually occur is still much needed (Delli Carpini et al., 2004). Many authors agree that participatory practices and their outcomes are very sensitive to context, that it is very difficult to extrapolate from one case to another, and that participatory processes should hence be tailored to the specific context in which they are applied (Andre et al., 2006; Barreteau et al., 2010; Geurts & Joldersma, 2001; Geva-May, 2002; IAP2, 2009; Mansuri & Rao, 2004; Mayer, 1997; Nicholson, 2005;).

Evidently, if the political and legal systems of a country do not provide some minimum level of democracy and political rights (e.g., subscores of Freedom House), a participatory approach cannot be practiced, or what may be labeled as "participation" will in fact be what Arnstein (1969) calls non-participation, or tokenism. Assuming that the essential preconditions are met, Von Korff et al. (2010) characterize the craft of designing participation processes as "finding a balance between pushing for the breadth and depth of participation and respecting political, financial, cultural, and psychological realities".

In this chapter, we focus specifically on cultural factors because this aspect is widely problematized, but less studied in the literature on policy analysis and public participation. Enserink et al. (2007, p. 3) emphasize that "Public participation and culture are intertwined; national, local, and professional cultures and their formal institutions co-determine the level and methods of public participation". Reed (2008, p. 2424) points out that "the amount of time that participants are likely to give up varies between cultures, and limited time may constrain the choice of methods". Abraham and Platteau (2004) show the significant role of social and cultural fabric in the participatory development approach in sub-Saharan Africa. They identify certain cultural norms and values of tribal or lineage-based societies, such as highly personalized relationships, other-regarding norms, strong beliefs in the role of ancestors and supernatural powers, and strict respect of status and rank differences, and argue that these can complicate a participatory approach to the point of failure in achieving its intended outcomes. As Mayer (1997, pp. 241-242) puts it: "There is no single method of Participatory Policy Analysis (PPA) applicable in all – or most – contexts. […] Studying PPA from a general context requires comparative studies using experiments on participation in analysis: historically or cross-culturally, such as, do participatory procedures developed in Denmark work the same way and are they as successful in the United States, the United Kingdom or the Netherlands?"

Despite the general consensus on the need for context-sensitive design and implementation of public participation, there is a dearth of research on how to operationalize context-sensitive participatory approaches (Sagie & Aycan, 2003). We hope to contribute to research and practice by proposing a framework that will assist designers and/or implementers of public participation by indicating which contextual factors are sensitive to national culture, and may need special attention.

In the following sections we present our framework step by step. We start by identifying those Factors Affecting Participation (FAPs for short) that are culturally sensitive. We then explore three different cross-cultural theories, and relate selected cultural indicators identified in these theories to our FAPs. We show how the relation between the selected indicators and our FAPs can be presented in the form of a "slide bar" framework that, when filled with country-specific empirical data, will reveal context-specific caveats. We then test this framework by investigating to what extent the caveats it indicates for four countries (Denmark, France, Japan, United States) match with observations made about similar participatory practices (consensus conferences on the issue of genetically modified

food) in these four countries. We conclude with a discussion of the validity and usability of the framework in designing participatory practices.

7.2 Culturally Sensitive Factors Affecting Participation (FAPs)

Seeking to clarify the linkage between a participatory approach and the cultural context in which it is applied, we conceptualize this linkage as a set of FAPs: factors that will influence the occurrence and form of a public participation process, while themselves being influenced by cultural orientations. Perusing the literature on the design and evaluation of participatory approaches (Blackstock et al., 2007; Rowe & Frewer, 2000, 2004; Van Duijn, 2007), on success factors (OECD, 2001), and on risks and challenges of participation, such as the choice of participants (Deleon, 1990), the potential of conflict (Kweit & Kweit, 1984), and time and consultation fatigue (Innes & Booher, 2004; Nicholson, 2005), we have identified nine FAPs. These factors, classified in three categories that correspond to stages of public participation, are listed and briefly described in Table 7.1.

The first category of FAPs relates to the inputs of public participation. Public demand for participation (FAP1) can be considered as the first prerequisite for effective participation. The cultural tendency towards involvement in decision-making is a crucial and determinant factor for public participation. Without public demand, the 'Participation Hall' will remain empty even when its gates are wide open. Preferred participants (FAP2) reflects the types of people that are preferred and accepted to be involved in the participatory practice. In some societies, participatory practices involve resourceful stakeholders or experts, and the participation of ordinary citizens and laypersons is not encouraged and even seen as useless and meaningless. In other cultures, the presence of the powerless is crucial and a sign of inclusiveness. The role and intention of participants (FAP3) also matters. People may participate as an independent individual who represents his/her points of view, but also as a representative of a broader group or community. In some cultures, participating for one's own interest is not commonly accepted, and people are expected to seek the collective interest. In other cultures, participants are supposed to seek their own personal benefit without special concern about others.

Table 7.1. Culturally-Sensitive Factors Affecting Participation (FAPs)

Code	Name	Description
	Category 1 – Input of Public Participation	
FAP1	Public Demand	Extent to which people want to participate
FAP2	Preferred Participants	Acceptance of and/or preference for powerless vs. powerful participants
FAP3	Role and Intention of Participants	Participation as individual vs. representative, for taking care of self-interest vs. collective interest
	Category 2 – Process and Interactions in Public Participation	
FAP4	Process Format	Structure, style, formality, and arrangement of the participatory process
FAP5	Process Scope	Duration, speed, and number of participants of the participatory process
FAP6	Inter-party Trust	Trust between policymakers and the public and/or within these two parties in the participatory process
FAP7	Communicativeness	Extent of being communicative, participative, explicit, critical, and reflexive in interactions, and indifferent to rank
	Category 3 – Outcome of Public Participation	
FAP8	Outcome Expectation	Acceptance and/or expectance of optimal solution vs. satisficing consensus
FAP9	Conflict Resolution Mentality	Acceptance of and/or preference for compromise vs. defeat in conflicts

The second category of FAPs contains factors that relate to the process and interactions in public participation. Process format (FAP4) reveals which type of process is compatible with cultural traits of a society. Structure, style, arrangement, and regulation of a participatory session should be adapted to cultural context. In some cultures, formal meetings and strict protocols are preferred, whereas other cultures favor informal meetings and flexible procedures. Process scope (FAP5) refers to preferences regarding duration and speed of a participatory process. In some cultures, a short and fast process is preferable or tolerable, while in other cultures, a slow and long process can also be acceptable. Cultures may likewise differ with respect to the size of the process (i.e., the number of participants and activities). Inter-party trust (FAP6) is crucial for fruitful implementation of public participation. Lack of trust can be a serious hurdle for public participation. Confidence in government and policy makers will make it easier to persuade the public to participate. Interpersonal trust among different stakeholder groups will facilitate cooperation. Communicativeness (FAP7) determines how participants communicate with others when they do not know each other, or when they are in different status. In some cultures, people are explicit and self-expressive in their communication; in other cultures, people are modest

and implicit. The degree of respect for rank is important for the proper arrangement of participants in a participatory session. In some cultures, people with higher rank (social position, ascription, or age) must be respected, and confronting and opposing others with higher rank is a taboo. In other cultures, it is not important "who you are" and what rank you have.

The third category of FAPs regards the outcome of public participation. We reckon that outcome expectation (FAP8) is affected by culture. In some cultures, the "best decision" may be the main, and probably the only acceptable, outcome of a process. Participants and decision makers seek substantive, quantitative outcomes (optimized system performance), and find social, qualitative outcomes (e.g., relation-building and involvement) *per se* not relevant or desirable. Such societies will be reluctant to use participatory policy analysis, preferring a more conventional (rational) type of policy analysis. For other societies, this may be reversed. The outcome of public participation will also be affected by the conflict resolution mentality (FAP9) of the people involved. Some cultures value compromise and working towards agreement. Other cultures favor a determination to win, or lose without giving in.

Having identified these culturally sensitive FAPs, we need to identify what cultural dimensions would explain different attributes of FAPs in various national contexts.

7.3 Indicators of National Culture

Culture and its operationalization is a controversial issue. Most definitions emphasize that culture is the representation of shared values of a community (Hofstede, 2001; Kluckhohn, 1951). Hofstede was the first to show that "cultural differences between modern nations could be meaningfully measured and ordered along a discrete set of dimensions, representing different answers to universal problems of human societies" (Hofstede, 2006b, p. 883). A cultural dimension is a human construct which aims to represent a cluster of interdependent values bound by some similarity. Cultural dimensions can only be measured relative to other cultures (Hofstede, 2006a), and may be striking but also imperceptible (Minkov, 2007).

Hofstede (1980) inspired other researchers (House et al., 2004; Inglehart & Baker, 2000; Minkov 2007; Schwartz, 1999; Trompenaars & Turner, 1997) to identify alternative sets of cultural dimensions using

different data sets. Minkov (2007, p. 23) argues that, although cultural dimensions "are based on objectively existing phenomena, they are not the phenomena themselves but ways of describing them. Therefore, one and the same reality can be explained and presented in different ways, through different constructs".

Although many of the dimensions that have been introduced by different theories are strongly correlated and interrelated, and could be used interchangeably, each theory features distinctive dimensions that are absent in the others. The cultural studies can therefore be utilized in a complimentary way, provided that we know the interrelatedness of the dimensions from different cultural models. In Chapter 2, we tried to systematically cluster different dimensions from various cultural theories. Building on that study, we found that four cultural dimensions identified by Hofstede, two identified by Minkov, and three from GLOBE were best suited for our study in this chapter. We will briefly review these cultural dimensions, and then present those values, attitudes and behaviors manifested in each cultural dimension that are highly relevant to the FAPs introduced in the previous section.

7.3.1 Cultural Dimensions Identified by Hofstede and Minkov

Using a vast set of survey data from IBM subsidiaries in more than 50 countries, Hofstede (2001) derived four cultural dimensions: *Power Distance* (related to the problem of inequality distribution of power), *Uncertainty Avoidance* (related to the problem of dealing with the unknown and unfamiliar), *Individualism-Collectivism* (related to the problem of interpersonal ties), and *Masculinity-Femininity* (related to the attitudes towards mastery and competition).

Using data from the World Value Survey (WVS) - the largest representative international survey of basic values and beliefs, covering 97 societies - Minkov (2007) extracted three cultural dimensions. Quite recently, Hofstede collaborated with Minkov and adopted two dimensions from the latter's work: *Monumentalism versus Self-Effacement* (reflects to what extent a society emphasizes self-regard, pride, status, religiousness, and consistency between feelings and thoughts) and *Indulgence versus Restraint* (reflects to what extent people tend to enjoy free gratification of desire and feelings) (Hofstede et al., 2010).

Each dimension reflects a set of values, attitudes and behaviors of a society. In Hofstede et al. (2010), many of these features for each dimension are listed. From these lists, we selected those features that we

consider to be related to the FAPs. Table 7.2 shows how we tabulated our findings for the six dimensions by Hofstede and Minkov.

Table 7.2. FAP-related values, attitudes and behaviors associated with Hofstede's and Minkov's cultural dimensions

Large Power Distance	Small Power Distance	Related FAP
Subordinates expect to be told what to do	Subordinates expect to be consulted	FAP1
Older people are both respected and feared	Older people are neither respected nor feared	FAP7
Power-holders are entitled to privileges; elitist ideas about society	All should have equal rights; pluralist ideas about society	FAP1, FAP7
Collectivism	**Individualism**	
Collective interest prevail over individual interest	Individual interest prevail over collective interest	FAP3
Opinions predetermined by in-groups	Personal opinions expected	FAP3
High public self-consciousness	Low public self-consciousness	FAP3
Openly sharing with a person one's feelings about him or her spoils cooperation	Openly sharing with a person one's feelings about him or her may be productive	FAP7
Harmony should always be maintained and confrontation should be avoided	Speaking one's mind is a characteristic of an honest person and confrontations are normal	FAP7
Emphasis on ascription	Emphasis on individual achievements	FAP7
Low Uncertainty Avoidance	**High Uncertainty Avoidance**	
Citizens competent toward authorities	Citizens incompetent toward authorities	FAP2
Laypersons in key positions	Experts in key positions	FAP2
Few and general laws and regulations	Many and precise laws and regulations	FAP4
Openness to change and innovation, and tasks with uncertain outcomes	Preference for tasks with sure outcomes, no risks, and for following instructions	FAP4
Most people can be trusted	One can't be careful enough with other people, not even with family	FAP6
Acceptance of foreigners as managers; tolerance of diversity	Suspicion of foreigner as managers; xenophobia	FAP6
Masculinity	**Femininity**	
Sympathy for the strong	Sympathy for the weak	FAP2
Big and fast are beautiful	Small and slow are beautiful	FAP5
Achievement in terms of ego boosting, wealth and recognition	Achievement in terms of relationship, quality of contacts and environment	FAP8
Monumentalism	**Self-Effacement**	
Personal superiority and interpersonal competitions	Cooperation and equality	FAP9
Immutable values and beliefs; absolutist thinking	Flexible values and beliefs; dialectical thinking	FAP9
Indulgence	**Restraint**	
Higher importance of having fun; lower priority of maintaining order	Lower importance of having fun; higher priority of maintaining order	FAP4

Source: Hofstede (2001) and Hofstede et al. (2010)

7.3.2 Cultural Study of the GLOBE Project

GLOBE (Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness) is a multi-phase, multi-method project in which a worldwide network of researchers is examining the interrelationships between societal culture, organizational culture, and organizational leadership (House et al., 2001). GLOBE defines culture as 'shared motives, values, beliefs, identities, and interpretations or meanings of significant events that result from common experiences of members of collectives' (House et al., 2002, p. 5). GLOBE has introduced nine cultural dimensions, from which we use only those three that are distinctive from the six Hofstede-Minkov dimensions, and pertinent to our study: Institutional Collectivism (the degree to which people are encouraged to practice collective action), Assertiveness (the degree to which individuals in societies are assertive, confrontational, and aggressive in social relationships), and *Future Orientation* (the degree to which individuals in societies engage in future-oriented behaviors) (House et al., 2002).

Table 7.3. FAP-related values, attitudes and behaviors associated with high or low scores in each GLOBE's cultural dimension

High Score	Low Score	Related FAP
Institutional Collectivism		
Individuals are likely to engage in group activities	Individuals are likely to engage in activities alone	FAP1
People emphasize relatedness with groups	People emphasize rationality	FAP3
Group goals take precedence over individual goals	Individual goals take precedence over group goals	FAP3
Assertiveness		
Value direct, explicit and unambiguous communication	Value indirect and ambiguous speech and face-saving	FAP7
Value expressiveness and revealing thoughts and feelings	Value detached and self-possessed conduct	FAP7
Stress competition and dominance	Stress solidarity and cooperation	FAP8
Future Orientation		
Place higher priority on immediate rewards	Place higher priority on long-term success	FAP5
Flexible and adaptive way of organizing	Inflexible and non-adaptive way of organizing	FAP9

Source: House et al. (2004)

Similar to the Hofstede-Minkov dimensions, the three GLOBE dimensions are associated with specific values, attitudes and behaviors.

These features are numerous and can be found in the GLOBE book (House et al., 2001). Again, we selected those features that we consider to be related to our FAPs. Table 7.3 shows our findings.

7.3.3 Interpersonal Trust and Confidence in Government Indexes

The 'interpersonal trust' and 'confidence in government' are two indicators that are normally measured in the main global public surveys. In our study, we consider the latter as a proxy for the trust between the public and the government, and the former as a proxy for the trust between people. We use both as indicators for FAP6 (inter-party trust). We extract the scores for these two indicators from the Legatum Prosperity Index (2012), which in turn used the Gallup (2012) survey.

All in all, Table 7.4 summarizes which cultural indicators are pertinent to which FAP.

Table 7.4. Summary of cultural indicators relevant to FAPs

FAP	Factor Name	Relevant Indicators
Category 1 - Inputs of Public Participation		
FAP1	Public Demand	power distance, institutional collectivism
FAP2	Preferred Participants	uncertainty avoidance; masculinity
FAP3	Role and Intention of Participants	individualism/collectivism; institutional collectivism
Category 2 - Process and Interactions in Public Participation		
FAP4	Process Format	uncertainty avoidance; indulgence/restraint
FAP5	Process Scope	future orientation; masculinity/femininity
FAP6	Inter-party Trust	interpersonal trust index; uncertainty avoidance; confidence in government index
FAP7	Communicativeness	individualism/collectivism; assertiveness; power distance
Category 3 - Outcome of Public Participation		
FAP8	Outcome Expectation	masculinity/femininity; assertiveness
FAP9	Conflict Resolution Mentality	monumentalism; future orientation

7.4 A Framework for Assessing FAPs on the Basis of Cultural Indicators

Scores for the cultural dimensions identified in the previous section are publicly available. We expect that presenting these scores in relation to FAPs produces an 'orientation' for each FAP that may assist practitioners in deciding how to develop public participation in a specific

country. Figure 7.1 illustrates how the framework is used to obtain 'orientations' for a single FAP for the four countries that we will consider in the next section.

This framework consists of 'sliders' indicating the position of cultural dimensions related to each particular FAP. As an example, Figure 7.1 presents the framework for FAP2 (*Preferred Participants*) which has two indicators: uncertainty avoidance and masculinity. The minimum and maximum scores of each cultural dimension correspond to the two extremes ("poles") of the qualitative scale for the FAP: acceptance of and preference for the powerless on the left, and the powerful on the right. The scores of a country determine its inclination toward one of the poles and the corresponding attributes.

This example illustrates how we propose to translate available international survey data onto a left pole – right pole scale for each of the nine FAPs. Although we summarize the 'orientations' in Figure 7.1 as arrows positioned somewhere on the "left–right" continuum, they convey a richer picture if the underlying details are considered. This will become clear as we examine the applicability of the framework in the next section by applying it to four case studies.



Figure 7.1. Obtaining an 'Orientation' of a FAP for each country by positioning the scores of related indicators

Note: This framework (on-line available at http://actoranalysis.com/fap-framework/) consists of sets of "slide bars" that for each FAP indicate the position of countries on the cultural dimensions related to this FAP.

7.5 Application of the Framework to a Participatory Practice in Four Countries: Denmark, France, Japan and the United States

We tested the framework by filling it with data on four countries and then comparing the nine FAP 'orientations' with the findings reported by scholars on well-documented instances of a Consensus Conference in these countries. These conferences were held on the same topic of genetically modified (GM) food in France (1998), Denmark (1999), Japan (2000), and the U.S. (2002). A consensus conference aims to involve ordinarily citizens in a policy analysis issue, e.g., a technology assessment. It consists of a three- to four-day public meeting, organized by a planning/steering committee, in which a citizen or lay panel and an expert panel interact (Andersen & Jæger, 1999). For each country, we first placed the country-specific indicator scores in the framework (cf. Figure 7.1 and Table A.5 in Appendix A), interpreted the resulting 'orientation' for the FAPs, and then checked whether these concurred with what the literature reported on the actual implementation of the consensus conference. To facilitate comparison, we place 2-letter country codes (DK for Denmark, FR for France, JP for Japan, and US for the U.S.) on the sliders so that its position reflects the indicator score.

First of all, the high scores of all four countries under study on the indicators evaluating the 'freedom of expression and beliefs' and 'associational and organizational rights' (Freedom House, 2012) indicate that the precondition of legal and political support for public participation is met.

Figure 7.2 shows the results for the first category of FAPs: *Inputs of Public Participation*. The orientation for FAP1 predicts a high public demand for participation in Denmark. Indeed, Einsiedel et al. (2001, p. 85) state that "… since the end of the 19th century, adult education and local debate have been an important part of Danish cultural and political life. Thus, the consensus conference model, as it has been developed in the Danish context, had a specific historical origin in the learning processes related to technology controversies in Denmark and a basis in Danish political culture". The orientation for France (relatively high power distance and low team-working orientation) suggests that public participation will appear in forms of protest and demonstration instead of participatory meetings and negotiations. In their case study of participatory river basin management, Patel and Stel (2004) found that

discussions and negotiations were hindered by public participation in the form of public demonstrations: the public struggle was conducted outside the institutional framework, usually on the streets. The orientation for Japan (high scores on team-working orientation combined with moderate power distance) suggests a tendency of citizens to participate, and indeed Nishizawa (2005, p. 486) reported that "… the Japanese Government changed its original position and transferred the debate on GM food from the scientific to the public arena because there was a strong popular movement towards more transparent policy decisions and political change. Since the 1980s, the public administration has suffered severe critical attacks on its secrecy and lack of transparency".



Figure 7.2. Application of the framework for Category 1(Inputs of Public Participation) to Denmark (DK), France (FR), Japan (JP) and the United States (US)

For preferred participants (FAP2), the framework predicts that Denmark will strive to give voice to the powerless, and the literature concurs: "the consensus conference model is consistent with the dominant Danish egalitarian and participatory ethos" (Dryzek & Tucker, 2008, p. 867). The orientations for the other countries globally suggest a lower acceptance of powerless participants (U.S.), and even a predilection for the powerful (France and Japan). The empirical evidence supports this. In Japan, up to 1998, there were almost no public forums in which ordinary citizens consider issues in science and technology to come to a decision by themselves. It is often believed that these issues are difficult to understand, and that one should rely on expert judgment (Wakamatsu, 1999). It is indicative that, while the standard Danish model of consensus conference prescribes that the lay panel decides which experts are to be invited, it was the steering committee, not the lay panel, that nominated the members of the expert panel in the Japanese case (Nishizawa, 2005). At the consensus conference in France, "… some deputies argued that citizens should not have any role beyond voting in elections. Parliamentarians were not keen on any of their authority being delegated to another body. Some thought lay citizens would not be able to understand complex technological issues" (Dryzek & Tucker, 2008, p. 869). When a film of the consensus conference was shown in the national assembly in France, the reaction was silence and amazement at the ability of ordinary citizens to deliberate complex issues. Moreover, the press coverage revealed a degree of skepticism concerning the wisdom of entrusting key roles to ordinary citizens (Dryzek & Tucker, 2008). In the U.S., power-holders support public participation via organized stakeholder groups, not ordinary people (Dryzek & Tucker, 2008, p. 870). The state legislature paid little attention to the U.S. consensus conference "… though one legislator wrote to the president of the University of New Hampshire complaining about the university's involvement in what looked like policy making, involving citizens who could not possibly have the requisite expertise" (Dryzek & Tucker, 2008, p. 871). Moreover, a columnist in the conservative Washington Times ridiculed the idea of letting citizens "vote" about scientific issues (Dryzek & Tucker, 2008).

The indicators for the role and intention of participants (FAP3) in Figure 7.2 show that all western countries are individualistic, but scores differ in their institutional collectivism. The scores of Denmark and Japan on institutional collectivism indicate a priority of group goals over individual goals. France has the lowest scores, while the U.S. scores also indicate that they are not zealous of collective benefits and social interest.

The data on consensus conferences provides only weak evidence concerning FAP3. Although the Danish model prescribes random selection of participants as a (weak) guard against self-interest, the U.S. consensus conference organizers used advertisement to recruit participants. This entails more participant self-selection: potentially those most interested in the issue were most likely to volunteer (Dryzek & Tucker, 2008, p. 871).

Figure 7.3 shows the results for the second category of FAPs: *Process and Interactions in Public Participation*. The scores for FAP4 (*Process Format*) predict that Denmark and the U.S. will favor innovative and flexible processes with informal and friendly atmosphere, while France and Japan will prefer conventional and established processes, being formal and serious. Indeed, Denmark and the U.S. were the main developers of many innovative participatory methods: the "consensus conference" and "scenario workshop" originate from Denmark, and the "citizens' jury" and "deliberative polling" have been invented in the U.S. The Danish Board of Technology (DBT) actively championed participatory practice. By contrast, the French counterpart of the DBT, the Office in Parliament for Evaluation of Science and Technology (OPECST) was against sponsoring participatory technology assessment. The initiative for the consensus conference on GM food in France "… came from the office of newly appointed Prime Minister, Lionel Jospin, who wanted to appear innovative in response to a knotty issue" (Dryzek & Tucker, 2008, p. 868). In the case of Japan, Nishizawa (2005, p. 486) indicates that although "… the deliberation process was radical and structurally and organizationally very different from conventional conflict-resolution methods in Japan, nevertheless, the content of the deliberation was nothing like as radical. Rather, it mirrored the conventional policy style of consensual and technocratic decision-making and the conformist attitude in Japan".

The scores for FAP5 (*Process Scope*) indicate that in Denmark and Japan a slow and long process with small group of participants is accepted, while in the U.S. and France the reverse is preferred. The high future orientation scores for Japan and Denmark are important indicators of this prediction. Indeed, for the consensus conference in France, a short timescale was enforced (Lieberman & Taylor, 2005). It is likewise indicative that "the Danish conference was held over four days to allow the lay panel more time to write its report" while "the Canadian final public conferences were done over a three-day period, with the lay panels producing their reports in a marathon overnight session that lasted well

into the early morning hours" (Einsiedel et al., 2001, p. 89). As for size, it is revealing that the participatory methods developed by Denmark (consensus conference and scenario workshop) involve from 15 to 25 people, whereas those developed in the U.S. (citizens' jury and deliberative polling) involve from 50 to 500+ people (Fishkin et al., 2000). Moreover, "… the America-Speaks Foundation organizes deliberative 21st Century Town Meetings that involve hundreds of participants meeting for a relatively short time – partly on the grounds that politicians and the media find it harder to ignore such numbers than the 15 or so that a consensus conference involves" (Dryzek & Tucker, 2008, p. 872). We should not ignore, though, that a country's population size might co-determine the preferred number of participants.

For FAP6 (*Inter-party Trust*), the framework shows that, except for Denmark, confidence in government is low. Moreover, interpersonal trust is low in France. Here, too, the reports on consensus conferences corroborate the orientations obtained with the framework. In spite of efforts of the steering committee to assure the lay panelists of the trustworthiness and benevolence of the French government, there remained mistrust on the part of the lay participants because the government seemed already to have decided on growing GM maize (Dryzek & Tucker, 2008). In Japan, the questionnaire filled by lay members prior to the first consensus conference revealed that "… most of them (15 out of 19) have little faith in the current politicians" (Wakamatsu, 1999, p. 29). In a U.S. process, where "… inputs normally take the form of advocacy, it is hard to get partisans to accept that the forum is not going to be biased somehow against their interests" (Dryzek & Tucker, 2008, p. 871). The remarkable Danish public confidence may be inspired by the emphasis government places on transparency. One Member of Parliament in Denmark stated that reports of consensus conferences "… are better than opinion polls because they are less biased, there is no hidden agenda and the methodology is explicit and clear. With opinion polls in the newspapers you never know who is behind them and what is the agenda" (Dryzek & Tucker, 2008, p. 867).

Concerning FAP7 (*Communicativeness*), the indicators for Denmark, France and the U.S. show that these countries are self-expressive and explicit in their communication, while Japanese culture is implicit and self-censoring in communication with others.



Figure 7.3. Application of the framework for Category 2 (Process and Interactions in Public Participation) to Denmark (DK), France (FR), Japan (JP) and the United States (US)

Moreover, Japan and to a lesser degree France tend towards higher respect for authorities. This is reflected by the observation that after the consensus conference in Japan "… a panel member explained the unspoken, subtle strategy taken by the lay panel to bring the state-involved deliberation to a successful conclusion without jeopardizing their future participation" (Nishizawa, 2005, p. 483). In the French consensus conference, "… the lay citizens proved more critical and less compliant than expected by the sponsors, even though their final report was not radically at variance with existing government policy" (Dryzek & Tucker, 2008, p. 869).

Interviews with lay panelists in Japan revealed that the involvement of governmental authorities had influenced the discussion at the deliberative session: "… several other panel members also said that they refrained from suggesting extreme opinions such as a total ban on GMOs. This self-restrained reaction seen in the statements by several lay panelists corresponds to the 'conflict avoidance behavior' that has been described as an important behavioral norm of the Japanese" (Nishizawa, 2005, p. 483).

Figure 7.4 shows the results for the third category of FAPs: *Outcome of Public Participation*. Regarding outcome expectation (FAP8), the framework predicts that the U.S. highly values success, performance and optimized outcome (right pole), while Denmark highly values relationships and a satisficing outcome (left pole). The scores for France and Japan indicate a right-pole inclination. Indeed, Dryzek and Tucker (2008, p. 870) report that "… the GM food issue plays out somewhat differently in the United States than in Denmark and France. GM agriculture is very big business in the United States, GM crops having made great inroads with a minimum of public fuss. The level of public anxiety on this issue is lower than in Europe". In Japan, the authorities disclosed that their expectation from the public participation was to see acceptance of the current achievement in GM foods, because the Japanese government has invested too much in advancing industrial development of biotechnology (Nishizawa, 2005). It meant that a consensus on reduction or restriction policy of GM food might not be accepted and adopted. Indeed, "… the plan thus emphasized the importance of maintaining Japan's current competitive advantage in the analysis of rice genomes and, at the same time, the general public acceptance of biotechnology that was considered to reinforce Japan's competitive advantage in this field" (Nishizawa, 2005, p. 485). Indeed, the decision makers finally did not accept to integrate the outcome of the consensus

conference into the management decision, and this created a tension between them and the lay panel members (Nishizawa, 2005). In France, despite the claim that the goal was to "… assure both higher economic growth and social acceptance", the French authorities believed that uninformed public opinion is an obstacle to progress and needs to be overcome by education (Dryzek & Tucker, 2008). Interestingly, in France the term "consensus conference" was changed into "citizen conference" with the argument that "consensus" would be interpreted as "halfhearted consensus" based on some ambiguous compromise (Lieberman & Taylor, 2005). However, contrary to the Americans, the French citizens in the lay panel did not accept the economic benefit of biotechnology at expense of people's health (Dryzek & Tucker, 2008, p. 869). In Denmark, in response to the 1996 Eurobarometer survey statement "we have to accept some degree of risk from modern biotechnology if it enhances the country's economic competitiveness", only 30 percent of Danes agreed (Einsiedel et al., 2001), which indicates that the Danish are loath to sacrifice their qualitative concerns to the economic achievement. Moreover, the output of Danish consensus conferences, for or against the GM food, should be taken seriously to the extent that it can lead to parliamentary questions to ministers, asking why they do not follow the citizens' recommendations (Dryzek & Tucker, 2008).



Figure 7.4. Application of the framework for Category 3 (Outcome of Public Participation) to Denmark (DK), France (FR), Japan (JP) and the United States (US)

Finally, the scores for conflict resolution mentality (FAP9) put the U.S. on the left pole, and Denmark and Japan on the opposite side. In the United States, whenever different parties think that there could be a possibility of bias and conflicts, instead of negotiation and compromise, they withdraw from the session (Dryzek & Tucker, 2008). Stakeholders play to win, or they do not participate. In the Danish GM consensus conference, all the relevant actors with opposing views participated, played their roles, and followed the proceedings under the neutral direction of the Danish Board of Technology (Dryzek & Tucker, 2008). In Japan, compromise is more accepted than confrontation in dealing with conflicts. Their high flexibility and future orientation indicates that they value the compromise and consensus, and may try to prevent conflicts in advance. Indeed, Nishizawa (2005, p. 484) observed strategic behavior of lay panelists in confrontation with authorities during the consensus conference, and quoted a scientist who said that "… this behavioral pattern is the 'essence' of the Japanese style of conflict management. It is neither self-sacrifice nor spontaneous consensus, but rather a strong desire to avoid direct conflict, particularly with government authority". The orientation for France reflects a middle position between compromise and defeat in conflicts. The fact that, despite critical and negative opinions of French citizens during the consensus conference, their final report did not radically oppose government policy shows a sense of compromise. However, French authorities would in some cases not compromise, but try to impose their interests (Dryzek & Tucker, 2008).

In sum, the 'orientations' obtained by applying the sliders-framework show good correspondence with the empirical data that we found on participatory practice of consensus conferences in Denmark, France, Japan, and the U.S. The fact that it does so for four countries with distinct cultures shows the robustness of the framework, and also its potential as a diagnostic tool for policy analysts and practitioners who wish to tailor a participatory approach to the cultural context of a particular country.

7.6 Discussions and Conclusion

This research originated from the observation that context and, more specifically, national culture, play a significant role in public participation. By means of conceptual analysis of well-established cross-cultural theories, we operationalized this relation in the form of a framework that permits analysts to assess the effect of cultural factors on

the process, interactions, and expectations of participatory practices. Based on quantitative scores publicly available for numerous countries, our framework produces 'orientations' for nine factors affecting participation (FAPs). The secondary case studies in four countries showed that these 'orientations' correspond well with the way the consensus conferences proceeded in these countries. We found it helpful in understanding why a consensus conference is successful and effective in Denmark, but not much favored and less fruitful in other contexts like France, the U.S., and Japan. This suggests that our framework can be instrumental in the selection and/or design of appropriate participatory methods and processes for a given country having specific cultural orientations.

In general, the orientations produced by the framework for a particular country can guide researchers and practitioners in their thinking about the following four aspects of participation:

(1) What to aim for: If there is a weak demand and supply from the public and power-holders respectively (right pole of FAP1), then we cannot expect to attain the higher rungs of the "ladder of participation" defined by Arnstein (1969). Meanwhile, high public demand for participation can lead to request for higher levels of participation. When the outcome expectation (FAP8) indicates optimized performance (right pole), the compatible purpose of public participation would be consultation. If public satisfaction and consensus are sought (left-pole), higher levels of participation (e.g., co-decision, delegation) may be more appropriate.

(2) Whom to involve: Context will co-determine which type of participants will be preferred or discouraged in forms of public participation. FAP2 (preferred participants) indicates whether this will be lay people or organized and strong stakeholders. FAP3 (role and intention of participants) may suggest participation of stakeholder representatives, or rather of individual citizens. FAP4 (process format) will also bear on the choice of type of participants: a preference for formal and serious processes (right pole) may imply involvement of authorities and influential individuals, whereas a preference for informal and friendly sessions (left pole) may suggest involving ordinary citizens as well. FAP6 (inter-party trust) may indicate that participants should be "in-group" (right pole) or that "out-group" individuals such as foreign mediators are welcome as well (left pole).

(3) Which methods to use: All FAPs of the second category (*Process and Interactions in Public Participation*), have implications for designing

or selecting appropriate participatory methods and techniques. Each such method has particular features (see Fishkin et al., 2000; OECD, 2001; Rowe & Frewer, 2000, 2005; Van Asselt Marjolein & Rijkens-Klomp, 2002) which should be taken into account when seeking methods that are compatible with the specific context. For example, the state of FAP4 indicates whether a flexible format of a process is preferred, or a structured format. Likewise, FAP5 bears on the duration and number of participants of the method. Right-pole of FAP6 and FAP7 (i.e., a lack of trust between and within participants, culturally modest and non-communicative participants, or the likelihood that the attendance of highly ranked persons may overshadow the participatory session) indicate that an impartial facilitator should be engaged. The same FAPs also affect a characteristic feature of participatory methods, namely what participatory setting, such as Face-to-Face (FTF) meetings, anonymous questionnaires, or ICT-mediated interaction, is compatible. A leaning towards the right-pole of inter-party trust also implies a higher need for a transparent process. Finally, if FAP9 (conflict resolution mentality) indicates that stakeholders are not inclined to compromise in conflicts, non-FTF methods might be more effective.

(4) What risks to manage: Some FAPs entail risks and challenges of participation. The right-pole of FAP1 suggests a need for incentives to encourage people (e.g., compensations, subsidies, or educational programs, all of which will increase cost). When FAP5 indicates a preference for slow and long processes, this also implies a risk of consultation fatigue. Note that, although in essence beneficial for participation, being explicit, speaking one's mind, and criticizing overtly (left poles of FAP7) can also engender a risk of conflict. Such conflicts may escalate when people do not easily compromise (right pole of FAP9).

The framework may prove to be even more helpful when considering the transplantation of participatory practices from a reference country to a target country. By checking for each FAP whether the orientations for the target country differ significantly from those for the reference country, practitioners may discover a need for adaptation of particular aspects of these practices.

We should also point out potential weaknesses of this study. First of all, we are aware that the cross-cultural theories or, more generally, the dimensionalization of culture that underpin our framework, are subject to debate. In line with Williamson (2002), we caution against the assumption that all members of a culture homogeneously carry all

attributes of that culture, or that behavior is mainly determined by cultural background. However, our framework does not build on these assumptions; it translates scores for cultural dimensions – global as they may be – into caveats for practitioners. As do Hofstede (2001) and Minkov (2007), we emphasize that cultural indicators should not be used at the level of individual. Our framework is likely to produce actionable results only for participatory practices that will involve sufficient numbers from a variety of societal groups.

Secondly, the available cultural dimensions have not been developed for our specific purpose. Although we tried to select only those that can explain something about factors affecting participation, these cultural indicators entail many values and attributes which could not be separated for specific use. As a result, some cultural dimensions are used as indicators for several FAPs. However, using several cross-cultural theories through the complementary application of their dimensions would also seem to make our framework more plausible and reliable.

Thirdly, we have tested our framework not by first-hand experience, but by using observations from case studies reported in the literature. Inevitably, the research focus of the original researchers will have filtered the data, and this may have restricted our view. Moreover, we have used the framework for a specific method (consensus conference) and topic (genetically modified food). It should be tested for other cases in other countries to examine how robust and helpful it is.

Our framework is not a generic manual for policy analysts, prescribing "do's" or "don'ts" for successful participatory practice in different cultural contexts. What we aimed to do was to find the relation between FAPs and indicators to make a framework which can be used as a flashlight to reveal hidden and unknown points of a context to researchers and practitioners of public participation. We see the product of our research as a guiding tool that says something important about cultural context, but definitely not the final word.

Chapter 8

Cultural Orientations and Institutional Choices

8.1 Introduction

The previous chapters have theorized and examined the relation between cultural orientations and dimensions of democracy. The results have provided a general picture of how culture and democracy walk hand in hand. However, much more should be done to elucidate more details of this striking, mysterious picture.

In Chapter 2, nine clusters of cultural dimensions were identified. In Chapter 4 the two dimensions of democracy were operationalized. Then, in Chapter 5, the relation between cultural orientations and the two dimensions of democracy (i.e. Integrative Dimension of Democracy (IDD) and Participative Dimension of Democracy (PDD)) have been presented and discussed. However, as presented in Chapter 4, each dimension of democracy in turn consists of three components, each of which is an indicator for measuring one modality of the concept of contestation and participation. Each component in turn is affected by some institutional choices. Thus, for having a better understanding of interrelations between the dimensions of culture and democracy, the effect of cultural orientations on the components of IDD and PDD, and on the institutional choices forming the components should be studied.

These components are manifestations of the political preferences of people in each society. They can be considered outcomes of the interaction between a constellation of cultural orientations and an arrangement of institutional choices; the institutional arrangement determines the possibilities and constraints of political options, and societal culture codetermines people's preferences and choices of those options. While cultural orientations are durable and hard to change, institutional setting can be reformed and manipulated.

In this chapter, we want to zoom in on the interrelations between cultural orientations and some underlying institutional elements generating dimensions of democracy. Table 8.1 shows the list of different institutional choices/elements that can be selected and tailored in constitutional and institutional design. These elements will directly or indirectly affect the democratic model of a country. The preference for and superiority of one institutional option over another is a challenging, crucial and endless debate among political scientists. This study tries to demonstrate the importance of involving the role of cultural orientations in the selection and adoption of constitutional/institutional choices. This issue should, in my estimation, be a part of the debate agenda on models

of democracy. Indeed, the involvement of culture would change the starting point of the debate; from 'what is the best model/institutional choice?' to 'what is the most compatible model/institutional choice?'.

Table 8.1. List of main institutional choices and elements in democracies

Institutional choices/elements	Options
Type of regime	presidential/semi-presidential/semi-parliamentary/ parliamentary
Electoral system	PR/mixed/majority
Electoral threshold	legal threshold; district magnitude; legislative size
Compulsory voting	compulsory/non-compulsory
Referendum provision	top-down/bottom-up; binding/advisory; national/local

Figure 8.1, a spaghetti-like diagram, depicts the associational relations between the cultural dimensions, institutional elements and components of IDD and PDD. The cultural orientations are positioned in the middle. The right and the left sides present the components of IDD and PDD, respectively, as well as the corresponding institutional elements of each dimension. The seven cultural orientations demonstrate either weak or strong associations with the components of democratic models. The plus and minus signs above each relational vector demonstrate a positive or negative association between the two variables, respectively.

In the following sections, we elaborate each of the interrelations presented in Figure 8.1 and discuss the conceptual and empirical links between the cultural orientations and institutional choices. In presenting these interrelations, we will discuss, in the concluding chapter that follows, the importance of involving culture in designing, tailoring and reforming democratic models by introducing the Cultural Compatibility Thesis, which will be the last step of this study and the first step of follow-up research.



Figure 8.1. Map of interconnections between cultural orientations, institutional elements and components of IDD and PDD

8.2 Institutions Forming the Integrative Dimension of Democracy (IDD)

8.2.1 Regime Type: (semi) Presidential vs. (semi) Parliamentary

In Chapter 4, regime type has been indirectly involved in the operationalization of democratic models. Regime type affects the IDD through the presidential disproportionality measure. For presidential democracies, we consider the presidential disproportionality in addition to parliamentary disproportionality, basing this on the Lijphartian approach. Presidential disproportionality decreases the total electoral proportionality (TEP) and accordingly lowers the IDD score. For now, however, the question is why different countries opt for different regime types.

I assert that different cultural orientations codetermine the preference of a society for a specific regime type. In a presidential system, a person/party would be delegated, in a direct vote, to take the significant part of political power, while in the parliamentary system the power could be much more fragmented. And in a presidential system, the concentration of power can be larger than in the parliamentary one. Therefore, I speculate that the cultural orientation of power distance can play a role in this institutional choice. I assert that societies with higher power distance would incline more toward accepting and adopting the presidential system. In order to examine this notion, the cultural orientation of hierarchy measured by Schwartz and the classification of regime types developed in Appendix C are used.

Figure 8.2 shows the relation between the two variables. We observe that countries with a presidential system have a higher hierarchy score. There are two outliers, namely India and Turkey, without which the Spearman's correlation between presidentialism and hierarchy is 0.41 ($N= 42$, $p<0.01$). Among outliers, Turkey has recently started to move toward a semi-presidential system, with the first direct presidential election took place in August 2014. All in all, we can see the footprint of the cultural orientation of hierarchy on the choice of regime type. We can assume the direction of causality from societal culture to political institutions since the former is antecedent to the latter.



Figure 8.2. The relation between hierarchy and regime types

Note: 0: parliamentary, 1: semi-parliamentary, 2: semi-presidential, 3: presidential

Another cultural orientation that could affect the regime choice is individualism vs. collectivism. As discussed in Chapter 2, the two cultural dimensions of individualism and power distance are not perfectly orthogonal, but rather interrelated. However, beyond that interrelation, one can theoretically argue that individualism bears an affinity with parliamentarism because this type of regime can better satisfy the attribute of 'representation' in a democratic system. Indeed, people in an individualist culture prefer more autonomy and less embeddedness; and smaller communities and minorities are stronger in individualist cultures, and there is greater concern over their representation. Although the choice of an electoral system is the main determinant of representation, it is widely believed that parliamentarism is better matched with the inclusive electoral system (Lijphart, 1999). Thus, I assert that individualist societies are more inclined to adopt parliamentarism, whereas presidentialism would be more accepted in collectivist nations.



Figure 8.3. The relation between collectivism and regime types

Note: 0: parliamentary, 1: semi-parliamentary, 2: semi-presidential, 3: presidential

Figure 8.3 presents the relation between GLOBE's in-group collectivism and the regime type. Excluding the USA and Namibia as outliers, the Spearman's correlation between them is 0.46 (N=44, $p<0.005$). Other cultural dimensions that measure individualism/collectivism, namely Hofstede's individualism and Schwartz's bipolar dimension of embeddedness/autonomy, also have the significant correlations of -0.72 (N=50, $p<0.001$) and 0.52 (N=43, $p<0.001$) with the regime type, respectively (excluding the USA).

Traditionalism/monumentalism is another cultural orientation that is conceptually associated with presidentialism. This cultural trait relates to pride and conviction. It was argued in Chapter 5 that in the monumentalist culture, charismatic characteristics are praised and encouraged; and hence, people would like to see charismatic leaders in power. Thus having a powerful president is more expected in those societies. Figure 8.4 presents the correlational pattern between Inglehart's traditionalism and regime types. The Spearman's correlation between the two variables is -0.50 (N=65, $p<0.001$).



Figure 8.4. The relation between traditionalism and regime types

Note: 0: parliamentary, 1: semi-parliamentary, 2: semi-presidential, 3: presidential

Finally, I argue that those societies with higher uncertainty avoidance would show a stronger inclination toward a presidential system than a parliamentary one. In a presidential system, the ministers and ruler of the government are appointed shortly after the elections, while in the parliamentary system, negotiations for making coalitions are started the day after the election, and cabinet formation may take months. This means that the uncertainty in a parliamentary system is higher than a presidential system and explains why presidentialism might be more popular in uncertainty-avoidant cultures. Given this argument and bearing in mind the relation between uncertainty avoidance and future orientation discussed in Chapter 2 (section 2.3.3), I assert that future orientation should have a negative association with presidentialism. It is assumed that in future-oriented cultures people accept the long and slow process of decision-making, while in a short-term-oriented culture people prefer to see that decisions are made fast. Therefore, I assert that the parliamentary system bears a stronger affinity with high future-oriented and low uncertainty-avoidant cultures. Figure 8.5 corroborates this assertion. Presidentialism has the Spearman's correlations of 0.30 (N=51, $p<0.05$)

and -0.35 (N=46, p<0.05) with Hofstede's uncertainty avoidance and GLOBE's future orientation, respectively. As the figure shows, almost all the countries with a presidential system have a low score for future orientation. The direction of causality can be a debatable question, but considering the fact that most of these countries are new and young democracies, we can argue that the cultural orientation codetermines this institutional choice, although undoubtedly there is an interaction between the institutional setting and societal culture.



Figure 8.5. The relation between future-orientation and regime types

Note: 0: parliamentary, 1: semi-parliamentary, 2: semi-presidential, 3: presidential

There is a common conviction among political scholars that parliamentary and presidential systems bear an affinity with consensual (integrative) and majoritarian (aggregative) models of democracy, respectively. However, there is only a weak Spearman's correlation (-0.24, N=80, p<0.05) between the regime type and the integrative (vs. aggregative) dimension of democracy. Normally, in a multi-party parliamentary system, consensus building is crucial in forming the cabinet, while this is less needed in a presidential system, in which the winner president/party is under less pressure to collaborate. Thus, I assert that societies with a weaker teamwork spirit (lower collaborativeness)

might have more inclination towards the presidential system. Figure 8.6 shows the association between the regime type and GLOBE's institutional collectivism. Excluding South Korea as an outlier, we observe a significant Spearman's correlation of -0.32 (N=45, $p<0.05$) between the two variables, which gives support to this assertion.



Figure 8.6. The relation between collaborativeness and regime types

Note: 0: parliamentary, 1: semi-parliamentary, 2: semi-presidential, 3: presidential

8.2.2 Electoral System: Majority vs. Mixed vs. PR

The electoral system is an important institutional element in forming the democratic model of a country. The electoral system affects both the parliamentary electoral disproportionality as well as the effective number of parties in the parliament (ENPP). However, the electoral system per se is not the only determinant of the outcomes. This means that we may see democracies with a majoritarian electoral system that have higher ENPP than democracies with a PR system. This is sometimes also the case for parliamentary disproportionality. This implies that people's political behavior is not regulated merely by the institutional setting. Societal culture, in my estimation, is another important factor that affects political

preferences. Therefore, I argue that each society inclines to adopt a kind of electoral system that is more compatible with its societal culture.

In Chapter 5, the notion that countries with higher mastery orientation are more inclined to adopt the aggregative (majoritarian) model of democracy has been discussed. Considering the connection between components of IDD and the institutional elements, I argue that mastery-oriented cultures accept, and even prefer, the majority/plurality electoral system, whereas the PR system is more popular in low mastery cultures. Figure 8.7 confirms this speculation. The Spearman's correlation between Schwartz's mastery and majoritarian electoral system is 0.44 (N=44, $p<0.005$).



Figure 8.7. The relation between mastery and electoral system

Note: 0: majority, 1: mixed, 2 :PR

PR would be considered a more egalitarian system of representation. The distribution of power in a PR system decreases the hierarchical dominance of a party or a coalition of parties. Therefore, we can speculate that the PR system is more likely to be adopted in societies with a low power distance culture. On the other hand, the electoral systems that use majority/plurality rule - even partly as in mixed systems - would be accepted more in societies with higher hierarchy orientation. Figure

8.8 shows the significant correlation of -0.35 (N=44, $p<0.05$) between the electoral system and Schwartz's hierarchy. This association supports our assertion.



Figure 8.8. The relation between hierarchy and electoral system

Note: 0: majority, 1: mixed, 2 :PR

Choosing electoral systems is a matter of importance in designing the democratic model of a country. I posit that the selection of the electoral system is affected by cultural orientations and that the affinity between societal culture and electoral system would matter for a credible and workable model of democracy.

8.2.3 Electoral Threshold

The electoral threshold is defined as the minimum percentage of the vote that a party needs in order to obtain any seats in the parliament. The 'legal threshold' is a rule in PR systems that restricts small parties in gaining parliamentary seats if they cannot receive a minimum share of the vote (e.g. 5%), whether nationally or within a particular district. It is argued that besides the legal (or explicit) threshold, we should consider the 'implicit threshold' (or natural threshold), which is determined by the

number of constituencies and the legislative size (i.e. number of seats in the parliament). The 'effective threshold' is normally considered the largest one between implicit (natural) and explicit (legal) thresholds, although some scholars consider a different formula for measuring the effective threshold (Taagepera, 1998). Lijphart (1999, p. 153) proposes the following formula for calculating the implicit threshold (T), in which S is the number of seats and E is the number of constituencies (S over E is known as average district magnitude):

$$T = 75\ \% / (S/E + 1)$$

By using this formula, the implicit threshold of countries with different electoral systems can be calculated. In plurality/majority system with a single-member constituency (i.e. E equalizes S), the effective threshold would be 37.5 % in each constituency. That is, in the majority/plurality single-member district system, the effective threshold is fixed and predetermined and cannot be considered an independent element in designing the electoral system.

Implicit threshold and its constituent element (i.e. E and S) are important design choices that can yield a variety of proportional electoral systems. In Austria, for instance, there are nine constituencies (from 7 to 36 seats each) and the legislative size (S) is 183. Thus, the average district magnitude is 20.3, and the implicit threshold would be 3.5%; however since there is a legal threshold of 4%, the 'effective threshold' would be the largest one, i.e. 4 percent. Effective threshold can make a spectrum of different PR systems in practice. The Netherlands, Spain, Ireland, and Chile have PR electoral systems, but the effective thresholds of the four countries are 1%, 9.7%, 15% and 25%, respectively. This shows how the effective threshold can differentiate the electoral outcomes of a similar electoral system. It is needless to say that the effective threshold, like the electoral system, affects parliamentary disproportionality and the ENPP.

Electoral threshold is an important institutional choice in designing the democratic model. Regarding the selection of a legal threshold or the institutional elements that form the implicit threshold (i.e. number of seats and district magnitude), I argue again that societal culture matters. Theoretically, one can expect a negative association between teamwork spirit and the effective threshold. A higher threshold decreases the number of small parties in the parliament and makes coalition forming

easier. It is expected that societies showing a strong culture of collaborativeness will be more open to work with many political parties.

To examine this assertion, I utilize the empirical data for measuring electoral thresholds in countries having PR or mixed systems. Using the electoral system database by Johnson & Wallack (2012) and the database of political institution (Beck et al., 2001), I gathered countries' average district magnitude and calculated the effective threshold for 80 electoral democracies in 2005. In responding to skewness of large values, I use the logarithmic scale of the electoral threshold.

As seen in Figure 8.9, after excluding Namibia as an outlier, there is a significant correlation of -0.40 (N=37, $p<0.05$) between the logged effective threshold and GLOBE's institutional collectivism. Considering only countries with PR systems, this correlation would be much stronger (-0.56, N=25, $p<0.005$).



Figure 8.9. The relation between collaborativeness and effective threshold

We can also theoretically argue that future orientation is another cultural dimension that may affect the electoral threshold. Lower threshold leads to a higher number of parties in parliament. In a parliamentary system, a higher number of parties prolongs the process of

cabinet forming and makes building consensus slower and longer. Thus, it is plausible that short-term-oriented societies (i.e. low future-oriented cultures) prefer to control increases in the number of parties by increasing the electoral threshold.

On the other hand, a high threshold may lead to exclusion of some minority groups who cannot have a representative in the parliament. This can be detrimental to democratic consolidation in the long run and makes some group of people apathetic to the political system. A lower threshold that can effectively guarantee the representation of different groups and minorities may weaken the power of large parties in the short run, but it makes a political system more inclusive. A future-oriented mentality, for its part, prefers the advantage of the latter to the disadvantage of the former. Therefore, we can predict that future orientation and electoral threshold will be negatively associated. Empirical evidence supports this assertion. As seen in Figure 8.10, the effective threshold and GLOBE's future orientation have a significant correlation of -0.55 (N=37, $p<0.001$) for all cases and -0.59 (N=25, $p<0.005$) for countries with the PR system (again excluding Namibia as an outlier).



Figure 8.10. The relation between future orientation and effective threshold

8.2.4 Effective Number of Parties in Parliament and Government

Cultural orientations indirectly affect the components of IDD (i.e. ENPP, NPG and TEP) through the association they have with institutional elements (see Figure 8.1). Societal culture, however, also has a direct influence on the effective number of parties and on cabinet inclusiveness.

Above, we observed the indirect impact of mastery orientation on parliamentary disproportionality through its influence on the electoral system. Here, I assert that mastery orientation would affect the effective number of parties as well. As argued before in Chapter 5, in a mastery culture, people primarily prefer to vote for parties that have a high chance of victory: they are obsessed with being a winner. As a result, smaller parties can hardly procure enough votes and survive. This implies that the effective number of parties would be negatively associated with mastery orientation. Figure 8.11 shows the relation between Schwartz's mastery and the logarithm of the effective number of parliamentary parties (LENP). Excluding three outliers (India, Israel and Brazil), there is a strong, significant correlation of 0.69 ($N=41$, $p<0.001$), which corroborates our assertion[1].

The integrative (consensual) model of democracy aims to integrate different political attitudes in the process of national governance. When there are a variety of political tastes, reaching a satisfying consensus is not an easy task unless all actors are open to compromise and patient when working in coalitions. Cultural values codetermine the teamwork mentality. The cultural dimension of 'collaborativeness' represents the precedence of group loyalty, group interest and group acceptance beyond individual goals. We can also assert that those who are concerned about the future will be more open to collaborate with others, which explains why the two dimensions of institutional collectivism and future orientation are positively and significantly correlated (see Table 2.3 in Chapter 2).

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1. There are two measures for effective number of parties: one is the effective number of elective parties (ENEP) which is calculated on the basis of the vote distribution and second, effective number of parliamentary parties (ENPP) which is calculated based on the seat distribution (Gallagher & Mitchell, 2005). The electoral disproportionality causes a difference between these two. In fact, the ENPP incorporates both ENEP and disproportionality in one measure. As it is argued that ENEP and ENPP have a high correlation (Lijphart, 1994), I assert that the correlation between mastery and ENPP implicitly indicates the association between mastery and ENEP as well.



Figure 8.11. The relation between mastery and effective number of parliamentary parties

The importance of the consensual culture is felt more in those countries that have adopted the PR electoral system. In a 'winner takes all' system, there is less need for consensus because usually the winner alone can form the government. In the PR system, when parties have to make a multi-party cabinet, the teamwork spirit will be crucial. Thus, I hypothesize that societies with higher collaborativeness (teamwork orientation) or higher future orientation will show a stronger inclination towards more inclusive cabinets.

Figure 8.12 demonstrates the relation between GLOBE's institutional collectivism and the LNPG (Logarithm of Number of Parties in Government) for 26 countries having a PR system. The general pattern confirms the hypothesis. Brazil is the notable outlier. The number of parties in its government is much higher than expected in connection to relatively low institutional collectivism. However, excluding Brazil, the correlation between LNPG and institutional collectivism is 0.48 ($N=25$, $p<0.05$). On the other side, Denmark and Sweden present high levels of teamwork spirit, which is connected to lower than expected cabinet inclusiveness. This may be explained by the tradition of having minority

cabinets, which are more inclusive in practice than formal institutionalization suggests.



Figure 8.12. The relation between collaborativeness and cabinet inclusiveness

Moreover, The pattern depicted in Figure 8.13 confirms the expectation that cultures with higher future orientation lean toward more inclusive cabinets. This time, Brazil emerges as a semi-outlier. With and without Brazil, the correlation between the two variables is 0.48 ($N=26$, $p<0.05$) and 0.52 ($N=25$, $p<0.01$), respectively.

In these figures the countries' regime type is also illustrated. It is commonly accepted that in presidential regimes, cabinet formation is less dependent on negotiation and accommodation. The situation is different, however, in countries like Indonesia, Colombia and Brazil, where presidentialism is combined with a PR system. In such countries, multi-party cabinets are often unavoidable.



Figure 8.13. The relation between future orientation and cabinet inclusiveness

8.3 Institutions Forming the Participative Dimension of Democracy (PDD)

8.3.1 Compulsory Voting

There are few institutional elements that can affect the participative dimension of democracy. Compulsory voting is one of them, as it can promote the level of electoral participation. This rule defines voting as an obligation of citizens so that they have to participate in the democratic process. Compulsory voting decreases the uncertainty of electoral participation by forcing people to vote. Thus, we can hypothesize that compulsory voting would be more expected and accepted in societies with higher uncertainty avoidant culture. Figure 8.14 gives support to this assertion and presents the association between Hofstede's uncertainty avoidance and the dummy variable of compulsory voting. The Spearman's correlation between two variables is 0.42 (N=51, $p < 0.005$).



Figure 8.14. The relation between uncertainty avoidance and compulsory voting



Figure 8.15. The relation between collaborativeness and compulsory voting

On the other hand, we can theorize that compulsory voting would be more employed in countries with a lower teamwork orientation. As I will discuss later, societies with lower collaborativeness have a weaker inclination for electoral and non-electoral participation. Therefore, people in these societies need more of a push to participate. Figure 8.15 corroborates this claim. The Spearman's correlation between GLOBE's institutional collectivism and the dummy variable of compulsory voting is -0.50 ($N=46$, $p<0.001$).

8.3.2 Referendum Provision

The provision of referendums is an important institutional arrangement for promoting direct democracy in a society. As discussed in Chapter 4, there are different types of referendums, on different levels and with different effectiveness. The provision of this variety of referendums varies across different electoral democracies. The referendum is known as the crucial element of self-determination in a 'voter democracy'. Hendriks (2010, p. 28) notes that "the strength of voter democracy lies in citizens' non-dependence on others for having their voices heard and their preferences in public matters counted." He argues that this model of democracy has an affinity with Douglas's cultural type of Individualism. (Douglas's Individualism indicates the combination of low Grid and low Group dimensions and is different from the individualism that is used as a cultural dimension. See Chapter 3 for more on this). Therefore, I assert that the provision of referendum would be higher in societies with strong individualistic and weak power distant cultures.

To examine these assertions, I use the Direct Democracy Index (DDI) measured by Fiorino & Ricciuti (2007), which categorizes countries based on their institutional and practical possibilities for referendums. The Spearman's correlation between GLOBE's in-group collectivism and DDI, as presented in Figure 8.16, is -0.52 ($N=40$, $p<0.001$). Hofstede's individualism also has a strong significant correlation of 0.69 ($N=44$, $p<0.001$) with DDI. Moreover, Figure 8.17 shows the association between DDI and Schwartz's hierarchy orientation. As seen, there is a significant, negative correlation of - 0.41 ($N=39$, $p<0.01$) between the two variables.



Figure 8.16. The relation between collectivism and the referendum provision



Figure 8.17. The relation between hierarchy and the referendum provision

8.3.3 Turnout in General Elections

As argued before, general elections are still the most important locus of public participation. There are many factors that explain the variance in the level of electoral turnout; and I assert that societal culture could be one of them. Indeed, I theorize that individualism is one of the cultural orientations that fosters electoral participation, as this cultural element incorporates the values of self-reliance, self-expression and self-determination. These traits encourage individuals to participate in elections so that they can have their voices heard.

Figure 8.18 presents the association between GLOBE's in-group collectivism[2] and the average of GEP for 1990-2009. Excluding two outliers, namely USA and Switzerland, there is a significant correlation of - 0.52 ($N=44$, $p<0.001$) between the two variables. Switzerland has a high frequency of referendums, which can explain its low level of participation in general elections. The United States also has a high number of referendums on the local level, which may partly explain the low and declining turnout in its legislative elections. As seen in the figure, most of the individualistic countries have a higher level of electoral participation (more than 60% turnout in average).

Another cultural trait that may encourage higher participation is future orientation, as discussed in Chapter 5. Indeed, as democracy is consolidated gradually and in the long run, we can speculate that future-oriented people are likely to be more convinced that their vote in a democratic system will influence the decisions that will be made in the future. Therefore, we expect a positive association between future orientation and electoral participation.

Figure 8.19 gives support to this speculation. Excluding Switzerland and USA, the correlation between GLOBE's future orientation and GEP is 0.40 ($N=44$, $p<0.01$).

2. As argued in Chapter 2, this dimension and Hofstded's individualism are alternatives and virtually exchangeable (with reverse direction). I utilized the GLOBE's dimension in this section since it has been measured more recently.



Figure 8.18. The relation between collectivism and electoral turnouts



Figure 8.19. The relation between future orientation and electoral turnouts

8.3.4 Protest Participation

Societal culture codetermines the variance in the acceptance and popularity of non-electoral (or protest) participation across societies. This form of participation is more active, i.e. requires more involvement, than electoral participation. However, we can theorize that those cultural orientations that encourage people to participate in elections, i.e. individualism and future orientation, could also inspire non-electoral participation. Figure 8.20 presents the high and significant correlation of -0.82 (N=46, p<0.001) between NEP and GLOBE's in-group collectivism.



Figure 8.20. The relation between collectivism and non-electoral participation

Excluding two outliers – Malaysia and New Zealand – there is a significant correlation of 0.69 (N=44, p<0.001) between NEP and GLOBE's future orientation, as seen in Figure 8.21.



Figure 8.21. The relation between future-orientation and non-electoral participation



Figure 8.22. The relation between hierarchy and non-electoral participation

Furthermore, it can be argued that societies with higher power distance would be less inclined to challenge authorities through protest participation. Indeed, as in these societies the existence of hierarchy is perceived as a mechanism for maintaining the order of society, the majority might be less involved in protest participation. Thus, we expect more non-electoral participation in societies with lower power distance. Figure 8.22 gives support to this assertion. The correlation between Schwartz's hierarchy and NEP is -0.42 ($N=44$, $p<0.005$).

8.4 Conclusion

To sum up, we have observed that there are significant correlations between dimensions of societal culture and political institutions of democracy. But what do these correlations imply? Why are some correlations not strong? How does each institutional element have a correlation with several dimensions? These are questions that may arise from the associations observed above.

There are some plausible answers to these questions. First of all, the correlations imply that cultural dimensions and institutional choices are compatible in a majority of countries, as otherwise no significant correlations would emerge. This compatibility could be formed organically through the influence of societal culture on the decisions of political actors who design the institutional arrangement of a country.

A weak correlation between an institutional element and cultural orientation can be explained in two ways. Firstly, there are also other cultural orientation(s) that codetermine that institutional choice. That is, a constellation of cultural dimensions, and not a sole dimension, codetermines the inclination of a society toward one institutional choice or another. Cultural dimensions interact with each other, and their integration shapes the political preference of a society. This is why several cultural orientations are associated with each institutional element. The second explanation is that the institutional choices of some countries are not as compatible with their societal culture as they should be. This means that some countries might suffer from cultural incompatibility; and they are indeed out-of-pattern cases. Given these two reasons, it is plausible and expected that in practice some weak correlations between cultural orientations and institutional elements would be seen.

Considering these interrelations, and integrating the influence of different cultural dimensions on institutional choices, in the next

concluding chapter a thesis on the importance of cultural compatibility for institutional design will be proposed.

Chapter 9

The Cultural Compatibility Thesis

9.1 Introduction

Culture is a concept attributed to a group of people. It is rightfully called the "collective programming of mind" (Hofstede, 2001). It is argued that human behavior is regulated by different drives, among which personal characteristics and cultural values are two important ones. Rational choice theory is usually considered a rival of the cultural theory of social behavior; however, in reality these two are not contradictory, but complementary. Hofstede's proposition that 'nationality defines (or constraints) rationality' (Hofstede et al., 2010, p.340) and Douglas's argument that we have several 'rational beings, with [several] kinds of values' (Douglas & Ney, 1998, p. 174) refer to the influence of culture on rational choice.

Cultural values codetermine the way people, think, decide and act. Collective actions are affected by collective values. We can argue that the preferences and behaviors of political actors, both power-holders and citizens, are partly regulated by societal culture. Accordingly, the main proposition of this study is that the preference for different institutional settings in different countries can be explained by the diversity of cultural orientations. This assertion has been examined throughout this book. Empirical examination of the presence and importance of this interrelation is not an easy task that can be accomplished fully in a few chapters. What this study tried to do, however, is problematize this interrelation and involve the dimensions of culture into the discussion on democracy, political institutions and comparative politics. This book started the study of this interrelation at the national level, as this is the main locus of representative democracy in practice and real politics.

In the previous chapters, we tried first to identify the dimensions of national culture through a critical assessment and systematic comparison and clustering of different theories and measurements of culture (Chapters 2 and 3). Then, we operationalized the two dimensions of democracy – contestation and participation – using indicators pertinent to each dimension (Chapter 4). Next, the relation between dimensions of culture and democracy was examined (Chapter 5). The importance and implication of the interaction between cultural values and democratic models were presented in the chapters that followed. This was done by examining the moderation effect of societal culture on the relation between models of democracy and democratic satisfaction in developing democracies (Chapter 6). The effect of national culture on the practice of participatory democracy has been studied by using the framework

developed in Chapter 7. Finally, we discussed the relation between cultural orientations and institutional elements, which shape the components and dimensions of democratic models (Chapter 8).

In this concluding chapter, I make an effort to develop a framework to describe how different cultural dimensions connect to political institutions. In a prescriptive application, the framework can advise which institutional elements should be adopted or adapted when designing a democratic model for a specific context. The framework will lead us to establish the Cultural Compatibility Thesis, which explains why different countries opt for different democratic political institutions and how the compatibility between formal institutions and informal institutions (i.e. societal culture) would matter for the workability of democracy.

To this aim, four major institutional choices that are crucial in shaping the dimensions and models of democracy in action are examined. The affinities between the cultural orientations and each of these institutional choices, as demonstrated and discussed in the previous chapter, are listed in Table 9.1.

Table 9.1. Institutional choices and corresponding compatible cultural orientations

Presidential	**Regime Type**	**Parliamentary**
Low	Individualism	High
High	Traditionalism(Monumentalism)	Low
High	Power distance(Hierarchy)	Low
High	Uncertainty avoidance	Low
Low	Future orientation	High
Low	Collaborativeness	High
Majority/plurality	**Electoral System**	**PR**
High	Mastery	Low
High	Power distance(Hierarchy)	Low
High threshold	**Electoral Threshold**	**Low threshold**
Low	Collaborativeness	High
Low	Future orientation	High
Compulsory	**Compulsory Voting**	**Non-compulsory**
Low	Collaborativeness	High
High	Uncertainty avoidance	Low
Low	Individualism	High
Low	Future orientation	High

9.2 Towards the Cultural Compatibility Thesis of Democracy

Cultural Compatibility Thesis (CCT) asserts that the cultural orientations of a society codetermine the *opting, adopting* and *adapting* political institutions. This thesis suggests that the compatibility of cultural orientations with institutional choices matters. As demonstrated in Table 9.1, each institutional element is associated with several cultural orientations. I hypothesize that the integration and interaction of these cultural orientations can present a viable range of institutional choices for each country. Accordingly, I problematize whether or not the institutional choices adopted in a democratic country are culturally compatible with that society, and if not, what the consequences of these incompatibilities would be. Moreover, we can also investigate the changes in institutional elements across democratic countries and evaluate to what extent these changes have been congruent with the expected direction suggested by the cultural compatibility thesis.

CCT theorizes that countries having many culturally incompatible institutional elements should exhibit some credibility or functionality challenges with their model of democracy. Also, it is expected that these countries have reformed or shown a tendency to reform their institutional elements over the past years. In the following, I will examine the CCT for the four abovementioned institutional choices, namely regime type, electoral system, electoral threshold and compulsory voting.

Aggregating the scores of relevant cultural orientations presented in Table 9.1, I extract a "Culturally Compatible Score" for each institutional element of democracy. The scores of all the cultural orientations (as given in Table E.1 in Appendix E) are rescaled to the corresponding range of each institutional element. For instance, the six cultural orientations associated with regime type are rescaled to the range between zero and four to make their cultural scores comparable with the four ordinal types of regimes (from full parliamentary to full presidential). The scores of the cultural dimensions are also reversed whenever required. Then, the rescaled scores of the cultural orientations are averaged, and the Culturally Compatible Score (CCS) extracted. The CCS is only calculated for countries that have cultural scores for the adequate number of dimensions, as otherwise the CCS is not sufficiently reliable. Having the calculated CCS and the real score of the institutional element for the corresponding countries, the cultural compatibility plot is drawn for each institutional element, as elaborated below.

9.2.1 Culturally Compatible Score for Regime Type

Rescaling (to a range of 0 to 4), reversing (as needed for the cultural dimensions of traditionalism, hierarchy and uncertainty avoidance) and averaging the scores of the six relevant cultural orientations (as indicated in Table 9.1), the Culturally Compatible Score of regime type (hereafter CCSr) is calculated for 49 electoral democracies, as demonstrated in Figure 9.1. GLOBE's in-group collectivism, institutional collectivism and future orientation; Hofstede's uncertainty avoidance; Schwartz's hierarchy and Inglehart's secular-rational dimensions are used to calculate the CCSr. The CCSr is calculated only for the countries that have the scores for at least three abovementioned cultural dimensions. The gray up-down bars show the difference between the countries' real score of regime type and the plausible, culturally-compatible score for the regime type. Assuming that a bar shorter than 0.75 is in an acceptable offset range, we can judge to what extent the current regime type of each country is congruent with the one predicted by societal culture.

Figure 9.1 shows that many democratic countries –Switzerland, Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Slovenia, Ireland, Austria, Finland, Georgia, Taiwan, France, Guatemala, Colombia, El Salvador, Bolivia, Argentina, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico and Venezuela –have a more or less culturally compatible regime type (as their bar size is shorter than or around 0.75). Among them, Finland has experienced an institutional reform from semi-presidentialism to semi-parliamentarism. This change is in accordance with the cultural compatibility thesis.

On the left side of the figure, we observe some countries with parliamentary systems whose societal culture shows tendencies towards semi-presidentialism. Two conspicuous cases are Turkey and Thailand. This is striking in that Turkey recently held its first direct presidential election and already transformed to semi-parliamentary system after the constitutional reform in 2012. The elected president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, had announced before the election that he would try to reform the constitution to a (semi) presidential system if he is victorious (Chugh & Krueger, 2013). Erdogan's recent victory can be seen as a public referendum that supports the turn to a semi-presidential system. This gives support to the prediction of the cultural compatibility thesis.



Figure 9.1. Cultural compatibility for regime types

Thailand is known as a country of coups. Thai democracy has been vulnerable and problematic over the past decades. Thailand's scores of collaborativeness and future orientation are low. There is a lasting conflict between different parties, including forces supported by the monarch (Ebbinghausen, 2013). The cultural compatibility thesis suggests that the country should adopt a semi-presidential system that could render democracy in the country more stable. In principle, a monarchy and a presidential system are mutually exclusive; however having an elected prime minister, similar to what was formerly experienced in Israel, is an option that resembles the semi-presidential system.

Greece, Hungary, India, Spain, Albania, Italy and Israel are other parliamentary states that are culturally inclined to the semi-presidential system. Israel experienced a semi-presidential system when it had direct elections for the prime minister between 1992 and 2003. This system aimed – and practically failed – to make a strong and stable government in Israel; and it was debated over by political scholars (Hazan, 1996). India and Malaysia have a parliamentary system in theory; but the combination of parliamentarism and a majority electoral system, known as Westminster model, shapes a political regime shares some common features with the presidential system. As seen in the figure, all Westminster countries – namely Australia, the UK, New Zealand and Canada – are, more or less, culturally deviant from the full parliamentary system.

Southern European parliamentary states – namely Albania, Greece, Italy and Spain – have a cultural inclination towards semi-presidentialism. As demonstrated in the global map of democracy (Figure 4.4 in Chapter 4), the democratic models of these countries are closer to the clusters of countries with a presidential or Westminster model (near the upper-left cluster). Moreover, most of these countries have suffered from weak and unstable governments over the past years. It can be argued that a full parliamentary system, which is less compatible with their societal culture, contributes to their political malfunction. Among them, Italy has seen public debate over adopting semi-presidentialism. The Italian Senate has recently approved a constitutional amendment to introduce direct elections of the president (Elgie, 2012b). There is also an ongoing debate on the constitutional change to a semi-presidential system in Hungary (Balogh, 2014).

Portugal and Poland reduced the power of the president in 1982 and 1997, respectively, although they still have a directly-elected president.

Thus, according to our criteria, these two are classified as semi-parliamentary systems although they are still known as semi-presidential in the literature. The former utilization of a semi-presidential system in these countries lends support to the cultural compatibility thesis. It will be interesting to examine how this change and departure from culturally compatible regime types in Poland and Portugal has affected their political performance and legitimacy.

On the right side of the figure, the USA and South Korea show a strong cultural tendency towards the semi-presidential system. Indonesia, Chile, Namibia, Philippines, Zambia and Brazil also show a cultural tendency to deviate from absolute presidentialism. The political system of the United States is known as a typical model of full presidentialism. There are many criticisms about different aspects of this model and its democratic deficit (Linz, 1990; Nelson, 2008), as well as its political decay (Fukuyama, 2014). On the other hand, American democracy is famous for its stability and functionality. This combination makes the US political system *A Different Democracy* (Taylor et al., 2014).

South Korea is considered as an instance of semi-presidentialism by some scholars; as Robert Elgie (2010) argues, "South Korea, constitutionally, is on the cusp of semi-presidentialism." Elgie indicates that the debate on the constitutional reform and adopting semi-presidentialism has been on the Korean political agenda.

Similar to the way that Westminster parliamentarism bears a resemblance to the presidential model, the multiparty presidentialism exhibits the feature of cohabitating with the legislature. Brazil, Indonesia, Philippines and Chile are presidential states in which multiparty cabinets have been formed between 1990 and 2009. That is, the political systems of these countries have operated like a semi-presidential system in practice. In Chile, two parties, with one being the government, recently suggested a proposal for introducing semi-presidentialism (Elgie, 2012a).

Finally, Figure 9.1 predicts that Namibia, Zambia, and to a lesser extent, Ghana, are three African presidential states that show a cultural tendency to adopt semi-presidentialism, probably when their new democracies are more consolidated. As we will see in the next section, Namibia is already using a full PR electoral system that has the capacity to develop a multiparty parliament.

All in all, we can see that there is a match between the regime type in operation, or in demand, and the culturally compatible one in many countries. This substantiates the cultural compatibility thesis.

9.2.2 Culturally Compatible Score for Electoral System

As listed in Table 9.1, two cultural orientations are associated with the institutional element of the electoral system. The national scores of Schwartz's mastery and hierarchy are used to calculate the Culturally Compatible Score for electoral system (hereafter CCSe). For those countries that have scores for both dimensions, the cultural scores are rescaled to a range of 0 to 3 and are then reversed and averaged. The result is the CCSe for 44 electoral democracies, as seen in Figure 9.2.

Up-down bars demonstrate the difference between the countries' current electoral system and the culturally compatible one. Assuming that a difference more than 0.75 indicates a considerable incompatibility, we learn that some countries on each side of the graph have electoral systems that are less compatible with their societal culture. The electoral systems of 28 democracies are compatible with what the cultural orientations predict. Interestingly, we see that over the past two decades, the direction of electoral reforms in six countries (Venezuela, New Zealand, Philippines, Bolivia, Japan and Italy) have been towards the CCSe.

On the right side of the graph, we see that among countries having a PR system, Namibia, Turkey, Brazil, Israel and Greece, and to a lesser extent Bulgaria, Indonesia, Portugal and Poland are culturally compatible with the mixed system. Turkey utilized a mixed system before 1995 and its electoral change to PR is in contradiction with the compatibility thesis. However, Turkey's high electoral threshold of 10% makes its PR system similar to the mixed system. In the case of Namibia, the PR system has been transplanted from the South African model. Using the PR model does not result in a real multiparty system in Namibia, although this allows for small parties to have few and ineffective representatives in the parliament. Referring to the cultural incompatibility of the regime type in Namibia that was discussed in the previous section, we can argue that adopting the PR system has a compensatory effect for the full presidential system of the country. This is also applied to Indonesia and Brazil.

Full PR systems in Brazil and Israel lead to a large number of effective parties in parliament. Between 1990 and 2009, the effective number of parliamentary parties in Brazil and Israel has been more than eight and six, respectively. In Brazil, many parties have to form coalitions in order to win the presidential elections as well. Accordingly, oftentimes a grand coalition cabinet has to be formed in both countries. It is argued that the presence of too many parties in government is detrimental for political accountability and stability.



Figure 9.2. Cultural compatibility for electoral systems

Increasing the electoral threshold is another strategy to make the PR model more effective and more similar to the mixed system. This will be discussed in the next section. The cultural thesis predicts that people in societies with a high level of mastery and hierarchy orientations, like Brazil and Israel, prefer to have a stronger and decisive government. The cultural compatibility thesis predicts that the mixed system might be more compatible with the Brazilian and Israeli societies.

The proportional electoral system of Greece is a complicated one which is not a full proportional system. In this system, 50 seats out of 300 automatically go to the party that receives the plurality of votes. Although this system cannot be called a mixed system, it is a system between a PR and a majoritarian system (Shugart, 2013). Bulgaria, Portugal and Poland have also shown a cultural tendency towards the mixed system. We will see in the next section that this inclination is realized in practice through implementing a higher level of effective threshold.

On the left side of the graph, France is a conspicuous case whose electoral system is very different from the one predicted by its societal culture. There is a long-lasting debate on the electoral system in France. The French electoral system was changed five times between 1945 and 1988. It changed once to a PR system in 1986 by president Mitterrand (Criddle, 1992). Moreover, France uses mixed systems in the Senate and municipal elections (Massicotte & Blais, 1999). The cultural compatibility thesis theorizes that a mixed system, like the German model, could be a better match for the electoral system in France, which provides room for smaller parties to be accommodated in the parliament.

As indicated before, countries with a Westminster model combine the parliamentary regime with majoritarian electoral system. Culturally speaking, these two institutional choices belong to two opposite perspectives of democratic governance: while the parliamentary system provides room for accommodation and representation, the majority electoral system is more favorable to governability and accountability. It seems that the combination of these two is compensatory to some extent. This can partially explain the cultural incompatibilities of the electoral systems in Canada, Australia, Malaysia and the UK, shown in Figure 9.2, which are in reverse direction of the cultural incompatibility of their regime type, illustrated in Figure 9.1. However, the cultural compatibility thesis predicts that these countries may adopt a mixed electoral system in future, similar to the electoral reform that New Zealand conducted in 1996.

The cultural compatibility thesis also predicts that the USA, with a low power distance culture, has more inclination for a mixed system rather than a majority one. A mixed system can expand the highly criticized two-party system in the US and allow different and new voices to be represented in the congress. The social movements that have emerged in recent years in the country (i.e. the Tea Party and Occupy movements) have shown that some different voices, beyond the two dominant parties, already exist in society. A mixed electoral system may accommodate them into the political structure and make the American democracy more viable and vibrant. As Lipset (1990, p. 82) argues, "the need for disciplined parliamentary parties encourages the transformation of political protest, of social movements, of discontent with the dominant party in one's region or other aspects of life, into third, fourth, or fifth parties." Moreover, the existing electoral system of the US is also highlighted as a cause of the low electoral turnout for legislative elections. The issue of electoral reform and adopting a more proportional system has been a topic of debate in the recent years (Heuvel, 2008).

9.2.3 Culturally Compatible Score for Threshold

The two cultural orientations of collaborativeness and future orientation are associated with the effective threshold as presented in Table 9.1. Since electoral threshold is intertwined with the electoral system of a country, the two cultural dimensions of mastery and hierarchy orientations, which affect the choice of electoral system (i.e. mixed or PR system), should also be involved in estimating the Culturally Compatible Score for threshold (hereafter CCSt). Using cultural scores of GLOBE's institutional collectivism and future orientation and Schwartz's hierarchy and mastery, we apply the same approach of rescaling (to range of 0 to 4), reversing (for all four cultural dimensions) and averaging the scores of the national dimensions to extract the CCSt. The CCSt is calculated for 38 electoral democracies with PR or mixed electoral systems that have scores for the two GLOBE dimensions.



Figure 9.3. Cultural compatibility for effective threshold

Figure 9.3 shows the difference between the CCSt and the effective threshold of countries. Countries are ordered in the figure based on the level of effective threshold in action in 2005. Similar to Figure 9.1 and Figure 9.2, here, again, the countries with a larger incompatibility have a larger bar. Considering the argument made in section 8.1.3, I use a logarithmic scale for the effective threshold. Also, the figure shows the former effective threshold of countries with electoral reform and the year of change.

Among countries having a low threshold level, Namibia has the most culturally incompatible threshold of 1%. Low collaborativeness, low future orientation and high mastery culture can make consensus hard for a country with a full PR system if the number of parliamentary parties is high. Namibia has not experienced this problem, as its effective number of parliamentary parties (ENPP) has been less than two over the past two decades. However, the cultural compatibility thesis predicts that Namibia should increase the effective threshold if its ENPP increases over time. Israel also shows a big gap between its CCSt and the threshold active in 2005. This gap has been reduced over the past years by increasing the threshold. Recently, the new threshold was set to 3.25% (Lis, 2014). The Netherlands also has the potential to raise its electoral threshold, but not too much. There has been an ongoing debate in Dutch politics on electoral reform (Leenknegt & Van der Schyff, 2007); however, societal culture in the Netherlands is in favor of inclusiveness and accommodation, insofar as a very small party for the animals exists. On the other hand, Finland and Sweden have a moderate threshold, but their cultural orientations would be matched even with a lower threshold.

South Korea, Switzerland and Japan have a high electoral threshold, but their societal cultures would call for a moderate one. While, in accordance with the cultural compatibility prediction, Japan's electoral reform in 1996 decreased the effective threshold, South Korea increased its effective threshold after its electoral reform. It is striking that among the 16 countries that have experienced a change in their effective threshold after 1990, changes in only three of the countries (i.e. Venezuela, Philippines and South Korea) have not been in accordance with the cultural compatibility thesis. That is, in other countries the direction of change has been towards the CCSt.

There are some countries on the left side of the graph with a very high threshold whose cultural orientations demand a lower threshold level. Ireland, the Philippines, Italy and Venezuela had very high effective thresholds in 2005 – much higher than their societal cultures would

suggests. As shown in Figure 9.3, the effective thresholds in Venezuela, Italy and the Philippines were more compatible with their cultural orientations before they made the changes. Italy changed back to its former threshold again in 2006, thus satisfying the cultural compatibility thesis. In the case of Venezuela, the remarkable increase in the electoral threshold over the past years has pushed the country's electoral system to a semi-majoritarian one. It has been claimed that the political leaders of Venezuela have manipulated the electoral system to exclude their opponents from power (Carroll, 2010).

All in all, the cultural compatibility thesis can satisfactorily explain the adoption and adaptation of the effective threshold in a number of electoral democracies studied here. The thesis can also raise alarm about institutional incompatibility seen in some countries and propose a plausible institutional reform regarding the effective threshold.

9.2.4 Culturally Compatible Score for Compulsory Voting

As summarized in Table 9.1, four cultural orientations affect the participatory behavior of people in elections. Aggregating the interaction of these cultural orientations would generate the Culturally Compatible Score for compulsory voting (hereafter CCSc). The CCSc predicts which countries may (or not) need to adopt compulsory voting in order to promote public participation.

Assuming zero for non-compulsory and one for compulsory voting, I rescale scores of four cultural dimensions – namely GLOBE's in-group collectivism, institutional collectivism (reversed), future orientation (reversed) and Hofstede's uncertainty avoidance – to the range of zero to one. The average of the rescaled scores generates the CCSc as demonstrated in Figure 9.4. The CCSc is calculated for 46 electoral democracies that have cultural scores for at least three of the abovementioned dimensions. The cultural compatibility thesis asserts that the country's CCSc position on each part of the graph (up or down) indicates whether compulsory or non-compulsory voting would be more compatible with the societal culture of the country. That is, countries having the CCSc on the upper side (higher than 0.5) might need to adopt compulsory voting to enhance their electoral participation, while countries with the CCSc positioned on the lower side (less than 0.5) need not adopt compulsory voting. To examine the credibility of this assertion, the average of electoral turnouts between 1990 and 2009 of each country is presented on the graph (black triangles).



Figure 9.4. Cultural compatibility for compulsory voting

It is very interesting that all countries using compulsory voting except Australia, shown on the left side of the graph, are culturally compatible with compulsory voting. Considering 60% as the cutoff for acceptable level of electoral participation, we see that all countries with compulsory voting, except Mexico, have a satisfactory level of participation. For the case of Mexico, it is argued that the country does not enforce compulsory voting in practice and voting is only required as a civil duty (Panagopoulos, 2008).

Among countries without compulsory voting and with a low CCSc, Switzerland, USA and Canada have electoral turnouts lower than 60%. Switzerland is an exception because of its referendum tradition; and Canada has an average turnout close to the threshold. The low level of turnouts in the U.S., however, is considerable. As I mentioned before, the institutional context including its majority electoral rule, which leads to a two-party system, is seen as a reason for the low participation in the U.S. (Powell, 1986).

Malaysia has an average turnout of 56%, and its CCSc is only a bit lower from the border. India is also on the brink, with an average turnout of 58%. Considering the population and the level of education in India, this level of participation is satisfactory.

Among countries whose CCSc indicates an inclination for compulsory voting, Indonesia, Taiwan, Albania, Namibia, Slovenia and Spain have high average turnouts. High turnout in Indonesia could be related to the popularity of initial elections during the transition to democracy, and this might decrease over time. This phenomenon was seen in some post-communist democracies, such as Albania, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Romania and Slovenia. In Albania and Slovenia, after high participation (more than 80%) in the first elections in the 1990s, in the 2000s, the average electoral turnout of the two countries dropped to 51% and 61%, respectively. Thus, adopting compulsory voting for new democracies some years after of transition could be of help in consolidating the culture of participation.

Spain is an amazing case, as it has consistently had high turnout without compulsory voting, despite that its CCSc would suggest the use of compulsory voting. Namibia is again an interesting, exceptional case. Turnouts in the Philippines, France and Portugal are only a bit higher than 60%, while their CCSc suggests the use of compulsory voting.

Eight countries with a high CCSc – Guatemala, Georgia, Hungary, Colombia, El Salvador, Venezuela, Poland and Zambia – present electoral turnouts lower than 55%. Their CCSc suggests that using compulsory voting could be an institutional choice for enhancing

electoral participation. Interestingly, Venezuela used compulsory voting until recently. It is indicated that Venezuela experienced a drop of 30% in turnout once the requirement was removed in 1993 (Frankal, 2005).

All in all, the cultural compatibility thesis also shows promising explanations and predictions about the institutional element of compulsory voting.

9.2.5 Assessing the Cultural Compatibility Thesis in New and Fragile Democracies

The cultural compatibility thesis suggests that in the initial phases of transition to democracy, taking into account the societal culture in designing a proper model of democracy is equally important as involving other socio-economic factors. The idea of using a power-sharing model in countries with a divided and heterogeneous society is very popular and widely recommended (Cho, 2010; Doorenspleet & Pellikaan, 2013), but the cultural compatibility thesis is hesitant about transplanting the institutional arrangements of a consociational model (Lijphart, 1969) in a country whose cultural and situational factors are less compatible with that model. Political accommodation of different groups in a fractionalized society is crucial; however, it should not occur at the expense of the stability of the country in a new, fragile democracy. Transplanting only integrative-oriented institutions in a country that is culturally more favorable to competition than to compromise might bring about a free-for-all instead of a consociational system. Thus, in such a society, a hybrid system of power sharing that integrates both inclusive and decisive elements might work better and receive more credibility. An example of this system is seen in Benin as a relatively successful and stable new democracy in West Africa.

In her book *Driving Democracy,* Pippa Norris (2008) presents an interesting comparison between two African countries, Togo and Benin, and argues how the different institutional arrangements of the two countries led to survival of democracy in the latter and failure of democracy in the former. This thought-provoking analysis convincingly demonstrates the importance of institutional arrangement for the sustainability of the democratic system; however, in my estimation this analysis needs to be complemented with a cultural compatibility analysis. Using the majoritarian electoral system in Togo could be a reason for its electoral autocracy; however, its neighbor to the left, Ghana, has experienced a working electoral democracy while using the majoritarian electoral system similar to Togo's. Furthermore, Benin's experience of

having both a presidential regime and a PR electoral system disqualifies the orthodox interpretation of the power-sharing model, in which only the parliamentary regime is endorsed and the presidential system is discredited.

To examine the explanatory power of the cultural compatibility thesis when it comes to the success or failure of democratic structures in new and fragile democracies, in the following, I provisionally study and compare some new and transitional electoral democracies, most of which are majority Muslim countries that have experienced internal or external conflicts.

Although measures of societal culture are not available for many new democracies, cultural scores for Bosnia, Iraq, Ghana, Nigeria, Pakistan and Senegal have been measured and reported in Hofstede et al. (2010) and in complementary databases of Schwartz (provided in a personal communication). After rescaling, I use countries' scores of Hofstede's masculinity and Schwartz' mastery interchangeably in case of lacking scores for mastery (this is justifiable when referring to the clusters of dimensions introduced in Chapter 2). The same is done for Hofstede's power distance and Schwartz's hierarchy. Relevant GLOBE's dimensions and Inglehart's score of the secular-rational dimension are also used if available. Rescaling and averaging relevant cultural scores (according to Table 9.1), I calculated the culturally compatible scores for regime type and electoral system (i.e. CCSr and CCSe). Figure 9.5 shows the incompatibility bars of the regime type for these six countries.



Figure 9.5. Cultural compatibility for regime type in six new/transitional democracies

The cultural compatibility thesis predicts that adoption of the parliamentary regime in Iraq and Pakistan is not compatible with the societal cultures of these societies. These societies show an inclination toward semi-presidentialism. On the other hand, Nigeria, with a presidential system, also has an inclination toward semi-presidentialism. Bosnia, Ghana and Senegal present a higher compatibility between their societal cultures and their regime types.



Figure 9.6. Cultural compatibility for electoral system in six new/transitional democracies

Figure 9.6 demonstrates the culturally compatible score for the electoral system in these countries. Iraq's electoral system seems the most incompatible. Using a full PR system could be problematic in a country with a high power distance and strong mastery culture. The institutional setting in Iraq has been designed to make an inclusive political structure, but the large number of parties, weak consensual culture and strong monumentality lead to a very fragile and weak political system. In 2010, the government was formed nine months after the election (Aljazeera, 2010). This can partly explain why just a while after the Iraqi parliamentary election in 2014, the militias of ISIS used the power vacuum and seized a large part of the country in a few weeks. The model of democracy in Iraq was designed very similarly to the Belgian model. It seems that it has many institutional elements of a consociational democracy; but the question is whether this democratic model is the most proper and most compatible with Iraq's context. When it took 589 days until a government could be formed in Belgium (Greene, 2011), what can we expect from Iraq's new and fragile democracy?

Furthermore, the cultural compatibility thesis proposes using a mixed system in Pakistan and Nigeria. Other countries have more or less compatible electoral systems. All in all, it seems that the institutional settings in Ghana, Senegal and Bosnia are compatible with the countries' societal culture. On the contrary, Iraq, Pakistan and Nigeria show lower cultural compatibility.

We employ some performance indicators to assess the functionality of democratic systems in these countries and examine how cultural compatibility and political stability are connected. We use the indicators of 'political and social integration'[1] and 'democracy status' from the well-known Bertelsmann Transformation Index, which provides evaluations with quantitative scores for the performance of 129 developing and transition countries (BTI, 2014a). We also employ the index of political stability by the World Bank (Kaufmann et al., 2012).

As seen in Figure 9.7, a meaningful connection between cultural incompatibility and the performance indicators is observed: countries with a higher cultural compatibility, namely Ghana, Senegal and Bosnia, have a higher BTI's democracy status as well as higher political and social integration. As the cultural compatibility thesis predicts, Iraq shows the lowest political and social integration.



Figure 9.7. BTI indexes for six new/transitional democracies

Figure 9.8 presents the political instability scores (reversed scores of World Bank's political stability indicator for 2010) for seven countries.

1. This index measures whether "stable patterns of representation exist for mediating between society and the state" (BTI, 2014b).

Again, countries with higher cultural compatibility have a higher level of political stability. These findings again lend support to the cultural compatibility thesis. According to the thesis, developing institutional compatibility might be helpful for making a more stable democratic system in countries in transition. The robustness of the thesis could be examined if the suggested institutional reform were realized in countries like Iraq and Pakistan, and the consequences then evaluated.



Figure 9.8. Word Bank index of political stability (reversed) for six new/transitional democracies

9.3 Implications of the Cultural Compatibility Thesis

Why do we have different models of democracy in different countries? This has been one of the key questions of this study. The discussions throughout the book have put forth a cultural explanation for this question. Based on what we found regarding the relation between dimensions of societal culture and elements of democratic institutions, one can assert that the emergence of various models of democracy and their survival and workability in different countries are not contingent. The cultural compatibility thesis developed in this chapter asserts that the compatibility of societal culture and institutional settings matters in designing democratic institutions in new democracies as well as in reforming institutions in established democracies. This study proposes that the ignorance of societal culture in the process of tailoring a democratic model for a new democracy can result in a much too tight or too loose democratic dress that would not fit the country.

The cultural compatibility thesis suggests that the transplantation of democratic institutions could be less problematic and more successful if the cultural difference between host and donor countries is low. That is, transplanting a democratic model from a country with a similar societal culture to a new democracy is more likely to be successful due to 'the goodness of fit' principle (De Jong et al., 2002). However, this does not mean that the cultural compatibility alone will guarantee the effectiveness of the adopted institutions. This would be, indeed, a sine qua non but not per se adequate.

Needless to say that there are many factors that play a role in the formation and success of democratic political institutions in the country. Societal culture is one of the important, but less studied, contextual factors that affects the credibility and workability of a democratic model. This means that transplanting a so-called 'best practice' of democratic institutions into a country without considering the compatibility with the cultural orientations of that society might bring about a nonfunctional democracy. Thus, the mentality of adopting a *best model* should be replaced with the attitude of finding *the most compatible model*.

The cultural compatibility thesis proposes that a constellation of cultural orientations predicts what arrangement of democratic institutions could better match to the societal characteristics of a country. The cultural compatibility thesis assumes that the cultural orientations (discussed in this study) are essentially neither good nor bad, but that they are different. The thesis presumes that the principle of democracy is consonant with different cultural orientations, but some cultural orientations might be mutually incompatible with a specific model of democracy. It should be emphasized that when we talk about cultural orientations in this study, we suppose that in principle none of the dimensions of societal culture should be interpreted in a way that justifies any violation of basic human rights and democratic principles. An unenlightened and authoritarian interpretation of cultural orientation has nothing to do with the cultural compatibility thesis. Interpreting a culture with high power distance, for instance, as a despotism-friendly culture is a grave misunderstanding of that cultural orientation. India and France have a very high and a relatively high power distant culture respectively, but both have old democratic systems as well.

Gone is the time when some political scientists were convinced that democracy could only take root in countries with some specific cultural orientations. The classic argument by Weber (2001[1930]) about the connections between Protestantism and capitalism has been interpreted as

claiming that democracy could only be feasible in Protestant countries. Lipset (1994) emphasized the role of individualism as a core value, as well as the importance of the British colonization heritage, for establishing democracy. He argued that "almost all of the postwar new nations that have become enduring democracies are former British colonies, as are various others, such as Nigeria and Pakistan, which maintained competitive electoral institutions for briefer periods. Almost none of the former Belgian, Dutch, French, Portuguese, or Spanish colonies have comparable records" (Lipset, 1990). Huntington (1991) was very skeptical as to whether a democratic system could be feasible in any Islamic countries. All of these ideas have been challenged or even rejected over time.

Nevertheless, the different cultural orientations have consequences for democratic practices. As presented and discussed previously, societies with higher future orientation, for instance, present higher political participation. Politicians in societies with high collaborativeness may cooperate and reach consensus easier and in a more sustainable manner. These cultural values do facilitate some practices of the democratic process, but a democratic system can still survive in countries with a lower level of these cultural attributes. Hence, the cultural compatibility thesis may help institutional designers learn of the vulnerabilities of a society regarding different aspects of democratic practices. As illustrated above, the specific constellation of four cultural orientations, for instance, could result in a weaker tendency toward electoral participation, which in turn endangers democratic consolidation. Therefore, a compensatory institution, i.e. compulsory voting, could be introduced to promote electoral turnout.

The notion of compatibility does not mean that institutional arrangements should be adjusted to societal culture even if those cultural orientations are less favorable for a functional democracy. On the contrary, the thesis suggests that if a specific cultural orientation hampers the democratic consolidation, a proper institutional arrangement can still be effectively designed if the positive and negative impacts of that societal culture are understood and taken into account. For instance, Licht et al. (2007) argue that individualist nations respect the rule of law more and that this cultural orientation is more compatible with "good governance." This proposition can be interpreted in various ways. Some scholars may conclude from this that no effective democracy can emerge in collectivist cultures. Others, including the author of this book, may conclude that we should consider social attitudes and behaviors attached

to collectivist culture when designing the institutional settings for such a society. That is, if there is a risk that in a collectivist culture preserving the relationship outvalues preserving the law, then institutions should be designed in a way that can protect the rule of law while also being considerate of relational ties. This is surely not an easy task; and often a trade-off between these two is inevitable. However, the cultural compatibility thesis suggests that in a collectivist culture, the transplantation of political institutions from an individualistic society could be problematic and nonfunctional. Moreover, the thesis suggests that more controlling measures and mechanisms are required for enforcing the rule of law in such societies.

All in all, the cultural compatibility thesis provides some promising explanations for the diversity of democratic models and institutional settings. It may also be used to predict and propose a set of institutional choices that may be more compatible with the cultural context of a society. The cultural compatibility thesis posits that involving societal culture in the process of *opting, adopting* and *adapting* political institutions is necessary, though not sufficient.

9.4 Plausible Challenges against the Cultural Compatibility Thesis

The cultural compatibility thesis might receive many questions and challenges, just as any other theory in social science. In this section, I attempt to briefly address some of the plausible challenges as well as indicate how the thesis deals with these questions.

9.4.1 The Challenge of Naivety

Is it not naive to assume that cultural compatibility is a solution for institutional arrangement and can bring about a workable and legitimate democratic model?

The cultural compatibility thesis does not at all claim that considering cultural compatibility when designing institutional arrangements would necessarily bring about a workable and sustainable democracy. Rather, it asserts that the compatibility between political institutions and societal culture can serve as a lubricant that decreases the stiction in the political mechanism. Without it, the system would work with more friction, which increases the danger of political collapse. However, as I emphasized before, the societal culture is one factor, along with many others, that should be taken into account. In new democracies and in the phase of

transition, this factor can play a crucial role in the acceptability and consolidation of democratic system.

9.4.2 The Challenge of the Vicious Circle

Is it wise to design a political system in accordance with some cultural orientations that are less beneficial for some aspects of the democratic process? How could a model of democracy that leaves more room for competition and less for cooperation help promote the culture of collaborativeness in a country lacking this cultural value? Can the adoption of competitive-oriented institutions, for instance, create a vicious circle of weakening the cultural value of collaborativeness?

These are crucial questions. The answer of the cultural compatibility thesis is that the adopted institutional setting should be in affinity with the cultural orientation of a society in order to sustain the democratic process. Democracy is a learning-by-doing process. Teamwork and consensus making would be developed in a sustainable democratic practice. Imposing the integrative-oriented institutions could not per se enhance the process of consensus building. Adopting the full proportional system, for instance, might result in a multi-party system, but it does not necessarily bring about a successful coalition of parties in a country that has a low level of collaborativeness or a high level of mastery orientation.

Adopting an incompatible institutional arrangement might lead to a vicious circle of dissatisfaction. This can destabilize democratic transition and encourage the authoritarian solutions or recurring revolution. A collaborative culture can be promoted if the compatible democratic system is established first in a new democracy; and then more integrative-elements can be gradually introduced and developed in the political system of the country as well.

The cultural compatibility thesis can help institutional designers and reformers assess which cultural orientations of a society can be employed to mediate the challenges that arise from other cultural values of society. For instance, a charismatic leader in a high monumentalist culture can be instrumental in encouraging people to take part in a collective behavior that might be less preferred in the society. This was the very mechanism that helped Nelson Mandela persuade angry South Africans to accept the power-sharing mechanism for their democratic system after the fall of the brutal apartheid regime.

9.4.3 The Challenge of Cultural Stability and Institutional Reform

How can the cultural compatibility thesis suggest and justify institutional reform if the cultural orientation of a society is presumably stable?

The cultural compatibility thesis has a descriptive and prescriptive application. In its descriptive mission, it explains how the model of democracy in a country is congruent with the national culture. Cultural compatibility can also partly explain why different models could be legitimate and functional in different contexts.

In its prescriptive application, the thesis can provide some hints and guidelines for institutional design in new democracies and institutional reform in developing or established democracies. The thesis can warn institutional designers about the consequences of changes that are incompatible with the societal culture. The cultural compatibility thesis proposes that institutional reform be in accordance with the dynamism of cultural values. There is a constant and active interaction between political institutions and societal culture. Cultural values do change, though gradually and slowly. Accordingly, institutional reform might be required. Institutional reform is also needed to facilitate changes in political attitudes. This cultural dynamism is not only due to the change of cultural values per se, but can also be the result of the interaction between cultural orientations within a society, as briefly discussed in Chapter 3 (section 3.5).

Some cultural orientations might be dormant and less motivating in one period and then be more influential and determinant at another moment or occasion. This makes for a cultural dynamism, which encourages institutional adaptation. For instance, during a transitional period after the fall of authoritarian regime, people might be very participative in initial democratic elections, despite the fact that the societal culture might be less participation-friendly (i.e. low future orientation and high uncertainty avoidance). But as time passes, dormant cultural orientations can become more active and might discourage political participation. Thus, institutional reform and the adoption of compulsory voting, for instance, may be required and helpful.

9.4.4 The Challenge of the Viability of Institutional Arrangements

Are all combinations of institutional elements viable? What if the cultural orientations of society encourage a nonviable model of democracy?

The combination of different institutional elements will shape a variety of institutional arrangements and democratic patterns. Although there are many institutional elements, two major institutional choices determine the formal pattern of democratic institutions: parliamentary vs. presidential regime type and majoritarian vs. proportional electoral system. These two are bipolar dimensions that are neither fully dependent nor fully orthogonal. The combination of these two axes makes a diversity of institutional arrangements. This diversity is expected and accepted so long as there is a diversity of societal culture and socio-economic factors. However, the viability of different democratic models is an interesting question to be investigated.

The cultural compatibility thesis posits that different institutional settings might be viable in different societal context. Nevertheless, we can argue that some combinations of institutional elements are harmful for the sustainability of a democratic system. For instance, the combination of a majoritarian electoral system and full presidentialism with a weak parliament is prone to creating an excluding, paternalistic form of government. This political system may seem decisive, but it is less checked and balanced by the parliament and opposition parties. Some new African democracies, namely Mali, Zambia and Tanzania, have practiced this model of democracy. These countries have experienced fluctuations and counter-democratic times over the past years, whereas other countries with a similar electoral system and presidential regime, namely Ghana and Botswana, have experienced more stable democratic systems because the role and power of the parliament is more significant in these countries (see Fish & Kroenig (2009) for the parliamentary powers index of these countries). We can tentatively conclude that the combination of a full majoritarian electoral system with a strong president and a very weak parliament might be not a viable and sustainable model of democracy even if the societal culture of a country seems compatible with this institutional system. The viability of different institutional arrangements can be an independent subject for further research.

9.4.5 The Challenge of the Trade-off between Representation and Effectiveness

How does the cultural compatibility thesis address the dichotomy between representation and performance in designing the institutional arrangement? Does the thesis make any contributions to the debate on the superiority of one over the other?

One of the main debates in the comparative study of institutional design is concerns the famous dichotomy of representation vs. effectiveness (or accountability) (Carey & Hix, 2011; Lijphart, 1999; Powell, 2000). It is widely accepted that a more proportional electoral system, in particular in a parliamentary regime, causes 'inclusiveness' and consequently 'consensus', while adoption of a majoritarian electoral system and presidential regime would be better for 'decisiveness,' and consequently 'effectiveness'. There is a subtle point here that inclusiveness per se does not lead to political consensus, and that decisiveness does not necessarily bring about effectiveness. We can argue that 'inclusiveness' without 'consensus,' and 'decisiveness' without 'effectiveness,' are neither desired nor helpful. The cultural compatibility thesis asserts that the compatibility between institutional arrangement and societal culture is crucial for breeding consensus from inclusiveness and effectiveness from decisiveness. The thesis suggests that too much representation in a low collaborative and high competitive culture can lead to a mess rather than consensus. On the other hand, a majoritarian, decisive-oriented institution in a country with high expectations of inclusiveness would lead to tensions and dissatisfaction instead of accountability and performance.

9.4.6 The Challenge of Divided Societies

What solution does the cultural compatibility thesis suggest for the challenge of accommodation in those divided societies whose cultural orientations are less collaborative and consensual?

The plausible answer to this challenge is that the institutional setting of a country should be a combination of institutional elements that can satisfy both social and cultural factors. That is, in divided societies with a weak collaborative and a strong mastery-oriented culture, a democratic model should be adopted that can satisfy both decisiveness and inclusiveness. For instance, we can think of a model in which the parliament accommodates the feature of inclusiveness and a directly elected president fulfills the attribute of decisiveness. That is, the electoral system of parliament should be designed to accommodate

different groups and ethnicities through giving them the power to influence the decisions of the government, whereas the presidential regime type could facilitate the formation of a strong and decisive government and maintain the unity of the country. The cultural compatibility thesis suggests that the adoption of a full proportional parliamentary system in a divided society with a weak culture of collaborativeness could make a free-for-all situation for different parties, leading to an indecisive, vulnerable political structure, even though it might also realize inclusiveness.

These are six plausible challenges that may be raised and that I have tried to reflect upon. There is no doubt that more challenges and questions may turn up regarding the cultural compatibility thesis, as it is a new, developing theory. This study tries to problematize the interrelation between societal culture and democratic institutions and makes the first step in examining this interrelation in practice. And, like any other empirical study in the social sciences, this study has its limitations, which should be addressed and improved upon in further works.

9.5 Limitations of the Study and Next Steps

This study is the first step of a longer march. This work has its own limitations that need to be improved in a further research. The relation between patterns of culture and models of democracy should be elaborated with more theoretical and empirical developments. The two concepts of societal culture and democratic models have many underlying components that should be recognized, operationalized and studied. Understanding the interrelation between these two modes of institutions, i.e. formal and informal institutions, and the implications of the interaction between them can be considered a theme of research in cross-cultural comparative politics. In the following, I list some limitations of this work and propose some complementary studies that should be conducted to consolidate the findings of this study and enhance the cultural compatibility thesis.

1- A systematic measurement of societal culture for a wider range of countries is a must for improving the cross-cultural study of democracy. That is, the measurement of culture should be expanded; several cultural orientations should be (re)measured systematically using the most updated surveys; and this should be done for a greater number of

countries, and particularly for more developing countries. As discussed in Chapter 2, the proposed nine clusters of cultural dimensions can be taken as a point of departure for a completely new framework, developing new question items for each cluster and measuring cultural dimensions for a broader range of countries. In this study, some cultural orientations that have been less studied and are usually embedded in other big dimensions, e.g. mastery orientation, out-group collectivism (or collaborativeness) and future orientation, are introduced as exclusive dimensions of culture. These dimensions demonstrate a strong potential to explain the variances in democratic models, political behaviors and institutional arrangements. Moreover, in further research, the conceptual definitions and empirical measurement of those cultural dimensions whose existing measures by different scholars are less convergent – like power distance – should be revised and redone. The measuring of these dimensions should be replicated and extended for more countries in further works. This will help researchers examine the robustness of the interrelations found in this study.

2- The whole analysis in this study is at the national level. Cultural patterns and democratic models are operationalized and utilized at the national level, but we expect that these interrelations to be seen at the lower level as well. That is, the cultural differences between different regions and groups within countries might codetermine the diversity of institutional choices and political behaviors at the corresponding level. This should be studied in further research. Moreover, we need to have some multi-level analysis to examine to what extent there is an interaction between the different levels of analysis. There is a lasting, controversial discussion on the relation between individuals' values and national cultural values. Many scholars in cross-cultural studies debate the validity of measuring national culture through aggregating individual responses (see Schwartz, 2014). They argue about whether the two levels of individuals and nations need to be connected or whether they are parts of two different worlds. Similar questions are asked about the relation between individuals' political preferences and institutional choices at the national level. This study found a meaningful relation between dimensions of societal culture and dimensions/institutions of democracy at the national level. The questions of whether this interrelation is also seen at lower levels and how political behavior and the institutional preference of individuals would be affected by their cultural and individual values should be studied in further studies.

3- This study should be complemented with some elaborated case studies and a comparative analysis of a smaller set of countries. Examining the cultural compatibility thesis in countries that experienced institutional reforms and the consequences of the changes can help us to better understand what contextual factor may explain the success or failure of institutional reform. The impact of institutional reform on democratic performance and public satisfaction, and considering whether the direction of institutional reform is culturally compatible or not would be an interesting subject of research. This can be done for both established and new democracies. The electoral reform in New Zealand, for instance, or the several changes of the electoral system in Italy are examples of established democracies. Among new democracies, more countries have experienced institutional reform. Analyzing the institutional arrangement in Iraq and Pakistan, for instance, and the role of cultural incompatibility in the malfunction of their political system can evaluate the prescriptive application of the cultural compatibility thesis. Moreover, studying similarities and differences in political institutions as well as in cultural orientations in a specific cluster of countries, like new democracies in Muslim countries, could be a complementary comparative study to follow up this research.

4- In the empirical analyses of this study, we tried to find meaningful patterns and significant associations between the different dimensions of culture and components/institutions of democracy; however, we saw some outliers and pattern-defying cases in several of the analyses. Studying these cases and the factors explaining their peculiar behavior is an important subject for further research. Outliers do not necessarily question the validity of a strong relation between two variables if they can be satisfactorily explained. For instance, in our analysis of the relation between the dimensions of culture and democracy (Chapter 5), the presence of some outlier countries (e.g. Brazil, India, Israel in Figure 5.2) may just show the incompatibility between societal culture and democratic models in those countries. This should be further examined in a follow-up research.

5- In the empirical analyses of this book, the average scores of indicators for one or two decades are used to extract the dimensions of democracy. It is argued that using the average scores eliminates the variance of indicators across time. This might endanger the reliability of

the results. In a further research, the scores for the dimensions of democracy for each year should be extracted, and the analysis should be replicated with data of country-year scores. This set of data would also be useful for studying the changes in democratic models over time. Moreover, there are a limited number of countries that have scores for both dimensions of democracy and culture. Extracting the country-year scores, we can reanalyze our hypothesis with a larger number of cases, which lends more reliability to the findings.

6- This study treats societal culture as a stable entity. As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, cultural values change gradually and slowly. Measuring cultural changes necessitates public surveys over time, but these surveys have been less available until recently. In further research, changes of culture should be studied; and accordingly, the relation between cultural change and institutional variation should be examined. Moreover, distinguishing between situational attitudes, which have more fluctuations, and cultural values, which are more durable, would be crucial for the further development of the study of the dynamism of contextual factors. The dynamism of interaction between values, attitudes and institutions is a very interesting subject of further research, and one that is also relevant to this study.

7- The consequences of the incompatibility between political institutions and contextual factors, and particularly societal culture, on the performance of a democratic system should be studied in future research. The effect of this incompatibility on the public's perception of satisfaction with democracy has been studied in Chapter 6. The effect of the interaction between societal culture and political institutions on other performance indicators is crucial for examining the cultural compatibility thesis. To this purpose, the proper and reliable indicators of good governance, political stability, public trust, corruption, economic growth and equality should be employed. This should be done in large-N studies as well as in more comprehensive comparative studies with smaller cases.

8- As emphasized previously, societal culture is one of the contextual factors that should be taken into account in institutional design. The interaction between societal culture and other social, economic and contextual factors and the effect of this interaction on the adoption and functionality of institutional arrangements in different countries should be studied in further research. It is crucial to understand, for instance, how

cultural orientations variously affect the institutional choices in heterogeneous and homogeneous societies. This would definitely help institutional designers recognize different types of 'power-sharing' models that work successfully in different contexts. The role of societal culture on institutional arrangement cannot be fully understood without studying its interaction with other contextual factors.

This research was started concurrent with the fall of Libyan dictator and is ended at a time when Tunisia is holding its first democratic, free and fair elections. Between these two junctures, and four years after the Arab Spring, some democratic attempts in Muslim countries have failed and faced a political winter (e.g. Egypt, Libya); some fragile democracies have faced grave challenges and gotten stuck in destabilizing storms (e.g. Mali, Afghanistan, Iraq); and some new democracies have been enhanced and experienced a breeze of democratic change (e.g. Indonesia, Turkey and Tunisia).

We all know that many factors have played a role in the success or failure of democratic experience in each of these countries and any other new democracies. Among many factors, this study has focused on the effect of societal culture and institutional arrangements, and the very important matter of their interactions. The recent ambivalent experience of democracy in Muslim countries has again questioned the conviction that some cultures are not compatible with democracy. This book hopes to have contributed to democratization studies by reformulating a controversial thesis: from an exclusive interpretation of '*Culture Matters*' to the inclusive position that '*Cultural Compatibility Matters.*'

Appendices

Appendix A: Dimensions of National Culture

Table A.1. Cultural dimensions of Hofstede and Minkov

Cultural dimension	Description
Hofstede	
Individualism vs. Collectivism	Individualism stands for a society in which the ties between individuals are loose: A person is expected to look after himself or herself and his or her immediate family only. Collectivism stands for a society in which people from birth onwards are integrated into strong, cohesive in-groups, which continue to protect them throughout their lifetime in exchange for unquestioning loyalty.
Power distance	The extent to which the less-powerful members of society expect and accept that power is distributed unequally.
Uncertainty avoidance	The extent to which members of society feel uncomfortable with uncertain, unknown, ambiguous, or unstructured situations. The fundamental issue here is how a society deals with the fact that the future can never be known.
Masculinity vs. Femininity	Masculinity represents a preference in society for achievement, competition, heroism, assertiveness, and material reward for success. Its opposite, femininity, stands for a preference for cooperation, consensus, modesty, caring for the weak, and quality of life. This dimension is also related to the division of emotional roles between women and men.
Long- vs. Short-term orientation	Long-term Orientation stands for a society that fosters virtues and is oriented toward future rewards, in particular perseverance and thrift. Short-term orientation stands for a society that fosters virtues related to the past and present, in particular respect for tradition, preservation of "face," and fulfilling social obligations.
Minkov	
Exclusionism vs. Universalism	Exclusionism is defined as the cultural tendency to treat people on the basis of their group affiliation and reserve favors, services, privileges for in-groups while excluding out-groups from those who deserve such privileged treatment. Universalism is the opposite cultural tendency; treating people primarily on the basis of who they are as individuals and disregarding their group affiliation.
Monumentalism vs. Flexumility (Self-Effacement)	Monumentalism stands for pride and high self-regard, demonstration of status and generosity with money, favors and services, consistency between feelings and outward expression and avoidance of dialectical feelings and thoughts, including greater religiousness. Flexumility (Flexibility + Humility) is characterized by the opposite characteristics.
Indulgence vs. Restraint	Indulgence is defined as a tendency to allow relatively free gratification of some desire and feelings (leisure, casual sex, spending, and consumption). Restraint stands for the tendency to curb the gratification of desires and feelings by strict social norms and prohibitions.

Source. Hofstede (2001), Minkov(2007).

Table A.2. Cultural dimensions of Inglehart

Cultural dimension	Description
Traditional vs. Secular-Rational values	In traditional cultures religion is very important and a main goal in most people's lives is to make their parents proud; they idealize large families, and have large numbers of children. They also have high levels of national pride, favor more respect for authority and reject divorce, abortion, euthanasia and suicide. Societies with secular-rational values have the opposite preferences on all these topics.
Survival vs. Self-Expression	Self-expression dimension reflects a syndrome of tolerance, trust, emphasis on subjective well-being, civic activism, and self-expression that emerges in postindustrial societies with high levels of existential security and individual autonomy. At the opposite pole, people in societies shaped by existential insecurity and rigid intellectual and social constraints on human autonomy tend to emphasize economic and physical security above all.

Source. Inglehart et al. (2004), Inglehart & Welzel (2005).

Table A.3. Cultural dimensions of Schwartz

Cultural orientations	Description
Embeddedness (conservatism)	A cultural emphasis on maintenance of the status quo, propriety, and restraint of actions or inclinations that might disrupt the solidarity group or the traditional order (embedded value items: social order, respect for tradition, security, obedience, wisdom)
Intellectual autonomy	A cultural emphasis on the desirability of individuals independently pursuing their own ideas and intellectual directions (embedded value items: curiosity, broadmindedness, creativity)
Affective autonomy	A cultural emphasis on the desirability of individuals independently pursuing affectively positive experience (embedded value items: pleasure, exciting life, varied life)
Hierarchy	A cultural emphasis on the legitimacy of an unequal distribution of power, roles and resources (embedded value items: social power, authority, humility, wealth)
Egalitarianism	A cultural emphasis on transcendence of selfish interests in favor of voluntary commitment to promoting the welfare of others (embedded value items: equality, social justice, freedom, responsibility, honesty)
Mastery	A cultural emphasis on getting ahead through active self-assertion (ambition, success, courage, competence)
Harmony	A cultural emphasis on fitting harmoniously into the social and natural environment (unity with nature, protecting the environment, world of beauty)

Source. Schwartz (1999).

Table A.4. Cultural dimensions of GLOBE project

Cultural dimension	Description
Performance orientation	the extent to which an organization or society encourages and rewards group members for performance improvement and excellence
Future orientation	the degree to which individuals in organizations or societies engage in future-oriented behavior such as planning, investing in the future, and delaying gratification
Gender egalitarianism	the extent to which an organization or a society minimizes gender role differences and gender discrimination
Assertiveness	the degree to which individuals in organizations or societies are assertive, confrontational, and aggressive in social relationships
Institutional collectivism	the degree to which organizational and societal institutional practices encourage and reward collective distribution of resources and collective action
In-group collectivism	the degree to which individuals express pride, loyalty, and cohesiveness in their organizations or families
Power distance	the degree to which members of an organization or society expect and agree that power should be unequally shared
Humane orientation	the degree to which individuals in organizations or societies encourage and reward individuals for being fair, altruistic, friendly, generous, caring, and kind to others
Uncertainty avoidance	the extent to which members of an organization or society strive to avoid uncertainty by reliance on social norms, rituals, and bureaucratic practices to alleviate the unpredictability of future events

Source. House et al. (2002).

Table A.5. Scores of dimensions of national culture

	Hofstede				Minkov				Schwartz[a]							Inglehart		GLOBE (standardized practices)							
	H1	H2	H3	H4	H5	M1	M2	M3	S1	S2	S3	S4	S5	S6	S7	I1	I2	G1	G2	G3	G4	G5	G6	G7	G8
Albania					61	285	15	102								0.07	-1.14	4.57	3.69	3.48	4.57	4.28	5.51	4.62	4.40
Argentina	46	49	86	56	20	311	62	28	3.63	3.43	4.55	1.80	5.10	3.72	4.27	-0.66	0.38	3.63	3.10	3.44	4.18	3.66	5.51	5.56	3.94
Australia	90	36	51	61	21	174	71	35	3.85	3.39	4.20	2.16	4.92	3.75	4.13	0.21	1.75	4.37	4.09	3.41	4.29	4.31	4.14	4.81	4.32
Austria	55	11	70	79	60	191	63	40	3.19	3.89	4.97	1.66	5.06	3.72	4.62	0.25	1.43	4.47	4.47	3.18	4.59	4.34	4.89	5.00	3.77
Bangladesh	20	80	55	55	47	412	20	76								-1.21	-0.93								
Belgium	75	65	94	54	82	159	57	-46								0.50	1.13								
Bolivia									4.21	2.36	4.83	2.69	4.83	3.69	4.26			3.57	3.55	3.45	3.78	3.96	5.44	4.46	3.99
Bosnia					70	320	44	-74								0.34	-0.65								
Brazil	38	69	76	49	44	313	59	61	4.03	3.04	4.27	2.59	4.25	3.84	4.25	-0.98	0.61	4.11	3.90	3.44	4.25	3.94	5.16	5.24	3.76
Bulgaria	30	70	85	40	69	340	16	-135	3.80	3.11	4.26	2.32	5.04	3.77	4.04	1.13	-1.01								
Canada	80	39	48	52	36	172	68	64	3.52	3.71	4.57	1.69	4.99	3.93	4.20	-0.26	1.91	4.46	4.40	3.66	4.09	4.36	4.22	4.85	4.51
Chile	23	63	86	28	31	256	68	24	3.90	2.47	4.38	2.10	5.11	3.54	4.49	-0.87	0.00								
China	20	80	30	66	87	253	24	-206	3.74	3.20	4.31	3.63	4.31		3.76	0.80	-1.16	4.37	3.68	3.03	3.77	4.67	5.86	5.02	4.29
Colombia	13	67	80	64	13	320	83	38								-1.87	0.60	3.93	3.35	3.64	4.16	3.84	5.59	5.37	3.72
Costa Rica	15	35	86	21														4.10	3.64	3.56	3.83	3.95	5.26	4.70	4.38
Croatia	33	73	80	40	58		33	-76								0.08	0.31								
Cyprus							70		4.19	2.66	3.83	1.98	5.06	3.66	4.32	-0.56	0.13								
Czech Rep.	58	57	74	57	70	238	29	-116	3.77	3.07	4.59	2.07	4.59	3.45	4.66	1.23	0.38								
Denmark	74	18	23	16	35	107	70	-19	3.29	4.08	4.77	1.73	5.15	3.74	4.32	1.16	1.87	4.40	4.59	4.02	4.04	4.93	3.63		4.67
Dominican Rep.					13	338	54	53								-1.05	0.33								
Ecuador	8	78	67	63														4.06	3.66	3.09	3.98	3.82	5.55	5.29	4.45
Egypt	38	80	68	53	7	482	4	154								-1.61	-0.46	4.15	3.80	2.90	3.91	4.36	5.49	4.76	4.60
El Salvador	19	66	94	40	20		89	117								-2.06	0.53	3.72	3.73	3.23	4.49	3.74	5.22	5.56	3.69
Estonia	60	40	60	30	82	233	16	-146	4.08	2.92	4.11	1.88	4.75	3.44	4.66	1.27	-1.19								

	Hofstede				Minkov				Schwartz[a]							Inglehart		GLOBE (standardized practices)						
	H1	H2	H3	H4	H5	M1	M2	M3	S1	S2	S3	S4	S5	S6	S7	I1	I2	G1	G2	G3	G4	G5	G6	G7	G8
Finland	63	33	59	26	38	102	57	-27	3.53	3.61	4.84	1.70	5.03	3.39	4.59	0.82	1.12	4.02	4.39	3.55	4.05	4.77	4.23	5.08	4.19
France	71	68	86	43	63	196	48	-42	3.10	4.31	5.37	1.98	5.18	3.57	4.50	0.63	1.13	4.43	3.74	3.81	4.44	4.20	4.66	5.68	3.60
Georgia					38	367	32	-27	4.25	3.26	3.86	2.46	4.74	3.62	4.09	-0.04	-1.31	3.85	3.45	3.52	4.15	4.03	6.18	5.15	4.17
Germany	67	35	65	66	83	151	40	-92	3.18	3.75	4.92	1.91	5.14	3.75	4.71	1.39	0.50	4.42	4.41	3.25	4.66	3.97	4.16	5.48	3.30
Ghana	20	77	54	46	4		72		4.30	2.16	3.94	2.65	4.85	4.15	3.43	-1.94	-0.29								
Greece	35	60	112	57	45	332	50	4	3.47	3.83	4.43	1.78	4.98	4.13	4.68	0.77	0.55	3.34	3.53	3.53	4.55	3.41	5.28	5.35	3.44
Guatemala	6	95	101	37												-1.70	-0.17	3.85	3.35	3.14	3.96	3.78	5.54	5.47	3.91
Hong Kong	25	68	29	57	61		17		3.87	2.97	4.23	2.82	4.61	3.94	3.61	1.20	-0.98	4.69	3.88	3.26	4.53	4.03	5.33	4.94	3.72
Hungary	80	46	82	88	58		31	-46	3.73	3.35	4.46	2.04	4.51	3.74	4.38	0.40	-1.22	3.50	3.31	4.02	4.71	3.63	5.31	5.57	3.39
India	48	77	40	56	51		26	18	3.91	3.54	4.02	3.37	4.49	4.16	3.98	-0.36	-0.21	4.11	4.04	2.89	3.70	4.25	5.81	5.29	4.45
Indonesia	14	78	48	46	62	364	38	21	4.50	3.12	3.70	2.65	4.33	3.62	3.99	-0.47	-0.80	4.14	3.61	3.04	3.70	4.27	5.50	4.93	4.47
Iran	41	58	59	43	14	339	40	114								-1.22	-0.45	4.58	3.70	2.99	4.04	3.88	6.03	5.43	4.23
Iraq	38	80	68	53	25		17	123								-0.40	-1.68								
Ireland	70	28	35	68	24	208	65	91	3.60	3.62	4.38	1.86	4.99	3.84	3.90	-0.91	1.18	4.30	3.93	3.19	3.93	4.57	5.12	5.13	4.96
Israel	54	13	81	47	38				3.82	3.51	4.42	2.47	4.86	3.87	3.35	0.26	0.36	4.03	3.82	3.21	4.19	4.40	4.63	4.71	4.07
Italy	76	50	75	70	61	248	30	5	3.61	2.84	4.86	1.47	5.38	3.60	4.91	0.13	0.60	3.66	3.34	3.30	4.12	3.75	4.99	5.45	3.66
Jamaica	39	45	13	68																					
Japan	46	54	92		88	233	42	-80	3.55	3.47	4.73	2.58	4.47	3.97	4.30	1.96	-0.05	4.22	4.29	3.17	3.69	5.23	4.72	5.23	4.34
Kuwait	38	80	68	53	23													3.79	3.18	2.59	3.56	4.32	5.70	4.97	4.44
Latvia	70	44	63	9	69	220	13	-141								0.72	-1.27								
Lithuania	60	42	65	19	82	258	16	-159								0.98	-1.00								
Luxemburg	60	40	70	50	64	142	56									0.42	1.13								
Macedonia					62	299	35	-6	4.05	2.68	4.27	2.95	4.48	3.88	4.14	0.12	-0.72								
Malaysia	26	104	36	50	41		57		4.33	2.99	4.10	2.35	4.50	3.83	3.68	-0.73	0.09	4.16	4.39	3.31	3.77	4.45	5.47	5.09	4.76
Mali					20		43									-1.25	-0.08								
Malta	59	56	96	47	47	328	66	115								-1.53	-0.03								
Mexico	30	81	82	69	24	325	97	99	3.79	3.13	4.48	2.30	4.77	3.84	4.58	-1.47	1.03	3.97	3.75	3.50	4.31	3.95	5.62	5.07	3.84

	Hofstede				Minkov				Schwartz[a]							Inglehart		GLOBE (standardized practices)						
	H1	H2	H3	H4	H5	M1	M2	M3	S1	S2	S3	S4	S5	S6	S7	I1	I2	G1	G2	G3	G4	G5	G6	G7	G8
Moldova					71	262	19	-129								0.47	-1.28								
Morocco	46	70	68	53	14	333	25	178								-1.32	-1.04	4.31	3.50	3.08	4.72	4.18	6.37	6.14	4.52
Namibia									4.02	3.29	4.00	2.49	4.60	4.06	3.56			3.52	3.32	3.69	3.81	4.02	4.39	5.29	3.83
Netherlands	80	38	53	14	67		68	-55	3.36	3.65	4.78	2.00	5.08	3.80	4.19	0.71	1.39	4.46	4.72	3.62	4.46	4.62	3.79	4.32	4.02
New Zealand	79	22	49	58	33	152	75	-17	3.47	3.86	4.47	2.16	5.03	3.86	4.19	0.00	1.86	4.86	3.46	3.18	3.53	4.96	3.58	5.12	4.43
Nigeria	20	77	54	46	13	495	84	120								-1.53	0.28	3.79	3.95	3.04	4.53	4.00	5.34	5.53	3.96
Norway	69	31	50	8	35		55	34	3.55	3.29	4.67	1.41	5.29	3.62	4.64	1.39	2.17								
Pakistan	14	55	70	50	50	341	0	97								-1.42	-1.25								
Panama	11	95	86	44																					
Peru	16	64	87	42	25	298	46	19								-1.36	0.03								
Philippines	32	94	44	64	27	387	42	115	4.07	2.90	3.98	2.57	4.60	3.73	4.08	-1.21	-0.11	4.21	3.92	3.42	3.85	4.37	6.14	5.15	4.88
Poland	60	68	93	64	38	267	29	6	4.05	3.04	4.24	2.51	4.55	3.64	4.24	-0.78	-0.14	3.96	3.23	3.94	4.11	4.51	5.55	5.09	3.67
Portugal	27	63	104	31	28	239	33	42	3.51	3.41	4.51	1.85	5.39	3.90	4.57	-0.90	0.49	3.65	3.77	3.69	3.75	4.02	5.64	5.50	3.96
Romania	30	90	90	42	52	352	20	10								-0.39	-1.55								
Russia	39	93	95	36	81	258	20	-149	4.04	2.95	4.24	2.50	4.64	3.66	4.25	0.49	-1.42	3.53	3.06	4.07	3.86	4.57	5.83	5.61	4.04
Singapore	20	74	8	48	72	287	46	11	4.21	2.95	3.78	2.73	4.69	3.62	3.98	-0.54	-0.28	4.81	4.88	3.52	4.06	4.77	5.66	4.92	3.29
Slovakia	52	104	51		77	286	28	-96	4.05	2.61	4.15	2.11	4.58	3.71	4.53	0.67	-0.43								
Slovenia	27	71	88	19	49	236	48	-46	3.82	3.42	4.93	1.44	4.58	3.47	4.77	0.73	0.36	3.62	3.56	3.84	4.01	4.09	5.49	5.32	3.75
South Africa	65	49	49	63	34		63	102								-1.09	-0.10	4.40	4.37	3.52	4.46	4.51	4.80	4.71	3.96
South Korea	18	60	85	39	100	353	29	-96								0.61	-1.37	4.53	3.90	2.45	4.36	5.20	5.71	5.69	3.73
Spain	51	57	86	42	48	244	44	20	3.36	3.59	4.98	1.84	5.20	3.68	4.64	0.09	0.54	4.00	3.52	3.06	4.39	3.87	5.53	5.53	3.29
Sweden	71	31	29	5	53		78	-51	3.23	3.97	5.07	1.73	4.96	3.61	4.54	1.86	2.35	3.67	4.37	3.72	3.41		3.46	4.94	4.09
Switzerland	68	34	58	70	74	194	66	-35	3.04	4.13	5.42	2.09	4.98	3.74	4.53	0.74	1.90	5.04	4.80	3.12	4.58	4.20	4.04	5.05	3.73
Taiwan	17	58	69	45	93		49	-128	4.05	2.96	3.87	2.62	4.39	3.87	4.22	1.16	-1.18	4.27	3.65	2.92	3.70	4.30	5.45	5.00	3.82
Tanzania	27	64	52	41	34	284	38	80								-1.84	-0.15								
Thailand	20	64	64	34	32		45									-0.64	0.01	3.84	3.27	3.26	3.58	3.88	5.72	5.62	4.87
Trinidad	16	47	55	58	13		80									-1.83	-0.26								

	Hofstede				Minkov				Schwartz[a]							Inglehart		GLOBE (standardized practices)						
	H1	H2	H3	H4	H5	M1	M2	M3	S1	S2	S3	S4	S5	S6	S7	I1	I2	G1	G2	G3	G4	G5	G6	G7	G8
Turkey	37	66	85	45	46	379	49	65	4.03	3.08	4.29	3.05	4.91	3.78	4.31	-0.89	-0.33	3.82	3.74	3.02	4.42	4.02	5.79	5.43	3.92
Ukraine					86	280	14	-163								0.30	-0.83								
UK	89	35	35	66	51	114	69	-12	3.55	3.86	4.42	2.34	5.00	3.88	3.81	0.06	1.68	4.16	4.31	3.67	4.23	4.31	4.08	5.26	3.74
USA	91	40	46	62	26	172	68	148	3.77	3.51	4.21	2.07	4.80	3.92	3.69	-0.81	1.76	4.45	4.13	3.36	4.50	4.21	4.22	4.92	4.18
Uruguay	36	61	100	38	26		53	-44								-0.37	0.99								
Venezuela	12	81	76	73	16	310	100	150	3.94	3.09	4.36	2.10	4.73	3.86	4.03	-1.60	0.43	3.41	3.43	3.60	4.26	3.96	5.41	5.22	4.19
Zambia	27	64	52	41	30		42									-0.77	-0.62	4.01	3.55	2.88	4.00	4.41	5.72	5.23	5.12

Source. Hofstede et al. (2010), Inglehart (2007; most updated country scores from waves 1995 to 2006), Minkov (2008), Licht et al. (2007). House et al. (2004).

Note. H1 = individualism vs. collectivism; H2 = power distance; H3 = uncertainty avoidance; H4 = masculinity vs. femininity; H5 = long vs. short-term orientation; M1 = exclusionism vs. universalism; M2 = indulgence/restraint; M3 = monumentalism/flexumility; S1 = embeddedness; S2 = affective autonomy; S3 = intelectual autonomy; S4 = hierarchy; S5 = egalitarianism; S6 = mastery; S7 = harmony; I1 = secular vs. traditional; I2 = self-expression vs. survival; G1 = performance orientation; G2 = future orientation; G3 = gender egalitarianism; G4 = assertiveness; G5 = institutional collectivism; G6 = in-group collectivism; G7 = power distance; G8 = humane orientation.

[a]Schwartz's cultural scores are based on a sample of over 15,000 urban teachers in Grades 3-12, surveyed during 1988-1998 (Licht et al., 2007, p. 667). The scores for bipolar dimensions have been calculated based on Schwartz's procedure to subtract the scores of two poles of each bipolar dimension. For embeddedness vs. autonomy, he recommended to subtract the embeddedness score from the mean of the affective and intellectual autonomy scores (Schwartz, 2004).

Appendix B: GLOBE Survey Items

Definitions and survey items measuring cultural dimensions in the GLOBE project, which are to be answered by respondents using a 1- to 7-point scale (House et al., 2004; The GLOBE Foundation, 2006):

Institutional collectivism (the degree to which societal institutional practices encourage and reward collective distribution of resources and collective action):

1. In this society, leaders encourage group loyalty even if individual goals suffer.
2. The economic system in this society is designed to maximize, 1 = *individual interests*, to 7 = *collective interests*.
3. In this society, being accepted by the other members of a group is very important.
4. In this society, 1 = *group cohesion is more valued than individualism*, to 7 = *individualism is more valued than group cohesion*.

In-group collectivism (the degree to which individuals express pride, loyalty, and cohesiveness in their families):

1. In this society, children take pride in the individual accomplishments of their parents.
2. In this society, parents take pride in the individual accomplishments of their children.
3. In this society, aging parents generally live at home with their children.
4. In this society, children generally live at home with their parents until they get married.

Power distance (the degree to which members of society expect and agree that power should be unequally shared):

1. In this society, a person's influence is based primarily on 1 = *one's ability and contribution to the society*, to 7 = *the authority of one's position*.
2. In this society, followers are expected to 1 = *obey their leaders without question*, to 7 = *question their leaders when in disagreement*.
3. In this society, people in positions of power try to 1 = *increase their social distance from less powerful individuals*, to 7 = *decrease their social distance from less powerful people*.
4. In this society, rank and position in the hierarchy have special privileges.
5. In this society, power is 1 = *concentrated at the top*, to 7 = *shared throughout the society*.

Appendix C: Classification of Democratic Regime Types

The classification of regime types by Cheibub (2007) is based on the formal constitutions and not necessarily on the real practice of democracy. Cheibub et al. (2010, p. 82) argued that "in almost every instance where the formal rules do not seem to match practice at a first glance, we find examples of behavior that conform to the constitutional prerogatives of the president and/or the assembly". We believe, however, that finding exceptional instances cannot overshadow the real and regular practices in many countries.

If not the constitution but the practice of democracy is the main focus of attention, as it is here, things will look somewhat differently. For instance, we are not convinced that the Austrian regime should be viewed as semi-presidential, rather than semi-parliamentary; it has a popularly-elected president, but this president has a ceremonial role only. Given this argumentation and considering the different definitions and classifications of semi-presidentialism in the literature (Duverger, 1980; Elgie, 2005; Siaroff, 2003), we reformulated and rearranged the criteria by Cheibub (2007, p. 35) and identified four types of political regime, as illustrated in Figure C.1.



Figure C.1. The criteria for classifying the democratic regimes in practice

Countries in which the head of state is not popularly elected ('No' to the first question) are categorized under the 'parliamentary' regime here. Countries having an elected president with a ceremonial role *in practice* (No to the second question) are classified as 'semi-parliamentary' regimes. For answering the second question and assessing whether or not a president has 'considerable power', we use the 'Presidential Power'

score introduced by Siaroff (2003), which was extended for some more countries by Elgie & McMenamin (2008) and Qi (2010). If the score is lower than 5, then the system is semi-parliamentary (e.g. Lithuania, Portugal, Croatia after 2000); otherwise the regime is semi-presidential (e.g. France, Romania, Croatia before 2000) or presidential (e.g. USA, Latin America, South Korea) depending on the answer to the third question in Figure A1, regarding whether or not an executive branch responsible to the legislative (based on Siaroff (2003)).

According to our classification, Switzerland which has no popular elected executive, and Austria which has a ceremonial elected president are respectively considered parliamentary and semi-parliamentary democracies, while according to Cheibub (2007) they are presidential and semi-presidential regimes respectively. In Table E.1 in Appendix E, the regime type of each country, based on our formulation, is specified. Except for Croatia, Finland, Moldova and Poland, all democratic countries had the same regime type for the whole range of 1990 to 2009.

Appendix D: Varieties of Referendums and the Weighting Rationale

Two main categories of referendums can be distinguished: top-down and bottom-up.

- *Plebiscitary* and *mandatory (*or *compulsory) referendums* are two types of top-down referendums. A plebiscite is defined here as a referendum called by the authorities, either the executive or legislative. A mandatory referendum is required "under circumstances defined in the constitution or in legislation" (IDEA, 2008, p. 213).

- *Optional* (or *abrogative* or *facultative* or *citizen-demanded*) *referendums* and *initiatives* are two types of bottom-up referendums. The former is "initiated, or triggered, by a number of citizens referring to existing laws or political or legislative proposals" (IDEA, 2008, p. 61). Initiatives are political proposals (e.g. draft legislation) initiated by citizens. The proposal might be directly used for popular voting (direct initiative) or it could be revised by the legislative and then presented to the popular vote (indirect initiative which is also called *counter proposal* (Kaufmann et al., 2010)).

There is considerable inconsistency in the terminology of different types of referendums in the literature. For instance, in IDEA's terminology, the 'optional referendum' is used in the meaning of plebiscite while in the terminology of Center for Research on Direct Democracy (C2D, 2012) it resembles the citizen-demanded referendum. In the terminology of IRI (Kaufmann et al., 2010)), the term 'optional referendum' is not common and 'citizen-initiated referendum' is used instead. This could result in problematical operationalization

Some scholars distinguish and weigh referendums based on the main categories only (i.e. top-down or bottom-up) (Peterlevitz, 2011). Some studies use only the number of referendums, no matter their types (Altman, 2011; Kriesi & Bochsler, 2012; Vanhanen, 2002). Another approach is to give a different weight to each type of referendum (Altman, 2012; Vatter, 2009). We follow this approach and weigh each type of referendum distinctively, based on its importance and contribution to direct democracy.

It can be argued convincingly that bottom-up referendums with the citizens as initiators should have a higher weight than the top-down ones. Initiatives are seemed more participatory than optional (abrogative) referendums because in initiatives citizens themselves define, directly or indirectly, the issue and subject of the referendum. Plebiscites have more

'governmental control' than mandatory referendums (Setala, 2006; Vatter, 2009), which gives the latter higher participatory value than the former (see Table D.1 for weights).

Normally only binding referendums are taken into account in the indices (Peterlevitz, 2011; Vatter, 2009). However, we believe that the non-binding referendum presents a form of participation that cannot be ignored. Setala (2006) asserted that in west European democracies parliament binds itself to the result of advisory (non-binding) plebiscites. Therefore, we assign a weight for these referendums as well, albeit half the weight of a binding one. According to C2D (2012) database, all non-binding referendums have been plebiscites. However, we understood that there were also non-binding initiatives in some countries (e.g. the Netherlands) (van der Krieken, 2011).

Venhanen (2002), in his revised index of participation, includes the number of referendums as a supplement to voter turnout, assuming 5 points for each national referendum and 1 point for a local referendum. It seems an acceptable assumption, taking into account observation that in Switzerland – a country with a full-developed referendum culture – national referendums are five times as scarce as local ones. This ratio is reasonable if the practicalities (time, cost, facilities) in national and local referendums would also be taken into account. Moreover, the number of participants in a national referendum is also multifold than a local referendum. Thus a weighting factor of 0.20 for local referendums seems acceptable. Table D.1 summarizes the weighting coefficients for different type, level and effect of referendums.

Table D.1. Weight of different types, levels and effect of referendums

Classifications of Referendum		Weighting Factor	Scale of Factor
Effect	Binding	K_B	1
	Non-Binding (advisory)	K_{NB}	0.50
Level	National	K_N	1
	Local/regional/state	K_L	0.20
Type	Plebiscite	K_P	0.25
	Mandatory	K_M	0.50
	Optional	K_O	0.75
	Initiative	K_I	1

As an example, Switzerland in 2000 had 1 mandatory referendum, 2 optional referendums and 13 initiatives at the national level, and 84 mandatory, 12 optional and 16 initiatives at the local level, all bindings.

Thus the aggregated score of referendums for Switzerland in 2000 would be:

aggregated score of referendums = Σ ($K_{effect} * K_{level} * K_{type} * N_{type}$) = $K_B * K_N * K_M * 1 + K_B * K_N * K_O * 2 + K_B * K_N * K_I * 13 + K_B * K_L * K_M * 84 + K_B * K_L * K_O * 12 + K_B * K_L * K_I * 16$

$= 1 * 1 * 0.5 * 1 + 1 * 1 * 0.75 * 2 + 1 * 1 * 1 * 13 + 1 * 0.5 * 0.5 * 84 + 1 * 0.5 * 0.75 * 12 + 1 * 0.5 * 1 * 16 = \underline{28.4}$

The aggregated score could be zero, when there is no referendum held in a country and it could be as high as in the above example for Switzerland. The REP score for Switzerland in 2000 is calculated as Log (28.4+1) =1.47, however, considering the highest score limit, its score would be 1.

We collected all binding and non-binding, national and local, and different types of referendums for all countries whose data are available in the extensive database of C2D (2012) in addition to other sources (Direct Democracy Navigator, 2012; Statistics Norway, 2012; van der Krieken, 2011) for the range of 1990 to 2009.

Appendix E: Dimensions of Democracy and Other Indicators

Table E.1. Countries' scores of two dimensions of democracy, their sub-components, and satisfaction with democracy for 80 electoral democracies, averaged for the range 1990-2009

Country	Code	Elect. Syst.#	Regime type*	DBY	LENP	LNPG	TEP	IDD	GEP	REP	NEP	PDD	SWD (%)
Albania	ALB	PR	PARL	1992	0.361	0.374	0.862	0.488	0.707	0.021	0.260	0.480	42.6
Argentina	ARG	PR	PRES	1983	0.540	0.328	0.682	0.494	0.653	0.000	0.258	0.443	36.1
Australia	AUL	Maj.	PARL	1946	0.386	0.349	0.899	0.494	0.703	0.022	0.788	0.584	78.5
Austria	AUS	PR	sPARL	1946	0.537	0.456	0.979	0.621	0.763	0.011	0.505	0.561	68.9
Bangladesh	BNG	Maj.	PARL	1991	0.368	0.345	0.806	0.468	0.685	0.005	0.198	0.452	
Belgium	BEL	PR	PARL	1946	0.908	0.740	0.964	0.865	0.720	0.000	0.599	0.552	55.5
Benin	BEN	PR	PRES	1991	0.771	0.645	0.765	0.725	0.624	0.016	0.155	0.408	
Bolivia	BOL	Mix.	PRES	1982	0.564	0.453	0.715	0.568	0.562	0.061	0.186	0.386	30.6
Bosnia	BOS	PR	sPARL	1996	0.879	0.668	0.950	0.823	0.418	0.000	0.220	0.295	29.7
Botswana	BOT	Maj.	PARL	1973	0.199	0.301	0.810	0.365	0.482	0.106	0.145	0.339	73.4
Brazil	BRA	PR	PRES	1979	0.923	0.688	0.743	0.778	0.664	0.061	0.512	0.513	29.6
Bulgaria	BUL	PR	sPARL	1990	0.480	0.409	0.931	0.567	0.702	0.000	0.149	0.451	22.5
Canada	CAN	Maj.	PARL	1946	0.459	0.301	0.878	0.495	0.571	0.010	0.742	0.493	70.2
Chile	CHL	PR	PRES	1990	0.737	0.445	0.711	0.616	0.584	0.000	0.209	0.392	38.1
Colombia	COL	PR	PRES	1958	0.607	0.490	0.731	0.601	0.384	0.084	0.177	0.282	29.3
Costa Rica	COS	PR	PRES	1949	0.446	0.316	0.702	0.463	0.603	0.005	0.231	0.409	56.3
Croatia	CRO	PR	sPARL	1991	0.469	0.411	0.729	0.520	0.660	0.016	0.399	0.479	29.6
Cyprus	CYP	PR	PRES	1983	0.561	0.492	0.711	0.581	0.671	0.005	0.299	0.463	69.6
Czech Rep.	CZR	PR	PARL	1990	0.557	0.411	0.929	0.597	0.749	0.011	0.384	0.529	45.2
Denmark	DEN	PR	PARL	1946	0.674	0.442	0.986	0.665	0.824	0.046	0.584	0.620	83.0
Dominican Rep.	DOM	PR	PRES	1980	0.415	0.323	0.710	0.457	0.549	0.000	0.192	0.368	48.1
Ecuador	ECU	PR	PRES	1979	0.809	0.430	0.712	0.628	0.573	0.150	0.176	0.409	26.6
El Salvador	SAL	PR	PRES	1984	0.520	0.341	0.741	0.509	0.501	0.000	0.136	0.328	39.4
Estonia	EST	PR	PARL	1991	0.692	0.503	0.948	0.691	0.475	0.026	0.255	0.341	40.4
Finland	FIN	PR	sPARL	1946	0.705	0.586	0.722	0.668	0.685	0.003	0.450	0.501	64.3
France	FRN	Maj.	sPRES	1946	0.445	0.404	0.710	0.504	0.624	0.022	0.629	0.505	52.4
Georgia	GRG	Mix.	sPRES	1992	0.399	0.369	0.809	0.492	0.563	0.042	0.207	0.387	41.2
Germany	GMY	Mix.	PARL	1949	0.568	0.434	0.966	0.620	0.718	0.097	0.568	0.564	58.5
Ghana	GHA	Maj.	PRES	1993	0.314	0.309	0.713	0.411	0.703	0.005	0.081	0.439	71.3
Greece	GRC	PR	PARL	1974	0.373	0.301	0.929	0.471	0.648	0.000	0.362	0.461	45.1
Guatemala	GUA	PR	PRES	1986	0.572	0.431	0.726	0.563	0.351	0.051	0.178	0.256	33.4
Hungary	HUN	Mix.	PARL	1990	0.479	0.400	0.893	0.555	0.505	0.134	0.183	0.366	29.2
Iceland	ICE	PR	sPARL	1946	0.578	0.448	0.977	0.632	0.859	0.000	0.516	0.618	66.4
India	IND	Maj.	PARL	1947	0.729	0.574	0.926	0.729	0.577	0.000	0.275	0.401	61.8
Indonesia	INS	PR	PRES	1999	0.775	0.510	0.760	0.670	0.796	0.000	0.127	0.503	46.2
Ireland	IRE	PR	sPARL	1946	0.508	0.382	0.945	0.568	0.660	0.161	0.517	0.532	72.1
Israel	ISR	PR	PARL	1948	0.818	0.591	0.979	0.779	0.705	0.000	0.390	0.501	41.3
Italy	ITA	PR	PARL	1946	0.739	0.335	0.939	0.614	0.707	0.459	0.517	0.619	30.7
Jamaica	JAM	Maj.	PARL	1962	0.216	0.301	0.844	0.380	0.485	0.000	0.077	0.306	

Country	Code	Elect. Syst.#	Regime type*	DBY	LENP	LNPG	TEP	IDD	GEP	REP	NEP	PDD	SWD (%)
Japan	JPN	Mix.	PARL	1947	0.450	0.393	0.894	0.541	0.647	0.000	0.602	0.509	55.1
Latvia	LAT	PR	PARL	1991	0.766	0.592	0.948	0.755	0.531	0.108	0.345	0.409	32.5
Lithuania	LIT	Mix.	sPARL	1991	0.630	0.477	0.897	0.646	0.471	0.226	0.331	0.394	36.2
Luxembourg	LUX	PR	PARL	1946	0.593	0.466	0.961	0.643	0.483	0.003	0.563	0.403	79.0
Macedonia	MAC	PR	sPARL	1991	0.501	0.487	0.866	0.596	0.571	0.021	0.210	0.389	42.3
Malaysia	MAL	Maj.	PARL	1974	0.358	0.554	0.848	0.552	0.564	0.000	0.064	0.351	
Mali	MLI	Maj.	sPRES	1992	0.528	0.377	0.809	0.544	0.281	0.005	0.156	0.201	
Malta	MLT	PR	PARL	1946	0.300	0.301	0.984	0.446	0.953	0.003	0.342	0.641	62.6
Mexico	MEX	Mix.	PRES	1994	0.437	0.313	0.685	0.454	0.528	0.036	0.260	0.376	27.1
Moldova	MLD	PR	PARL	1990	0.432	0.338	0.903	0.509	0.560	0.014	0.156	0.397	20.5
Namibia	NAM	PR	PRES	1990	0.229	0.301	0.870	0.391	0.683	0.000	0.175	0.445	72.7
Netherlands	NTH	PR	PARL	1946	0.721	0.547	0.989	0.731	0.754	0.086	0.516	0.573	71.5
New Zealand	NEW	Mix.	PARL	1946	0.470	0.354	0.930	0.537	0.781	0.000	0.888	0.646	68.5
Norway	NOR	PR	PARL	1946	0.651	0.444	0.967	0.654	0.752	0.110	0.651	0.603	79.4
Panama	PAN	Mix.	PRES	1989	0.549	0.361	0.703	0.518	0.621	0.031	0.160	0.411	37.8
Paraguay	PAR	PR	PRES	1990	0.440	0.305	0.696	0.454	0.413	0.000	0.181	0.284	15.9
Peru	PER	PR	sPRES	1980	0.579	0.394	0.751	0.555	0.617	0.005	0.226	0.416	19.1
Philippines	PHI	Mix.	PRES	1986	0.558	0.460	0.661	0.553	0.620	0.000	0.107	0.394	51.1
Poland	POL	PR	sPARL	1989	0.675	0.464	0.683	0.598	0.507	0.036	0.220	0.355	42.7
Portugal	POR	PR	sPARL	1976	0.415	0.310	0.947	0.496	0.637	0.016	0.243	0.434	49.8
Romania	ROM	PR	sPRES	1990	0.560	0.414	0.765	0.562	0.643	0.029	0.137	0.419	34.4
Senegal	SEN	Mix.	sPRES	2000	0.186	0.314	0.691	0.343	0.399	0.050	0.137	0.277	55.2
Slovakia	SLO	PR	sPARL	1993	0.673	0.558	0.940	0.707	0.760	0.118	0.387	0.557	28.1
Slovenia	SLV	PR	sPARL	1991	0.758	0.548	0.963	0.737	0.727	0.183	0.274	0.528	44.7
South Africa	SAF	PR	PARL	1994	0.325	0.372	0.997	0.494	0.657	0.003	0.185	0.432	52.5
South Korea	KOR	Mix.	PRES	1988	0.430	0.352	0.670	0.466	0.648	0.000	0.420	0.473	43.4
Spain	SPN	PR	PARL	1977	0.407	0.319	0.945	0.497	0.751	0.007	0.273	0.507	58.0
Sri Lanka	SRI	PR	PRES	1989	0.421	0.321	0.727	0.461	0.729	0.000	0.167	0.471	
Sweden	SWD	PR	PARL	1946	0.610	0.476	0.981	0.658	0.803	0.005	0.772	0.637	70.2
Switzerland	SWZ	PR	PARL	1946	0.739	0.663	0.970	0.780	0.375	1.000	0.706	0.566	78.9
Taiwan	TAW	Mix.	sPRES	1989	0.420	0.312	0.705	0.452	0.692	0.088	0.106	0.454	58.9
Tanzania	TAZ	Maj.	PRES	1995	0.143	0.364	0.775	0.343	0.547	0.011	0.198	0.370	
Thailand	THI	Mix.	PARL	1983	0.635	0.508	0.934	0.670	0.664	0.011	0.032	0.407	
Trinidad	TRI	Maj.	PARL	1962	0.310	0.315	0.919	0.447	0.655	0.000	0.228	0.438	
Turkey	TUR	PR	PARL	1983	0.530	0.429	0.857	0.580	0.662	0.000	0.133	0.424	
UK	UKG	Maj.	PARL	1946	0.353	0.301	0.839	0.447	0.652	0.008	0.701	0.533	61.6
Ukraine	UKR	PR	sPRES	1991	0.613	0.610	0.702	0.640	0.698	0.088	0.178	0.472	16.8
Uruguay	URU	PR	PRES	1985	0.455	0.473	0.715	0.536	0.769	0.051	0.327	0.537	62.9
USA	USA	Maj.	PRES	1946	0.296	0.301	0.700	0.397	0.458	1.000	0.740	0.623	76.3
Venezuela	VEN	Mix.	PRES	1959	0.568	0.368	0.726	0.533	0.483	0.054	0.188	0.338	46.1
Zambia	ZAM	Maj.	PRES	1991	0.383	0.301	0.707	0.434	0.399	0.000	0.151	0.269	49.1

Note: DBY: Democracy Birth Year (*Source*: Cheibub, 2007; Marshall et al., 2011); PR=Proportional Representation, Maj. = Majority/Plurality, Mix. =Mixed; PARL =Parliamentary, sPARL =semi-Parliamentary, PRES =Presidential, sPRES =semi-Presidential; LENP = Log (Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties); LNPG = Log (Number of Parties in Government +1); TEP = Total Electoral Proportionality; IDD = Integrative Dimension of Democracy = $(LENP*LNPG*TEP)^{1/3}$; GEP = General-Electoral Participation; REP = Referendum-Electoral Participation; NEP = Non-Electoral

Participation; PDD = Participative Dimension of Democracy = 0.60*GEP + 0.20*REP + 0.20*NEP; SWD = Satisfaction With Democracy.

Electoral system in some countries changed as follows (Bormann & Golder 2012; Doorenspleet, 2005; IDEA, 2012; Norris, 2011):

PR to Mixed: Bolivia (1997), Italy (1994), Romania (2008) and Venezuela (1993);

Mixed to PR: Albania (2009), Croatia (2000), Ecuador (1998), Italy (2006), Turkey (1995) and Ukraine (2006);

Majority to Mixed: Japan (1996), New Zealand (1996), Philippines (1998), Thailand (2001) and Ukraine (1998);

Majority to PR: Macedonia (1998);

* After 2000, regime type in Croatia, Finland and Poland changed from semi-presidential to semi-parliamentary and in Moldova from semi-presidential to parliamentary.

Sources of data to calculate IDD and PDD: African Eelections Database, 2012; Afrobarometer, 2012; Alcantara, 2012; Araúz et al., 2010; Armingeon & Careja, 2007; Armingeon et al., 2012; Beck et al., 2001; Benito Sánchez, 2010; Bormann & Golder, 2012; Bunker, 2007; C2D, 2012; Carey & Hix, 2010; Carr, 2012; Coppedge, 2007; Croissant & Martin, 2006; Democracy Barometer, 2010; Direct Democracy Navigator, 2012; EVS, 2012; Foweraker, 1999; Gallagher, 2012; Globalbarometer, 2012; Golder, 2005; IDEA, 2012; IPU, 2012; Keesing, 1998; Kriesi & Bochsler, 2012; Latinobarometro, 2012; Nohlen & Stöver, 2010; Norris, 2009; Qi, 2010; Reilly, 2007; Statistics Norway, 2012; Stockton, 2012; Van der Krieken, 2011; Van Eerd, 2009; WVS, 2012.

Sources of data on SWD: Afrobarometer, 2013; ANU Poll, 2013; Central Archive for Empirical Social Research, 1997; East Asia Barometer, 2013; EVS/WVS, 2006;; European Commission, 2013; European Values Study, 2011; Globalbarometer, 2009; ISSP Research Group , 1999; LAPOP, 2013; Latinobarometer, 2013; Mattes & Davids, 2000; Nadeau, 2002; Schmitt et al., 2008; Social Weather Stations, 2013; The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, 2013; WVS, 2009; Zhu et al., 2001.

Table E.2. Correlations between two dimensions of democracy and cultural/socio-economic indicators (including outliers)

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1	IDD (1990-2009)	1								
		(80)								
2	PDD (1990-2009)	0.24**	1							
		(80)	(80)							
3	Mastery (Schwartz)	-0.39***	-0.09	1						
		(44)	(44)	(44)						
4	Monumentalism (Minkov)	-0.39***	-0.01	0.33**	1					
		(56)	(56)	(37)	(56)					
5	Hierarchy (Schwartz)	-0.07	-0.45***	0.44***	0.04	1				
		(44)	(44)	(44)	(37)	(44)				
6	Future Orientation (GLOBE)	0.28	0.49***	0.04	-0.10	-0.12	1			
		(46)	(46)	(36)	(36)	(36)	(46)			
7	British Colony (dummy)	-0.40***	0.09	0.51***	0.41***	0.22	0.21	1		
		(80)	(80)	(44)	(56)	(44)	(46)	(80)		
8	Ln Population (1990)	0.00	0.03	0.31**	0.26**	0.44***	0.08	-0.01	1	
		(80)	(80)	(44)	(56)	(44)	(46)	(80)	(80)	
9	Fractionalization (ELF)	-0.05	-0.44***	0.29*	0.11	0.51***	-0.02	0.26**	0.14	1
		(80)	(80)	(44)	(56)	(44)	(46)	(80)	(80)	(80)
10	Ln GDP (PPP) (1990-2009)	0.27**	0.65***	-0.25*	-0.14	-0.69***	0.47***	-0.09	-0.15	-0.54***
		(80)	(80)	(44)	(56)	(44)	(46)	(80)	(80)	(80)

Note: Standardized coefficients are shown. *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.10$.

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